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ABSTRACT 
 
THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR: THE TURKISH CASE 
ÇAKAL, HÜSEYİN 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Nur Bilge Criss 
 
September, 2006 
 
 
 
This thesis aims to analyze the “contribution” of Turkey to the origins of the 
Cold War in the Middle East. The main argument of this thesis, in this context, is that 
the immediate post war environment in the middle east did not resemble something 
different from the years-old strategic environment in the middle east, main 
characteristic of which is continuous great power rivalry for hegemony over the 
region. At this juncture Turkey’s contribution happened to be a catalyst in the 
deterioration of the pragmatist wartime partnership between the Soviet Union and the 
Western Allies. Turkish policy makers stressed the power and inevitability of 
Russian attack in the event of lack of British and American opposition. During the 
period concerned, in the Middle East, the danger to the security of the free world did 
arise not so much from the threat of direct Soviet military aggression. It mainly 
aroused from continuation of the unfavorable historical trends.  Therefore, imperial 
rivalries and dynastic ambitions suffice to explain most part of the postwar situation 
in the Middle East and thereby gave enough clue for the origins of the Cold War in 
that part of the world. 
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ÖZET 
 
SOĞUK SAVAŞIN ORTADOĞU’DAKİ ÇIKIŞ KAYNAKLARI: TÜRKİYE 
OLAYI 
ÇAKAL, HÜSEYİN 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslarası İlişkiler 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Nur Bilge Criss 
 
Eylül, 2006 
 
 
 
Bu tez Soğuk Savaşın Ortadoğu’da çıkış kökenlerine Türkiye’nin katkısını 
analiz etmektir. Tezin temel savı, savaş sonrası Ortadoğu’daki uluslarası ortamın 
tarihsel büyük güç çekişmesinin devamı niteliğinde olduğu ve Türkiye’nin bu 
bağlamda katkısının büyük güçlerin savaş sırasında kurdukları pragmatist ilişkinin 
bozulmasında katalizör görevini yerine getirdiğidir. Türk politikacıları devamlı 
olarak savaş sonrası Sovyet gücünü ve Amerika ve İngiltere’nin bu güce karşı 
durmaması halinde Sovyet saldırısının kaçınılmaz olduğunu her ortamda 
vurgulamaya çalışmışlardır. Ancak, belirtilen dönemde Ortadoğu’da güvenlik tehdidi 
Sovyet askeri saldırısından çok tarihsel çıkar çatışmalarının devamından ortaya 
çıkmaktadır. Bu yüzden emperyalist çıkar çatışmaları ve bu çıkar çatışmalarından 
dolayı ortaya çıkan tehlikeli rekabet savaş sonrası Ortadoğu’da ortaya çıkan durumu 
açıklamak için yeterli olabilmekte ve bu bölgede Soğuk Savaşın kökenleri 
konusunda yeterli ipucu sağlamaktadır.  
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Ortadoğu, Köken, Soğuk Savaş, Rekabet.                                                
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
"The term -Middle East- is a 
geopolitical invention - void of any 
scientific basis." 1
 
 
 Before launching into the main current of the thesis, a question exists in 
relation to terminology, which is inescapable for a project involving the arbitrary 
term, “Middle East.” Although the scope of this thesis does not necessarily deal with 
as vast a topic as the postwar developments of the Middle East in great detail, it is, 
however, highly relevant to define clearly what the term “Middle East” means, given 
the centrality of this terminology to the subject discussed. Naturally this is not a 
simple question to investigate because of historical as well as contemporary 
complications and deepest issues it raises in itself. The question of terminology is a 
hard task since there has been no single, agreed definition of the geographic and 
political boundaries of the Middle East. There have been only sign posts for inquiry 
which have in turn opened up horizons for further inquiries. On the other side, 
involving a corollary question of whether the boundaries of this political rather than 
geographical area deemed to extend and include Turkey at least at the time span of 
this study leads this investigation into another terminological impasse.  
                                                 
1 Kaveh Farrokh, “What does the term “Middle East” Mean?;” available from 
http://www.rozanehmagazine.com/MarchApril06/AmiddleEast.html; Internet; accessed 27 March 2006. 
 1
 Throughout history the descriptive term of “Middle East” has been adopted 
by its inventors and employers for an amorphous geographical area of the world, 
embracing the original coastlands of the Persian Gulf to a broad region stretching 
from the Black Sea to equatorial Africa and from India to the Atlantic.2 This 
confusing term, therefore, had elastic political and geographic applications in 
international relations studies. Firuz Kazemzadeh put this case, in a sense criticizing 
the American Captain Alfred Mahan Thayer’s Middle East: “When used carelessly, 
it tends to create an imaginary unity where none exists in fact.”3 Due to this 
ambiguity, in each time period its definition has been changed- enlarged or shrunken- 
depending on the very interest of the employers of this term. 
 Any venture in defining the Middle East region and delimiting its boundaries, 
whether geographical or political has been a difficult task for every geographer, 
historian, journalist, and bureaucrat for several reasons. As a main reason there has 
been no official document that contained a definite definition of the Middle East as a 
geographical or political region. Rather every individual, institution or even the 
governments have employed their own practical criteria to define whatever they 
believed to be the Middle East region.4 The second reason of difficulties with 
delimitation of the boundaries of the Middle East might well be that there has been 
nothing in common in the region that keeps its constituent parts together.5 On the 
contrary, it has been characterized by national, linguistic, religious, ethnic and 
ideological lines that kept “the countries in the general area of the Middle East” away 
from building a regional union along these lines. As a natural result, it has never been 
a region in its own right, but rather a concept devised to serve the policies of 
                                                 
2 Bernard Lewis, The Middle East and the West (New York: Harper, 1966), 9.
3 Firuz Kazemzadeh, “The West and the Middle East,” World Politics 11 ( April 1959):468. 
4 Roderic H. Davison, “Where is the Middle East?,” Foreign Affairs 38 (July 1960):665. 
5 C.G. Smith, “Emergence of the Middle East”, Journal of Contemporary History 3 (July 1968):4; Peter Beaumont, Gerald Henry Blake, and J. 
Malcolm Wagstaff, eds. The Middle East: A Geographical Study (London: David Fulton, 1988), 4-6. 
 2
outsiders, and the concept changed its meaning in accordance with the security 
conceptions and practices of its employers.6  
Tracing back the origin of discussions about the term Middle East as a 
geographical, if not political, unit one ultimately has to go back to one of the 
architects of this popular term, not only in western countries but throughout the 
world, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan.7 Its origin was generally assumed, in academic 
circles, to be rooted in his article entitled “The Persian Gulf and International 
Relations,” published in the September 1902 issue of National Review. Yet over the 
years, different perspectives have emerged on the worth of his definition, but the 
usage of the term for this part of the world has gradually become widespread. Later 
on March 1, 1921, the first official endorsement of the term against the slightly older 
term “Near East” came by the establishment of the Middle Eastern Department in the 
Colonial Office by Winston Churchill.8 But it was not until the Second World War 
that the “term's practical as well as intellectual foothold”9 was given by “a series of 
accidents in military organization.”10 This wartime usage of the term gave rise to the 
popularity of the term both among official and academic circles and ordinary 
citizens.  
Meanwhile mainly as a consequence of the British military formations and 
their wartime area of responsibility during WWII, the slight distinction in the use of 
                                                 
6 Don Peretz, The Middle East Today, 6th ed. (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1994), 3; Pınar Bilgin, “Whose Middle East? Geopolitical 
Inventions and Practices of Security,” International Relations 18 (January 2004): 26; Davison, “Where is the Middle East?,”  669-70. 
7 In some writings General Sir Thomas Gordon, a British intelligence officer and director of the Imperial Bank of Persia from 1893 to 1914, was 
credited with coining the term “Middle East.” For detailed discussions, see C. R. Koppes, “Captain Mahan, General Gordon and the Origin of 
the Term ‘Middle East’, “ Middle East Studies 12 ( 1976): 95-8. 
8 Winston Churchill was then the Secretary of State for colonies, the United Kingdom. Davison, “Where is the Middle East?,” 668. 
9 Pınar Bilgin. “Inventing Middle Easts? The Making of Regions through Security Discourses,” in The Middle East in a Globalized World, eds. 
Bjørn Ulav Utvik and Knut S. Vikør (Bergen: Nordic Society for the Middle Eastern Studies, 2000), 13.  
10 Smith, “Emergence of the Middle East,” 6-8; Beaumont, Blake, and Wagstaff, Geographical Study, 1. By establishment of a British 
Command-in-Chief in Cairo and subsequent expanding of its interest area, “a very natural but regrettable misuse of the term Middle East that it 
may be difficult to avoid in the official histories of the war,” emerged, see George Clerk, “Address at the Annual General Meeting of the Society, 
Held on June 1944,” The Geographical Journal 104 (July - August 1944): 5. Also Winston Churchill in one of his books wrote that “I had 
always felt that the name ‘Middle East’ for Egypt, the Levant, Syria, and Turkey was ill-chosen. This was the Near East…,” quoted in Davison, 
“Where is the Middle East?,” 670.  
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the terms "Near" and "Middle" became much more blurred. Historically, the Near 
East referred to the territory east of Greece, including the Levant and Asia Minor, up 
to the eastern borders of Persia an Indus Valley, and from the Black Sea in the north 
to Egypt in the South.11 For a certain period it largely overlapped with territory of the 
Ottoman Empire before the First World War. But after a short “process of 
unnecessary assimilation”12 which was initiated around the second half of the 
nineteenth century especially by Mahan’s article, the term “Middle East” came to 
refer to different geographical and political areas during the war. The Near East 
comprised “the Balkans, Turkey, Rhodes and Dodecanese, Cyprus, Syria and the 
Lebanon, Palestine, and sometimes Egypt, whereas the Middle East comprised Iraq, 
Persia, Afghanistan, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, and the other countries of the 
Arabian Peninsula.”13 Nonetheless, some of these countries which had been 
previously known and appreciated under the term “Near East” came within the scope 
of these wartime British military formations during the war. These countries 
(including Turkey), after all, continued to be referred to especially by British 
statesmen as “Middle East” countries.14 Whereas the American government 
continued unconsciously its tradition to use the “Near East” to refer to “the countries 
in the general area of the Middle East” without offering any major distinction 
between the two terms.15
 
                                                 
11 Clerk, “Address,” 5.  
12 Percy Loraine, “Perspectives of the Near East,” The Geographical Journal 102 (July 1943): 6.  
13 This classification was made by Colonel Lawrence Martin, then Chief of the Division of Maps in the Library of Congress of the US. His 
demarcation was also agreed upon by the Geographical Society at its annual meeting in 1944 and decided to be used contrary to “official 
nomenclature.” Clerk, “Address,” 4-5. 
14 Peretz, 3. 
15 Aside from usage of these terms by public media in the US, there appeared an inconsistency in official usage of these terms. In an official 
report of American Department of State, it was mentioned that the term “Middle East” employed in this document “denote the general area 
comprising Greece, Turkey, Iran, the Arab states, and Israel.” On the other hand the traditional term ““Near East” applied only to the Arab 
states and Israel.” See Department of State Report, "Conference of Middle East Chiefs of Mission (Istanbul, February 14-21,1951):Agreed 
Conclusions and Recommendations," available from http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB78/docs.htm; Internet; accessed 3 May 
2006. 
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II 
 
Turkey has been no exception to this terminological chaos. Various terms 
were attributed especially by outsiders to designate the geographical and political 
niche of Turkey. While the term “Near East” or “Middle East” was generally used to 
designate the geographical area occupied by Turkey for a long time, these terms were 
recently supplanted, whenever appropriate by the term “Europe” especially after it 
started to take part in key Western institutions or in a recent usage by the Great(er) 
Middle East. This situation becomes more explicit when one deals with some special 
agencies of the United Nations or in regional offices of the Great powers principally 
involved in this region. In these institutions, the place of Turkey was referred to 
either in the relatively older terms of “Near East,” and “Middle East” or in “Europe.” 
Indicative of this attitude might well be the position of Turkey in the eyes of the US 
Department of State. While Turkish affairs had been under the jurisdiction of the 
Division of the Near Eastern Affairs of the US Department of State, it switched to 
the European Affairs Bureau in the 1970s.  
Eventually these terminological ambiguities emanated mainly from the geographical 
as well as geopolitical location of Turkey as a borderline case for all these 
terminological discussions. Although the content of this thesis is not strictly 
geographical in its context, strategic and political matters in the immediate post-
Second World War years were tremendously dependent on geostrategic 
circumstances. In this thesis, Turkey is assumed to be in the abstract boundaries of 
the Middle East. However, under the shadow of above mentioned terminological 
chaos, to place Turkey in the Middle East, at least at the transitional period the world 
was going through after the war, is bound to be arbitrary, and, therefore, needs 
justification. Looking at the international relations literature, governmental reports or 
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diplomatic correspondence between states about this region, Turkey has been 
included or excluded from this region depending on determinants such as historical 
background, culture, religion, ethnicity, or political alignment.  
This thesis is primarily interested in the perceived importance of the strategic 
geography occupied by Turkey in the immediate postwar years. The effects of these 
perceptions, along with other variables such as political and military aspirations of 
the Turkish governments which contributed to the origins of the Cold War in this 
part of the world, will be discussed. Determinants used for the Turkish Cold War 
assumptions here are necessarily different from those who would wish to use other 
levels of analysis. Given the case this study’s determinants would firstly be the 
political and economic policies of the Great Powers in that part of the world, where 
Turkey was at first, out of necessary, considered in the Middle East and secondly, the 
place of Turkey for military planning purposes of Washington and London.  
However, it should be noted here that Turkey, regardless of its geographical 
location as a borderline case, though the bulk of its landmass is geographically 
located in Asia, has always denied belonging to the Middle East. Since its inception 
in 1923, Turkey, under the leadership of Kemal Atatürk, took the West as a model 
for its development and initiated an extensive program of cultural Westernization. 
The new Republic also put itself in a radical cultural and political transformation in 
order to break its historical links with the Ottoman Empire and for the family of 
nations along with westernized principles.16 As a result, Turkey took a great leap on 
the way of westernization and it presented a transition from the Near (Middle) East 
realm to the European realm because of its proximity in ideological terms, and its 
political affiliation with the West.  
                                                 
16 For more detailed information about this subject, see Çiğdem Nas, “Turkish Identity and the Perception of Europe,” Marmara Journal of 
European Studies 9 ( January 2001): 177-90; Halil İnalcık, “Turkey between Europe and the Middle East,” Foreign Policy (Ankara) (July 1980): 
7-16. 
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On the other hand, apart from the problem of political and cultural identity, 
Turkey continued to be construed in the Middle East realm due to its representations 
by the leading powers of the western world in postwar security arrangements. In 
other words, in the immediate postwar years strategic and regional security 
considerations were of such importance as to override other considerations which 
linked Turkey with the West. From the perspective of most Western countries, 
“Turkey was the only European country in this part of the world” and a security actor 
in the Middle East rather than in Europe.17 When Turkey first applied for 
membership in NATO, it was rejected by the United States and Great Britain on the 
premises that “Turkey did not belong either to Western Europe or the Atlantic and 
consequently it could not join the Atlantic regional group.”18 Indeed it was mainly 
Great Britain who was enthusiastic about dragging Turkey into its schemes for some 
kind of regional defense pact in the Middle East separate from a defense pact in 
Western Europe and after NATO was established, it was anxious to block Turkey's 
entry into it.19
The ambiguity regarding where Turkey belonged, brings with it the question 
of on what basis the countries are “located” in specific regions. Pınar Bilgin argues 
that “which states are covered in one spatial conception and omitted from another is 
indicative of one's conception of security, perception of threat, and the political 
project s/he upholds.”20 The security agenda of both American and British 
                                                 
17 Feridun Cemal Erkin, Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl: Anılar-Yorumlar, vol.1, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1987), 159; Bernard Lewis, 
“Discussion on Turkey between Middle East and Europe,” Foreign Policy (Ankara) (July 1980): 17. He quoted a conversation that took place in 
the early days of NATO between the Chief of the British General Staff, Field Marshal Slim and Turkish Generals in which the Field Marshal 
frequently referred several times to “Here in the Middle East” which rather annoyed the Turkish Generals and eventually one of them said,” But 
Field Marshal, you must remember that Turkey is a European country.” To which Marshal Slim said, “Yes, of course we all know that. The 
problem is that Turkey is the only European country in this part of the world.”  
18 E. Athanassopoulou, “Western Defense Developments and Turkey's Search for Security in 1948,” Middle Eastern Studies 32 (April 1996): 
101; Knox Helm, “Turkey and Her Defence Problems,” International Affairs 40 (October 1954): 437-8. 
19 For a comprehensive account for this subject, see Behçet K. Yeşilbursa, “Turkey’s Participation in the Middle East Command and its 
Admission to NATO, 1950-52,” Middle Eastern Studies 35 (October 1999): 70-102. 
20 For detailed elaboration, see Bilgin, “Making of Regions,” 10-37. 
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administrations required to involve Turkey in a settlement comprising Middle 
Eastern countries rather than NATO. Great Britain’s concerns about military 
arrangements in the Middle East and placing Turkey in the middle of these 
arrangements appeared as the main reason for identification of Turkey as a Middle 
East country. By this way, Great Britain tried to justify its insistence in the postwar 
era to drag Turkey into their Middle East security arrangements. Therefore, Turkey, 
in the years following the Second World War, found itself described as one of the 
Middle East rather than as a Western region. Western powers including the US 
characterized Turkey by its geostrategic position as a “buffer zone” against Soviet 
expansionism to the Middle East area. Moreover, Turkey, itself, used its strategic 
conjuncture in order to seek protection from the West and argued that its 
geographical position made it the key to the Middle East.21 In sum, Turkey’s 
perceived importance was related to the Middle East rather than Europe at least till 
the mid-1950s when Turkey’s place for the security of Europe was gradually 
accepted as a fact.  
Given the above mentioned fact, the question of the “contribution” of Turkey 
to the origins of the Cold War in the Middle East has been a source of scholarly 
debate among historians and international relations experts. On the one side of the 
debate, there are those, who emphasize how Turkey was “victimized” in the 
immediate post-war period vis-à-vis Soviet threats and demands and how the 
“guardian angel” of the free world, the United States of America came to Turkey’s 
aid in order to protect this freedom-loving country, which was brave enough to stand 
on its own feet vis-à-vis the “evil” Soviets.22 On the other side, there are those, who 
                                                 
21 Mustafa Aydın, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War,” Middle Eastern 
Studies (January 2000): 108. 
22 There is no shortage of literature on the cold war’s origins. Turkey, however, does not seem to have received a similar degree of attention in 
this growing literature. Its position has been covered briefly in most of the standard accounts of the origins of the Cold War and has not been 
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refuse to be naïve as to intentions of United States and assert that the state of 
relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey provided a good pretext for those 
American decision makers, who believed in the necessity of enhancing US interest 
towards the Middle East.23 The ideas of the first camp can easily be referred to as the 
orthodox view whereas the ideas of the second camp have a lot in common with the 
revisionist view. This thesis aims to display that Turkish perceptions as to Soviet 
intentions on Turkey and the consequent foreign policy pursued by it provided the 
United States and its western allies with a good opportunity to enhance the strategic 
interests of the West vis-à-vis the East. This main argument is based on the 
understanding that the post War regional and international context was, in principle, 
not new to Turkey.  
Firstly, the western interest in the Middle East and the policies pursued by the 
West to gain control of the region vis-à-vis the strategic rival, i.e. the Tsarist Russia, 
was not new. What was new was the primary actor promoting such policies. The end 
of the Second World War caused the replacement of Great Britain with the United 
                                                                                                                                          
subject to systematic and scholarly research. See for example, Altemur Kılıç, Turkey and the World (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1959); 
Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Soviet Policy toward Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan: The Dynamics of Influence (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), 4-
7; Ferenc Vali, Bridge Across the Bosporus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971); George Kirk, 
The Middle East, 1945-1950 (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), 21-56; Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol.1: Years of 
Decisions, 1945 (Great Britain: Hodder and Stoughton, 1955-1956), 303-5, 312-4, 338; and Memoirs, vol.2: Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-
1953 (Great Britain: Hodder and Stoughton, 1955-1956), 98-115; John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 
1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 336-52; John C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American 
Policy (New York: Harper, 1958), 154-82. Only exception to this can be Bruce Kuniholm’s book, Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: 
Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). In his book, Kuniholm, relying 
almost entirely on American archival sources and documents, placed his emphasis on regional developments in the Near East and evolution of 
American foreign policy toward Turkey along with Greece and Iran. Exploring the developments in Greece, Turkey and Iran in the immediate 
post-war era, he tried to put the origins of the Cold War in that part of the world within “Great Power” rivalry. While he made it clear the 
influence of great power interests on the origins of the Cold War, he focused traditional Soviet patterns of pursuing national interests in that 
region and assumed the American response as the result of Soviet intimidation. 
23 Interesting examples of one form or another of the “revisionist” argument can be found in Barton J. Bernstein, “American Foreign Policy and 
the Origins of the Cold War,” in Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration, ed. Barton J. Bernstein (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), 
56-57; David J. Alvarez, Bureaucracy and Cold War Diplomacy: The United States and Turkey, 1943-1946 (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan 
Studies, 1980); Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1972), 218-45; George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950 (Boston: An Atlantic Monthly Press Book, 1967), 317; Melvyn P. 
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States. On the other hand, the strategic rival was also not new: Tsarist Russia was 
replaced by the Soviet Union owing to a regime change in this country. Nevertheless, 
this regime change could not alter the long-standing strategic objectives of Russian 
foreign policy towards this region. All in all, Western-Russian rivalry in the Middle 
East was not new. 
Secondly, Russian foreign policy rhetoric toward Turkey was also not new. 
What was new was the way Turkey perceived the possible outcome of such rhetoric. 
Despite the provisional interwar “peace” between the Soviet Union and Turkey 
owing to conjunctural international circumstances, the commence of the Second 
World War brought traditional Russian foreign policy rhetoric vis-à-vis Turkey back 
to the international scene. Nevertheless, Turkish perceptions regarding this rhetoric 
were quite different in 1945 than it had been in 1939. In a nutshell, except the 
interwar period, Turkey had always been “victimized” by Russian/Soviet strategic 
intentions and threats. However, because the United States was a newcomer to the 
Middle East, the state of Turco-Soviet affairs was a new pretext for it to get involved 
in regional affairs. 
Given the above mentioned reasons, it is not easy to say that the US came to 
aid Turkey because it was bound to defend a freedom-loving nation. Thus, it is easier 
to argue that the US had already intended to get involved in Middle Eastern affairs in 
order to fill the vacuum created by the withdrawal of Great Britain from the region. 
Secondly, the US intended to prevent a possible Soviet penetration into the Middle 
East, which had already gained a favorable position on the world scene by 
establishing effective control on central and eastern European countries. In this 
context it was natural to support a country which stood just in between the Soviet 
sphere of influence and the Middle East, such as Turkey. If Turkey was not that 
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eager to place itself in the Western camp, the US would probably have to sustain 
much more political and economic effort to gain Turkish support. Besides, US 
containment strategy would become much harder to sustain in the case of a possible 
Turkish opposition against American demands. Thus, Turkish plea for help against 
the “new Soviet threat” rendered American penetration into Turkey rational, easier 
and cost-effective.  
As indicated above in this chapter, this thesis aims to analyze the 
“contribution” of Turkey to the origins of the Cold War in the Middle East. The main 
argument of this thesis, in this context, is that Turkey’s contribution to the origins of 
the Cold War in the Middle East was not of primary significance, in the sense that it 
only facilitated American penetration into the region. This argument is based on the 
fact that the immediate post war environment in the middle east did not resemble 
something different from the years-old strategic environment in the middle east, 
main characteristic of which is continuous great power rivalry for hegemony over the 
region. Thus, Turkey’s role as regional power was limited to maintain its survival 
amidst this great power rivalry. Turkey preferred to be in the Western camp in this 
rivalry for reasons to be explained later in the following chapters and thus, 
contributed to easier American penetration in the region.  
In the light of these above mentioned arguments, this thesis focuses on the 
questions of the origins of the Cold War in general, the role of Middle Eastern affairs 
was in the onset of the Cold War, the strategic environment in the Middle East in the 
immediate post war era and the contribution of Turkey to the onset of the Cold War. 
This research depends mainly on detailed analysis of relevant primary sources. The 
writings of prominent authors on the Cold War were also analyzed and used in this 
study. The first chapter analyses the sources of great power rivalry in Middle East, 
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whereas the second chapter focuses on Turkey’s position in the Middle East in the 
immediate post war era.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
 
SOURCES OF GREAT POWER RIVALRY  
IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
 
 
 
2.1 Interpretations of Great Power Rivalry in the Middle East 
 
“The successful termination of war 
against our [U.S.A.] enemies will find a 
world profoundly changed in respect of 
relative national military strengths, a 
change more comparable indeed with that 
occasioned by the fall of Rome than with 
any other change occurring during the 
succeeding fifteen hundred years.”24
 
At the conclusion of the Second World War, the elimination of Germany as 
well as Japan - economic and military powers of the pre-war world from the 
international arena, and the displacement of the old Great powers of Europe to less 
significant positions altogether altered the international arena to the advantage of the 
two formerly isolationist and isolated powers, the United States and Soviet Union 
respectively, and thereby, paved the way for them to step into the international scene 
as major world powers with overwhelming military preponderance. In addition to the 
novelty of that new systemic factor in the international order, there was also a 
complex situation, completely different from the pre-war multi-centric era in which 
either power could defeat one of these powers due to their relative strength and 
                                                 
24 US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, vol.1, Memorandum by the Chief of Staff to the Secretary of State: 
Fundamental Military Factors in Relation to Discussions Concerning Territorial Trusteeships and Settlements, (Washington: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1966), 701-2 (hereafter cited as FRUS followed by appropriate year, volume, and page). 
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geographic positions.25 Nevertheless, a continuing danger of war existed at any time 
and geography in the “world island.” The new world order, politically and militarily 
polarized around these two superpowers, therefore, can easily be described with the 
concocted a former slogan of an original Soviet leader, Leon Trotsky, “No war and 
no peace.” 26
The Cold War was the longest and one of the most frustrating experiences for 
the history of humanity and it virtually dominated the entire second half of the 
twentieth century. Historians paid little attention to understand the key elements of 
this period, especially of its early stages. Consequently, no comprehensive work 
emerged among a large amount of literature about the origins that leave us with a 
sufficiently clear and unambiguous view of that historical epoch. In that sense a great 
deal of confusion about that phenomenon arises from a certain sense of uncertainty 
about its key questions. That is partly due to a lack of a multi-archival research, 
which was impossible to do for the Cold War historians. Since the archives of 
Warsaw Pact countries 27 and many other countries which played a key role at the 
onset of the Cold War such as Turkey were kept closed to scholarly inspection, a 
great deal of Cold War debate remains inconclusive. The cold war historians, 
therefore, still know very little about the motivations behind the Soviet foreign policy 
during the postwar years that had direct policy impacts when compared with 
available information from the U.S.A. Only reports of speeches and interviews 
granted by the Soviet leaders bestowed the historians the chance of drawing some 
conclusions about Soviet motives.  
                                                 
25 Ibid. 
26 William Henry Chamberlin, “The Cold War: A Balance Sheet,” Russian Review 9 (April 1950): 85-6. 
27 Despite the selective opening of archives in Moscow and former Warsaw Pact countries, there are still classification restrictions on 
important Soviet primary sources. 
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Many Cold War historians (indeed many of them of American origin), who 
dealt with that phenomenon in this situation of uncertainty, offered a number of 
interpretations in order to provide definitive answers to significant questions 
regarding the origins and evolution of the Cold War. These interpretations were 
generally categorized into three essential schools of Cold War historiography; 
namely, the “traditionalist” or “orthodox,” “revisionist” and “post-revisionist.” The 
focal issue of former schools of interpretations in Cold War literature had mostly 
been about the effort to establish culpability on either side while seeking to explain 
the motives and intentions behind their foreign policies and the interactions between 
them. In the 1970s a new dimension of interpretation was pioneered by John Lewis 
Gaddis.  
In the traditional or orthodox school of Cold War historiography that 
dominated the international literature in Western countries at the height of the Cold 
War, there was the stark tendency to place responsibility in some way for everything 
that took place in the immediate post war years upon the ideologically driven 
expansionist Soviet Union. The traditionalists, as natural allies in furthering official 
history written by contemporary American policymakers,28 put the very premise that 
the US along with Great Britain29 in the immediate years following the Second 
World War had to implement a firm policy towards the Soviet Union after 
“realizing” the hard fact that Moscow would not cooperate in the postwar effort to 
                                                 
28 The spadework of this Cold Work historiography had already been done by “those who were waging it” and “felt obliged to defend their 
views.” Therefore the question of the Cold War, for a considerable time, became as an issue more than academics with few exceptions but for 
policymakers at that time. Brian Thomas, “Cold War Origins II,” Journal of Contemporary History 3 (January 1968): 183. The books and 
articles written by those who assumed several positions in the administration during these crucial years for beginning of the Cold War still 
dominates the orthodox interpretation. 
29 In most cases, the US and the Soviet Union were assumed as the main actors in the Cold War while the role of the Great Britain at least 
behind the curtain was mostly neglected. Therefore a British contribution to the emergence of the Cold War should be taken into account. Terry 
H. Anderson, The United States, Great Britain, and the Cold War, 1944-1947 (Columbia& London: University of Missouri Press, 1981); Henry 
Butterfield Ryan, The Vision of Anglo-American: The US-UK Alliance and the Emerging Cold War, 1943-1946 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987); Ray Merrick, “The Russia Committee of the British Foreign Office and the Cold War, 1946-7,” Journal of 
Contemporary History (July 1985): 453-68 
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construct a peaceful world order as supposed during the war. All that was done by 
the anti-communist camp, under the natural leadership of the US, therefore, was a 
mere reaction to a number of Soviet acts posing a threat to the “free world.” 
According to their contentions, Soviet Russia alone, under the leadership of “power-
hungry” dictator Stalin, was inherently expansionist and operated on the basis of the 
belief in this historically destined conflict between the Soviet Union and the United 
States and other Western countries.30 Stalin, most of them argued, aimed to impose 
communism around the globe by employing military aggression as well as fifth-
column penetration and subversion. Thus, most of the blame for the responsibility for 
the outbreak and evolution of that historical epoch that bedeviled the world for half a 
century, was attributed solely to the Soviet Union.  
Later in the 1960s, after historians of the orthodox school had made serious 
intellectual headway with their interpretation, a new epoch in cold war 
historiography was opened by the so-called revisionist historians. They challenged 
the uncritically accepted orthodox accounts of “official history” and the “myths” of 
that official historiography. Different from their traditionalist counterparts, 
revisionist historians added the more sophisticated and formerly unquestioned issues 
of economic and atomic bomb into the scope of inquiry, and reversed the blame for 
the responsibility for igniting the post war conflict, though not all, principally on the 
United States. Some radical revisionist historians, following the contentions of 
Williams and Kolko,31 stressed that instead of democratic principles and ideals, 
“provocative” and “imperialistic” policies of Washington caused the Cold War. Such 
policies were shaped by economic motives, especially in search for markets, raw 
                                                 
30 Raymond L. Garthoff. “Estimating Soviet Military Intentions and Capabilities,” in Watching the Bear: Essays on CIA’s Analysis of the Soviet 
Union, eds. Gerald K. Haines and Robert E. Leggett (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2003); available from 
http://www.cia.gov/csi/books/watchingthebear/article05.html; Internet; accessed 10 January 2006. 
31 William Appleman Williams, Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: W.W. Norton, 1962); Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of 
Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).  
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materials, and investment opportunities described as “open door” diplomacy. Its 
unilateral actions in order to shape the postwar world order, in which liberal 
capitalism could flourish, had been the determining force behind the American 
diplomacy in postwar era. Thus, accepting as the traditionalists did, though at 
minimized and to a limited level, some provocative conducts of Stalin in postwar 
years, which were contrary to the spirit of the Yalta Declaration, they rejected the 
illusion of the traditionalists that the nature of the Soviet dictatorship had changed.32 
They argued that the Soviet Union did not have a “master plan” in the postwar era 
such as “world revolution,” but instead a search for security in its alleged cordon 
sanitaire, what in other terms was called by some revisionist scholars, “the legitimate 
interests of the USSR.”33 The Cold War was, therefore, caused not due to Russia’s 
expansionist or imperialistic policies after the war, as argued hitherto by 
traditionalists, but conversely the Cold War was the cause of Russia’s expansionist or 
imperialistic policies.34 In other words, unjustifiable Soviet acts in the postwar era 
were indeed a reaction to external challenge, notably earlier aggressive moves on the 
part of Washington and London, and, therefore, simply defensive in nature. Should 
the legitimate interests of Moscow were recognized and should American politicians 
had not been mesmerized by the monopoly of Atomic bomb, most of them argued, a 
kind of compromise could have been anticipated. 
While a continuing debate between traditionalist and revisionist historians 
had been taking place in the historiography of the Cold War, a new school of 
interpretation emerged in the 1970s, labeled “post-revisionism,” and was pioneered 
                                                 
32 James P. Warburg, “Cold War Tragedy,” The Western Political Quarterly 7 (September 1954): 326. 
33 Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Plesbakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1996), passim; John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), passim; 
Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
34 Thomas, “Cold War,” 184-5. 
 17
by John Lewis Gaddis.35 The historians in this school supported traditionalists or 
revisionists in some issues or refuted some of their contentions and thereby tried, to 
some extent, to draw a synthesis. Nonetheless, post-revisionist historians put much 
more emphasis not only on the evolution of the “Grand Alliance” during wartime, 
but also on the determinants of foreign policy addendum regarding economic 
considerations in the postwar era or ideological motives the for post war world order 
of the US. The major representative of this school, John Lewis Gaddis, counted these 
forces- “domestic politics, bureaucratic inertia, quirks of personality, perceptions, 
accurate or inaccurate, of Soviet intentions”- in addition to the economic forces to 
analyze the evolution of the American policy toward the Soviet Union.36 More 
emphasis on war time diplomacy, and many other foreign policy forces gave the 
opportunity to comprehend the intentions and motives of each members of the 
“Grand Alliance,” which, in turn, paved the way for post war conflict. Deviating 
slightly from culpability, post-revisionists, however, positioned themselves nearer 
the orthodox view than the revisionists.37
Cold War historiography of Turkey, whether written by indigenous or 
American scholars reflect the orthodox view.38 Given the timeframe when these 
works were published- at the height of the Cold War- and limited access on the 
which part of the Turkish scholars to documents have since become available this is 
understandable. 
However, it is more than timely to take a fresh look, under new evidence, at 
the origins of the Cold War in the Near/Middle East, to place the issue in a larger, 
                                                 
35 John Lewis Gaddis, “The Emerging Post-Revisionist Thesis on the Origin of the Cold War,” Diplomatic History (Summer 1983): 171-90. 
36 Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, viii. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Bruce Kuniholm, Paul Henze, John Lewis Gaddis, Harry Howard, Ritchie Ovendale, Altemur Kılıç, Alvin Z. Rubinstein.  
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rather than regional context. The following sections will look at the dynamics of 
British, American and Soviet politics toward the Near/Middle East. 
 
2.2  The Position of the Great Britain 
 
The Middle East was not a constituent part of the Commonwealth of the 
British Empire. Whereas that part of the world has been assumed, since the 
beginning of the twentieth century, in the British strategic perimeter. The areas 
especially in close proximity to the Suez Canal carried a second-to-none position 
with the exception of British Isles and India for the United Kingdom.39 This strategic 
importance of the area was underscored at the beginning of both world wars, when 
scanty British reserves of men and material were sent to the Suez Canal zone, as an 
imperial line of communication, at “their blackest hour of peril.”40 However, the 
strategic importance of this region was not peculiar to the British Commonwealth. In 
a broader context, every power that had an instinct for world domination showed 
keen interest in this strategic area and thereby put its expansionist eyes on that part of 
the world. These interested powers naturally needed to risk much to put that part of 
the world under their political and military control, for neither Power showed 
corollary interests in each other. The very result, as historically proven, happened to 
be continuing rivalry for the Middle East. According to Sir Percy Loraine:  
…the economic life of this world depends on keeping open the east-west 
or, shall I say the horizontal communications, and whenever an attempt 
has been made to cut across, or drive a wedge of forces across the 
horizontal line of communications, there has been a bitter and bloody 
war.41
 
                                                 
39 Ritchie Ovendale, Britain, the United States and the Transfer of Power in the Middle East, 1945-1962 (London and New York: Leicester 
University Press, 1996), 2.
40 Foreign Office (hereafter FO) 371 / 52346, British Policy is in the Melting Pot - Can We Recast it in a New and Stronger Mould?, 11 May 
1946; Elizabeth Monroe, “British Interests in the Middle East,” The Middle Eastern Journal 2 (April 1948): 132. 
41 Loraine, “Perspectives,” 11. He represented Great Britain as Minister to Tehran, High Commissioner for Egypt & Ambassador to Turkey in 
different periods. 
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While this kind of explanation is not enough to cover every aspect of 
historical conflict in regard to the Middle East, it might be enough to explain a great 
deal of conflict in modern Middle East, in which the Ottoman Empire as the sole 
sovereign authority along with interested powers, namely Russia and Britain played 
greater roles. In this contemporary era, the “Eastern Question” had dominated both 
Middle Eastern international affairs and great power rivalry in the strategic areas of 
the Middle East.42  
Although it was generally confessed by British policymakers that “there were 
large portions which interested Russia much more than England and vice versa” in 
areas “which drains into the Black Sea, together with the drainage valley of the 
Euphrates as far as Bagdad,”43 as a least interested power, British government had 
many good reasons for not letting any other power having a dominant position in that 
part of the world. Among others, two factors largely determined the place of the 
Middle East area in British imperial policies. Firstly, no subject commanded more 
British interest and thus became a prime factor than the geographical position of the 
region as a communication hub at the junction of three continents. Geographically, 
the area along with Northern Africa was stationed on the lifeline stretching from the 
British Isles to India. However, it was after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 
that that part of the world jumped on “second-to-none position” for the defense of the 
British Empire. From the point of view of communication, the Suez Canal provided 
the shortest route from Europe to India and constituted the “gem of the British 
                                                 
42 The Eastern Question in 19th century can be summed up in general terms as the result of the conflicts between national and imperial 
interests of the Great powers over the Ottoman territory. Russian Empire along with Austria Empire thrust upon the Ottoman Empire in order to 
have access by water to the Mediterranean; British cause to maintain the security of the communication line to India either from Ottoman or 
Russia and finally the desire of especially non-Muslim population in the Ottoman Empire for independence. Some other scholars sum up the 
Eastern Question as merely ‘the Straits Question’. Nonetheless, it would be imprecise to assume that the classical “Eastern Question” followed 
a consistent pattern throughout the history. 
43 G.P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds. British Documents on the Origin of the War, 1898-1914, vol.1, (London: His Majesty’s Stationery 
Office, 1927), 8. 
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imperial system.”44 Therefore, looking at the evolution of British interests toward 
this region, to an extent that affected British policy, it is not a coincidence that the 
interests of Great Britain in the Middle East grew after nearly the same period when 
its colonial interests concentrated on India.45 Concomitantly, traditional British 
policy in the Middle East centered on the hard core of Empire’s defense, with an 
emphasis on this line of communication.46  
While this prime factor remained constant throughout the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries until the end of the war, the pattern of strategy pursued by the 
Whitehall in order to maintain the defense of this horizontal communication line 
continuously was attuned according to changing world power issues in that part of 
the world. Till the outbreak of the First World War, British policy, therefore, 
concentrated on a policy that would preserve intact the status quo in the Middle East 
with an emphasis on the Persian Gulf area.47 In this respect, Her Majesty’s 
Government (Queen Victoria r. 1837-1901) sought to preserve the balance of power 
by upholding the sole nominal power in the most part of the region - the Ottoman 
Empire - as a buffer state against southward expansionist aspirations of Russia. 
British concern was obvious. It preferred to maintain a weak Empire on the way of 
its communication line rather than to deal with any other possible powers. Great 
Britain, therefore, employed its mastery in diplomacy to prevent any nation from 
becoming strong enough to dominate the Ottoman Empire. Suffice it to say, keeping 
                                                 
44 Jacop Abadi, Britain’s Withdrawal from the Middle East: The Economic and Strategic Imperatives, 1947-1971 (Princeton, New Jersey: The 
Kingston Press, 1982), xiii-xiv. The Suez Canal across the Isthmus of Suez links two seas- Mediterranean and Red Sea. It was completed by 
the French but the British government purchased substantial shareholding in the Suez Canal.  
45 Halfrod L. Hoskins, The Middle East: Problem Area in World Politics (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957), 6-7; William Hale and Ali 
İhsan Bağış, eds. Four Centuries of Turco-British Relations: Studies in Diplomatic, Economic and Cultural Affairs (North Humberside: The 
Eothen Press, 1984), 2. 
46 Abadi, xiii-xiv; FRUS, 1947, vol. 5, Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State: The British and American Positions, 511. 
47 For a background information, see George E. Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East: From the Rise of Islam to Modern Times 
(Washington, DC.: Public Affairs, 1949); Hoskins, Middle East.; George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, 4th ed. (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1980); Elizabeth Monroe, Britain’s Moment in the Middle East, 1914-1956 (Baltimore: The John Hopkins 
Press, 1963). 
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the weak Ottoman Empire strong enough against other powers, and playing with the 
balance of power in the region according to the changing international 
circumstances, the British governments succeeded in preventing any power from 
having a dominant position in that region, practically until 1912.  
Meanwhile, the British were not reluctant to take advantage of the Empire’s 
weakness in those areas deemed important for the defense of the communication line. 
For this end, British policymakers made use of every opportunity in order to put the 
defense of the line on a sound footing and creating their own defense system. 
Acquisition of Malta at the Congress of Vienna by Great Britain in 1814 was 
followed by assuming the administration of Cyprus during the Russo-Ottoman war of 
1877-78. There followed, in 1883, British occupation of the Nile Valley under the 
justification of crushing ongoing Arab rebellion. Naturally, all these outposts added 
much to the security interests of Great Britain in the Middle East. 
Secondly, quite apart from these strategic interests, oil became an additional 
and vital economic stake for the British Empire after dependence on oil rose 
dramatically in the early twentieth century. While importance of oil as a marketable 
commodity had began to be perceived since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, 
it did not have a high priority in the hierarchy of British imperial objectives in regard 
to the Middle East until WWI. Thus, the real factor that gave Middle Eastern oil a 
rating in the course of British foreign policy and thereby security considerations 
concerning the Middle East had to do with mainly the development of the Royal 
Navy. Among others, Sir Winston Churchill, then first Lord of Admiralty, was the 
dynamo that produced the necessary vigor. His role in regard to this issue came from 
his “epoch-making,” but “risky for his nation” decision in 1913 that stimulated the 
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transition of the Royal Navy from coal to oil.48 The historical significance of this 
decision was reflected in the Oil & Gas Investor's special issue on the "100 Most 
Influential People of the Petroleum Century,” as: 
By the summer of 1914, the British Navy was fully committed to oil, and 
the government had assumed the role of Anglo-Persian's majority 
stockholder. For the first time, oil had become an instrument of national 
policy and a strategic commodity. It has remained so ever since.49
 
Technically speaking, there was no question that oil as fuel had countless 
advantages compared to coal. However, a switch from coal to oil had also many 
strategic implications for the imperial policies of Great Britain toward the Middle 
East. Contrasted with the coal resources at its disposal, Great Britain was extremely 
poor in oil resources. This great disadvantage was, of course, foreseen by Churchill. 
“The oil supplies of the world were in the hands of vast oil trusts under foreign 
control. To commit the navy irrevocably to oil was indeed to take arms against a sea 
of troubles…”50 As a solution, the British government “bought,” on May 20, 1914, 
51 per cent of the shares in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (a fully British firm 
operating in Persia) in order to safeguard sufficient supply of fuel oil to the Royal 
Navy at a reasonable price.51 By then, the British were in occupation of southern 
Persia. 
By this linking up of British naval power with the oil resources of the Middle 
East, the area assumed new importance for the Whitehall. Henceforth, maintaining 
oil supply both in time of peace and war started to become one of the principle 
features in British Middle Eastern policies. The vital aspect of oil in the persecution 
of war was appreciated, without doubt, by the First World War as attested by Lord 
                                                 
48 Hoskins, Middle East, 199; Erik J. Dahl, “Naval Innovation: From Coal to Oil,” Joint Force Quarterly 27 (Winter 2000-2001): 50-6. 
49 “100 Most Influential People of the Petroleum Century,” Oil and Gas Investor 20, Special Issue (2000). 
50 Winston Churchill, The World Crisis, vol.1, (New York: Scribner’s, 1923), 133-6. 
51 Benjamin Shwadran, The Middle East Oil and the Great Powers (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985), 19. By that time, Burmah 
Oil Company owned 97% of its ordinary shares. The rest were owned by Lord Strathcona, the company's first chairman. 
 23
Curzon's oft-quoted remark that “Truly posterity will say that Allies floated to 
victory on a wave of oil.”52 However, increasing significance of oil beyond its 
importance as a trading commodity, brought to the fore some strategic questions of 
fundamental nature in execution of war. Because, the need for sufficient petroleum 
reserves for long-sustained military effort was no longer open to question not only 
for the British Empire but for any world power. Consequently, the struggle for 
acquiring oil concessions in the Middle Eastern areas intensified, which, in turn, 
aggravated Middle East international relations and great power rivalry concerning 
that part of the world. 
While the increasing importance of oil in peace and more especially in war 
added a new momentum to British Middle Eastern policy. The most influential 
change had to do with this policy at the outbreak of the First World War as a result of 
Ottoman Empire’s participation in the war on the side of the Central Powers. 
Naturally, it created a “diplomatic paradox” for Great Britain since it had to abandon 
its traditional policy of preserving the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire at 
any rate as long as it served its own interests.53 For the Whitehall, a new policy, in 
any case, necessitated the partition of the Ottoman territory. Therefore, shortly after 
the outbreak of War, the Whitehall initiated to shape the future of the Middle Eastern 
politics according to its own interests.  
In this context, the British government made “contradictory” commitments 
both to the Zionists and Arab nationalists, which would, as realized in later decades, 
had far-reaching implications for the instability of the region, in order to gain their 
military and political support in the British war effort against the Triple Alliance. To 
the Arabs, Great Britain pledged that it would “recognize and support the 
                                                 
52 Cited in Daniel Yergin, The Prize (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 183. 
53 The British Middle Eastern policy, at least until the last decade before the First World War, had been that they did not “aim at no partition of 
territory, but only partition of preponderance.” See Gooch and Temperley, British Documents, 8; Lenczowski, Middle East in World Affairs, 74. 
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independence of the Arabs in all regions within the limits demanded by the Sherif of 
Mecca.” To the Zionists, a far-reaching promise was made, with the Balfour 
declaration of 1917, for support in “the establishment in Palestine of a national home 
for the Jewish people.”54  
During the same period, the British government did not waste any time to 
make secret arrangements with other Entente powers, in which the areas nominally 
under Ottoman sovereignty were divided into respective parcels suiting their long 
term imperialistic objectives in the postwar world.55 The first set of these secret 
arrangements was the Constantinople Agreement, drawn up over several diplomatic 
exchanges between Great Britain and France on the one hand, and Russia on the 
other. This arrangement was of great significance because it completely reversed the 
traditional western policy in regard to the Straits and realized Russians’ “time-
honored aspirations” concerning the Middle East.56 Also, this agreement alone was 
enough to indicate, without doubt, to what extent the Whitehall was “compelled,”57 
by virtue of the war, to set aside its traditional Middle East policy. For this 
arrangement “involved a complete reversal of the traditional policy” of Great Britain 
and was “in direct opposition to the opinions and sentiment at one time universally 
held in England and which have still by no means died out.”58  
However it should be noted that, Great Britain had not refrained from making 
arrangements with the Russians, whenever British desiderata elsewhere was 
considered bearing more strategic importance. But, more specifically, the Whitehall 
thought making arrangements “mutually beneficial,” with Russia over common 
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areas, to control the limits of Russian expansionist aspirations in the direction of its 
sphere of interest. Still before the Anglo-Russian Convention in 1907 concerning 
Persia, in a telegram transmitted in 1898 to British Minister at Constantinople, Sir N. 
O’Conor by the Marquess of Salisbury, a policy of “partition of preponderance” over 
the territory of the Ottoman Empire (and China) was put forward as the tenet of a 
possible understanding with Russia.59
Whereas the Tripartite (commonly known as the Sykes-Picot) agreement was 
of greater significance since it carried the lion’s share among other wartime secret 
arrangements not only for the future political life of the Middle East but also for 
postwar British Middle Eastern policy. It was signed between Great Britain and 
France with the consent of Russia on May 16, 1916.60 Under the terms of this secret 
agreement, the general area of the post-Ottoman Middle East, which had already 
been allocated for an independent Arab unity as mentioned above, was divided into 
spheres of influence to suit the two European powers’ long term strategic interests. 
Literally, the agreement divided the area, without any reference to the inhabitants, 
into the areas (A) France and (B) Great Britain. However, the text of agreement 
would seem to suggest, without doubt, that the matters adjusted were purely 
imperialistic in character61 and gave no sincere thought to the region’s stability. On 
the contrary, as proved by later events, the provisions of the agreement added too 
much to the volatility of the region.  
Under all these circumstances, the end of the First World War became a 
watershed in the Middle East. A different “form of colonial administration” was 
imposed over the inhabitants of the region by “the magic of the word mandate” at the 
                                                 
59 Gooch and Temperley, British Documents, 8. 
60 See Hurewitz, Documentary Record, 1914-1956, 18-22. 
61 For Barbara Tuchman, this agreement was “a pure imperialist bargain in old pattern,” see Barbara Tuchman, Bible and Sword: England 
and Palestine from the Bronze Age to Balfour (New York: New York University Press, 1956), 209. 
 26
San Remo conference as outlined at the Sykes-Picot Agreement.62 From then on, the 
Middle East became no longer a single political unit as had been under Ottoman rule. 
But rather the “artificial”63 countries of the area were dealt with individually by the 
Whitehall through “special political relationships (mandates, protectorates, treaties of 
mutual assistance) backed by the threat of use of military force by small but effective 
garrisons maintained at bases selected for strategic importance.”64 On paper, this 
kind of governance was needed since these new founded countries were not able to 
“stand alone” and therefore they had to be replaced under the “Mandatory Powers” 
such as Great Britain “until the territories deemed capable of self-government.”65 But 
in practice, it was a new beginning of a set of turmoil in the Middle East after a 
period of stability under Ottoman rule.  
More importantly, post-WWI era presented Great Britain, at least in the 
Middle East, a unique opportunity. Owing to the defeat of Germany, dismemberment 
of the Ottoman Empire, elimination of presumed Russian southward expansionist 
aspirations after the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, at least for a while, it was 
possible for Great Britain to have a preponderant position in the region during the 
interwar period. While there were no external pressures to British predominance 
except American economic initiatives to launch an open door policy in order to 
obtain more oil concessions in the region, the principal challenge came from 
domestic variables of the region. The inhabitants of the region, who had been lured 
by British promises during the war, felt betrayed when they encountered the outcome 
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of British dual policies during and after the war. However, except for minor 
incidences of violence in the immediate aftermath of the war, it was in 1936 that as 
result of increased Jewish immigration to Palestine the Arab revolt erupted. It lasted 
three years till the British White Paper of 1939 restricted Jewish immigration to 
Palestine and provided a temporary, forced solution for the country. 
The recent historical background is recorded largely in order to show that it is 
self-evident that the foundations of post-WWII problems of the Middle East were 
sowed both in secret agreements between foreign powers and in the public 
declarations in the course of the war by those powers and then consolidated by the 
postwar diplomatic settlements again extraneously. Therefore, one should dwell on 
the past in order to understand both the difficulties that imperialistic policies built up 
for the inhabitants of the region and the part that European powers, and significantly 
Great Britain, had played in building up difficulties for themselves.  
However, all these determinants that hitherto exercised a decisive influence 
on the shape of British imperial policies toward the Middle East began to change 
considerably starting with the end of the Second World War. While Great Britain 
emerged from the war as the weakest of the three major powers, it still appeared as a 
formidable power in the Middle East by holding some strong points and having 
treaty arrangements with countries in this region. Several developments combined to 
lessen Britain’s relative military and economic strength and gravely impaired its 
ability to maintain its imperial position in the Middle East. Indeed, doubts had 
already begun to appear, during the Second World War, as to “whether the Great 
Britain would be able to support [in postwar era] the burden of the joint Common-
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wealth defense system,” in which the Middle East constituted one of the major 
defensive fronts.66  
The reason for these doubts during the war had been mostly about the 
economic situation of Great Britain after the end of the war. These doubts proved to 
be real in the postwar era since “the war had left the British economy in a state of 
near prostration.”67 Therefore, British policymakers found a good chance of postwar 
recovery and “avoiding such perilous risks as they ran in the recent past” in “cutting 
their post-war coat according to their cloth.”68 In other words, they had to practice 
economy of force in order not to get deeper into difficulties. But London’s economic 
situation should not be taken as the sole factor responsible for the new phenomenon: 
“Britain’s withdrawal from the Middle East.” Several other factors led to British 
retreat from the Middle East and thereby a drastic reduction of overseas 
commitments should be attributed to a three decade-long process. However, it is 
noteworthy to mention that the postwar era did not mark an abrupt watershed in 
Britain –Middle East relations as largely assumed but started a process of declining 
British preponderant position and its scale of interests in the general area of the 
Middle East. This circumstance was not altogether surprising and was not peculiar to 
this region. Rather, it was only a part of the common situation faced by Great Britain 
following the postwar shifts in the balance of power, as well as nationalist 
movements and de-colonization.  
Generally speaking, this process of withdrawal might well be discussed under 
the domestic and external context. For the domestic context, British financial crisis 
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between the critical years 1945-1948 became the most important factor,69 from 
which other domestic constraints derived. Among others, the historian Jacop Abadi 
stated that “domestic constrains are not less crucial in the making of foreign and 
defense policy than the changes in the external environment” when he identified 
several domestic constrains, in addition to the economic condition.70 These factors 
were generally counted as: readjustments in British defense policy in line with the 
economic situation and with the impact of new technological developments; of Arab 
nationalism; adaptation of new ways other than military control for safeguarding the 
flow of oil from the Middle East; and finally the change in perception of its own 
image as a great power. 
 As a principle external factor in postwar era that affected British imperial 
security and accelerated the process of British withdrawal from the Middle East, a 
more serious development was the emergence a strong Soviet Union as a world 
power only second after the US on Britain’s communication flank. It was a serious 
determining factor because British defense policy was completely based on the 
possibility of war with Russia. Moreover, according to a report prepared by the 
British Chiefs of Staff in 1947, “the area in which Russian expansion would be 
easiest and at the same time would hurt British Empire most would be the Middle 
East.”71 Consequently, Britain, with historical experience, entertained grave doubts 
as to the intentions of the Russians in the regional scheme of things since some signs 
reflecting the attitude of the Soviet Union toward the region were shown in the 
countries on Russia’s border, such as in Iran and Turkey, if not Greece.  
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According to the same report, the importance of the Middle East in the 
postwar era for Great Britain was two-fold:  
Our experience in other areas such as Eastern Europe has shown that 
when Russia gains control our economic interests are forfeited and our 
communications are cut. The first impact of Russian expansion into the 
Middle East would therefore be upon our oil supplies and upon 
Commonwealth sea and air communications. The importance to us of 
present and potential oil supplies in the area is as great, if not greater, 
than ever, particularly in peace. The importance of the Middle East as a 
centre of Commonwealth communications remains, and will remain, 
beyond question.72  
 
However, the views of Chiefs of Staff might well be attributed to their 
professional obligation to look at international circumstances on the basis of a clearly 
defined potential enemy. Therefore, the Chiefs of Staff, establishing policy on 
historical background, only considered British strategy in relation with the Soviet 
Union without looking at the whole matter on broader lines. After a close look at 
domestic politics in Great Britain about the Imperial situation and thereby the 
postwar strategic importance of the communication line, one point attracts attention. 
Without an Empire, what was the importance of the communication line? A negative 
answer to that question naturally assigned economic factors more weight than 
strategical factors in the British strategic planning process. With the gradual loss of 
Imperial assets, the idea of the Mediterranean as a kind of covered passage for 
Britain exploded.73 Thereby, some strategic countries, for example Turkey and 
Greece, positioned on the communication line lost their raison d’etre for Great 
Britain.74  
British postwar fear of Russian expansion in the Middle East did not only 
emanate from their common historical background of rivalry in the region. But, for 
the first time, Great Britain, at least during the critical years of 1945 and 1946, found 
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itself alone, and in a weaker position in both economic and military terms in its 
rivalry with the Russians. Therefore, without putting the American factor into 
postwar regional balance of power, the Soviet Union was in a position to do 
whatever it desired, the British feared. In respect to this, the Whitehall had two 
possible choices-to continue wartime cooperation with Stalin or to turn its pre-war 
mission despite the fact that Britain was unable within its power to counteract on its 
own as it did in the recent past. Of course, it would be more advantageous to 
cooperate provided that Britain took the lead.75 But, since it was quite impossible for 
the Soviet Union as the sole great power in Eurasia to cooperate as an inferior partner 
under British lead, the remaining choice was inescapable for the Whitehall, even if it 
did not have adequate power-economic or military- to follow this course of action. 
Therefore, it had to look for some other ways to maintain its strategic interests, 
particularly in the Middle East. Britain hoped to find it first in the United Nations 
Organization. But “because of the Veto,” and other objections in the Cabinet and 
military quarters, policymakers in the British administration did not regard the 
organization as a guarantee to safeguard the political and strategic interests around 
the world to prevent a possible war with the Soviet Union.76 Naturally, Great Britain 
had to turn to the U.S.A. since in the postwar era no European country or a 
combination of European powers would be strong enough to resist Russian 
aggression. Therefore, Britain, in order to redress the shattered balance in favor of 
itself, had to have “the active and early support of the US” since: 
The United States alone, because of her man-power, industrial resources 
and her lead in the development of weapons of mass destruction, can turn 
the balance in favor of the Democracies. Apart from other considerations, 
the United States will for some years at any rate, be the sole source from 
which we [the Great Britain] can draw a supply of atomic bombs.77
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In short, the emerging determinants whether internal or external, in the 
immediate postwar years all shared one common component: alignment with the US 
was rapidly becoming a more attractive option for the British administration. 
Because, beginning in the early months of the postwar era, political and economic 
costs of continuing single-handed control and secure the vested interests in the region 
rose sharply. A central goal, therefore, was to share the cost of responsibilities with a 
powerful ally, notably the US.  
Great Britain needed to secure American support in order to retain its role as 
one of the great powers in the postwar era. Also, London undoubtedly needed to 
achieve a close co-ordination of policies with the United States in order to contain 
the advance of Soviet power not only in Middle East but also in Europe. The British 
administration assumed that, with “their own experience and superior wisdom,” they, 
as a “junior partner,” could guide this “lumbering giant” to their own ends.78 The 
British administration acted on this rhetoric. The former British Prime Minister, 
Winston Churchill appeared as the first prominent official to give expression to the 
idea, in his well-known speech generally known as the “Iron Curtain” speech on 
March 5,1946 at Fulton, Missouri. Churchill, in an effort to “gang-up” against the 
Russians, emphasized, in his speech, the need for a closer Anglo-American 
collaboration on the other side of the “Iron Curtain.”  
Although British efforts to convince the Americans for a close cooperation 
against the Soviet Union in the Middle East, before and after Churchill’s speech 
succeeded to considerable extent, the occasion should nevertheless be taken nothing 
more than a “catalyst.”79 In this respect, it has often been suggested in the orthodox 
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Cold War literature that Greece and Turkey were handed over by Great Britain to the 
US. This is at best an imprecise manner of speaking in that the extent to which a 
precise policy of taking responsibility for Greece and Turkey was developed within 
American policy-making circles between the British notes in February and Truman’s 
speech before the Congress is very much open to question. Contrasted to this general 
understanding of the Cold War literature, the assumption by the United States of 
responsibilities within this area resulted from the practical requirements of leadership 
in the postwar world. In a broader context, American Middle East policy was a 
constituent part of emerging global policy which had been labeled as “containment.” 
The basic tenet of this policy was that “all nations not now within the Soviet sphere 
should be given generous economic assistance and political support in their 
opposition to Soviet penetration.”80 However, in its efforts to establish situations of 
strength in the Middle East, the United States felt the necessity at the outset of 
“proceeding more or less in the role of deputy of the powers which, although 
enfeebled by war, still maintained recognizable spheres of influence in the area.”81 
Therefore, it would be more appropriate to suggest that US policy was shaped mainly 
by the stimuli of perceptions of the Soviet Union. In that point of view, the British 
share might have been well be to provide practical causes for the American 
administration to move away from its traditional isolationism and to attune their 
Middle East policy to events in the general area of the Middle East and specifically 
in Turkey and Greece. 
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2.3 The U.S.A. in the Middle East 
 
It has become a truism to state that the Second World War marked a turning 
point in the relationship between the US and the Middle East and propelled the 
U.S.A. actively into its complex politics. But the United States, with its long-
standing commercial and cultural ties, was not a newcomer to this region. 
Washington had had particular axes to grind in that part of the world before the war. 
Nonetheless, it took the Second World War with its dramatic consequences that gave 
Washington a sense of political and military involvement with the Middle East. 
Before, the interests of the US for the most part, in a limited scope of objectives, had 
been confined in scope and intensity to cultural relations such as colleges and 
archaeologists, philanthropic relations through missionaries, and commercial 
relations.82 Thus, the tenets of official American diplomacy in the pre-war period 
appeared “little more than extending protection to American philanthropic and 
missionary activities and assurance of equality of opportunity for nominal exchange 
of goods.”83  
By the end of the war, the general area of the Middle East came to be a 
significant area for Washington’s postwar role not only by virtue of its natural 
sources but also by its geostrategic location at the crossroads of three of most volatile 
regions in the postwar world - the Balkans, Asia and northern Africa as well as its 
geographic proximity to the USSR. Before that new chapter in the history of 
relationship between the Middle East and the U.S.A., this part of the world had been 
assumed and accepted to be in Great Britain’s political and military sphere of 
influence. And the US, in its relation with this region, did not seek to undermine or 
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oppose the influence of Great Britain. In line with the wisdom of abstention from 
international politics, it had, to a considerable extent, refrained from any involvement 
in international affairs of this region that would “commit it to foreign obligations or 
entanglements.”84  
Thus during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the U.S.A. maintained 
its strict neutrality and refused to join the European powers in the “Eastern 
Question,” which engaged the European concern with Middle Eastern politics for 
almost more than two centuries. Compared with other powers, such as the United 
Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Russia, Washington 
appeared politically disinterested in Middle East’s troublesome political affairs. No 
basic change occurred in the development of American policy at the outbreak of 
World War I. Washington carried on with its policy of nonintervention, at least in 
this region. Following the First World War, after some diplomatic initiatives, though 
failed, the US hastened, “to the deep disappointment and disillusionment of the 
peoples of the Near East,”85 to withdraw into its isolation. Suffice it to say, till the 
beginning of World War II, the US maintained a certain level of aloofness from 
becoming entangled in the region’s political and military conflicts and its approach 
to the region remained on an economic and cultural level. 
By the beginning of the Second World War, however, a heightened American 
presence in some particular areas of the Middle East such as Cairo, the southern part 
of Iran and Saudi Arabia was observed. Still, this presence was not enough to 
construe as politically motivated. In essence, it was militarily motivated and 
American technical and military advisors constituted most of this presence according 
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to the needs of the war. Americans provided exclusively for the needs of the British 
and Soviet forces through Lend-Lease and cooperated with the British government in 
the operation of an economic planning agency, the Middle East Supply Centre, by 
providing required resources and technical assistance.86 Again, as before the war, the 
predominant position of Great Britain in the Middle East was recognized and the US 
played a supportive role for the needs of the British and Soviet forces.87  
Against this background, the end of the War ushered in a new period in the 
Middle East-U.S.A. relations, and the beginning of a trend toward ever deeper 
American strategic interest in this region. Assuming “dutifully” the leadership of the 
“free world” with its preponderant military and economic power, Washington 
enjoyed a powerful say in matters of world politics including the political and 
economic life of the Middle East, hitherto which lay principally within British 
responsibility. Subsequently, the Middle East’s peripheral place, in political and 
military terms, elevated gradually to an area of increasing strategic importance in 
Washington’s foreign policy. As a result, policy makers in Washington came to 
appreciate “the tremendous value of this area as a highway by sea, land and air 
between the East and the West; of its possession of great mineral wealth; of its 
potentially rich agricultural resources.”88
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Nevertheless, Americans, relative to other great powers, were newcomers to 
Middle East politics, which they “by temperament were poorly fitted to cope.”89 
Moreover, the US came out of the war without a well-defined military and political 
policy for that part of the world other than economic interest90 and what was 
comprehended under the general principles of the United Nations Charter.91 Suffice 
it to say that, Washington’s Middle East policy evolved with the advent of the Cold 
War or in other words it was predicated by the subsequent circumstances which were 
not consistent with previous assumptions about the upcoming conjuncture. 
Therefore, it so happened in subsequent years that, many long-term strategic issues 
faced by the United States were “handled on an emergency basis” by the 
administration in Washington as they came up, instead of following a carefully 
prepared plan.92  
Just before 1945, when the global hostility was over and there were no 
indicative signs of the Cold War from the American point of view, that part of the 
world was assumed to be the most suitable region in which Washington and the 
Kremlin’s polices could “be made to dovetail with minimum friction.”93 In this 
respect, President Truman not only indicated his agreement with the assumption of 
Near East Mission Chiefs that there had been “existence of parallelism” between 
their policies in that area with those of Russians. But he consistently reassured the 
representatives that there needed to be no conflict between them. Although the Joint 
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Chiefs of Staff came to realize the threat of Soviet military power to the US the next 
year, only the Far East was considered as the area of direct “clashes of vital interests” 
between the US and Soviet Union.94 The other parts of the world, especially the 
Middle East, were seen as areas where national objectives of the Soviet Union and 
Great Britain “collide head-on.” 95  
Yet, in the immediate aftermath of the war, American representatives in the 
Middle East were anxious whether their country would “become a mere passive 
spectator” in this region or not. Realizing this indefiniteness in policy toward this 
region, Loy Henderson, Director of the Offices of Near Eastern and African Affairs, 
recommended to the Secretary of State that a conference be held between the Chiefs 
of Mission in the Middle East and the President. The very reason for this meeting 
was not only to give the envoys (who were anxious about the postwar policy of their 
Government), the tenets of the US postwar policy in this region but also to give them 
the reassurances that the US “had no intention of becoming again a mere passive 
spectator in the Near East.” 96  
From a military point of view, the picture was not different. While military 
planners in Washington were cognizant of the strategic importance of this oil-rich 
region in line with its newfound world role, the US gave every indication of its 
intention to continue to play the role of free riders in the strategic areas of the Middle 
East. This consideration was in keeping with the United States’ traditional position 
that the general area of the Middle East was primarily political and military 
responsibilities of Great Britain. Overall these military considerations were 
exemplified by the State-War-Navy-Coordinating Committee’s (SWNCC) policy 
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paper prepared in response to the suggestion of the Department of State. Therein, the 
committee examined “over-all requirements for military bases and base sites outside 
the continental limits of the United States” according to the strategic situation all 
around the world. As a result, it enumerated a list of thirty-two priority sites, in 
which there was no base site in the general area of the Middle East.97 But it was very 
normal for that time because strategic planners did not contemplate of any need to 
call for a base in the Middle East. For them the only place, of which security could 
not be transferred to any other power or institution such as United Nations, was the 
American continent. Therefore, military planners only needed to establish a defense 
system, more limited geographically to the American Republics. 
Viewed from this perspective, military planners thought that protection of the 
western hemisphere and Far East which comprised their immediate neighbors against 
any possible future attack were their primary responsibility and security in other 
parts of the world should be maintained through the United Nations or pre-war status 
quo powers.98 In the case of the Middle East, it was the strong feeling of the 
American government that Great Britain should “continue to maintain primary 
responsibility for military security in that area.”99 As a historical fact, traditional 
British policy in the Middle East had been, with a fair degree of success, that of 
preventing any power to acquire a strategic position along economic or political 
lines. Under these overall calculations, Americans contribution in the Middle East 
would not be in the military sense. But its contribution would be through “actively 
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implemented economic policy” and by the supportive role of the US in economic and 
political terms to the status quo power, Great Britain.100  
However, from the American point of view, maintaining the position of Great 
Britain, militarily and politically, did not mean that the US would follow and support 
British policies in this region to the detriment of American economic and political 
interests. Conversely, there was a critical approach in many circles of the American 
government against British imperialistic policies in the Middle East. Yet at the end of 
1945, some policy makers, like George Wadsworth, tried to impress the 
Administration with the gravity of the situation in the Middle East: unless the US 
supported the Middle Eastern countries in their effort to block efforts of Britain and 
France “to consolidate their pre-war spheres of influence” in that region, these 
countries would “turn to Russia and would be lost to our civilization.”101 This was a 
correct appraisal of the situation and Americans were eager not to repeat the errors of 
the previous Great Powers. In contrast to the British version of imperialistic policies, 
Americans pursued an open door policy since the beginning of their interests in the 
Middle East, which rejected the very idea of “a single power maintaining a 
paramount position” in any Middle Eastern country “by special treaty provisions.”102 
Aside from economic interests gained by this open door policy, the American 
thinking was to bring interested powers into the Middle Eastern picture on an 
cooperative basis and thereby to prevent great power ambitions and rivalries and 
local discontents and jealousies from developing into open conflict which might 
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eventually lead to a third World War.103 At this point, the US and Great Britain had 
divergent outlooks. While Great Britain also wanted great power cooperation, it 
wanted this cooperation to come “on a basis which they would lead and guide. But 
the US insisted on cooperation “along the line of free competition in trade and 
communications matters, complete liberty on the part of the independent countries of 
the Middle East.”104 Obviously the American sense of cooperation might have 
offered more advantageous terms for regional governments. And Washington’s 
position differed greatly from the interest in prestige and imperial position of Great 
Britain. 
Also Washington was very eager to employ its economic power, which was 
considered the most effective weapon at their disposal, both to influence Middle 
Eastern political events in direction with their desires and its relation with Great 
Britain. In a memorandum prepared by the Department of State, employment of 
economic power for political and strategic reasons was oversimplified as a matter of 
“simple bargain.” The memorandum read that “If for political and strategical reasons 
we want them [Britons] to hold a position of strength in the Middle East, then they 
must have from us economic concessions with respect to the area which will make 
worth while to stay there.”105 This kind of thinking became the tenet of postwar 
military and political policies in regard to regions carrying secondary importance for 
American national security.106 Therefore, it was necessary for Washington to meet 
Britain’s economic needs “in order to enable them to meet American desires in the 
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political and strategical field.”107 In regard to the same issue, comments of a 
columnist, in the American periodical Nation in October 1946, a week after the 
British loan issue was debated in the Congress, was remarkable since it reflected the 
main characteristic of American-British relationship in the transition period: 
… one nation was asking economic help of the other, while the other was 
making political demands upon the first. The economically powerful 
nation feels politically frustrated and the nation with world-wide political 
sovereignties which she is no longer able to sustain economically suffers 
from the frustration of economic weakness…108  
 
In any event, the critical years following the end of the war passed without a 
joint Anglo-American approach to the affairs of the Middle East. Rather some 
Middle Eastern affairs, such as Palestine, generated discord between them and 
political divergences between the two governments dominated Anglo-American 
relations in that part of the world. Americans sought to profit from London’s 
established political and military position in that part of the world without assuming 
any commitments other than providing economic assistance to Great Britain. In turn, 
Great Britain tried, to a considerable extent, to maintain its position in the Middle 
East by obtaining economic assistance from the US without having its preponderant 
position snatched by Americans. Although faced with “Soviet expansionist 
aspirations” towards the Middle East, the need for coordinated approach toward 
Middle Eastern affairs emerged in 1946.109 It took the informal “Pentagon Talks of 
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1947”110 that a sense of cooperative attitude was reached between the two 
governments.      
From the American point of view, disunity in their respective policies needed 
to be narrowed, since the full consequence of failure to do so would “have disastrous 
effect not only on American interests in the area but on our [American] general 
position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.”111 Strategically, it would mean that the region 
would be exposed to the influence of the Soviet Union and would give the 
opportunity to Russians to get in the picture in the Middle East. Concomitantly, 
several regional affairs drove them to reach that kind of thinking. Soviet diplomatic 
pressure upon Turkey and military occupation of northern Iran, and the civil war in 
Greece were the basic occasions. While all these issues were not new in early 1947, 
Washington, concerned about United States - Soviet relations, gave little reassurance 
till that year to the British government.112 Therefore, it took time for Washington to 
become oriented in the complexities of the Middle Eastern international politics.  
 
 
2.4 The USSR in the Middle East 
 
The end of hostilities in 1945 was a great turning point for Soviet Russia. It 
meant for Kremlin the prelude of new upheavals in a completely new situation in 
world politics, in which it found a chance to play a great power role along with the 
US alone. However, with regard to Russia’s relations with the Middle East, it was 
hard, at least in the period under consideration, to speak about such a turning point, 
but rather about a resumption of traditional Tsarist Near Eastern policy, that had been 
frozen in the interwar period. There is no tangible evidence to speak about a different 
interpretation. Since postwar circumstances in the northernmost areas of the Middle 
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East, notably in Iran and Turkey, as well as in Greece, were such that provided 
enough evidence for such an interpretation to be constructed and gave warning 
signals, in advance, of future Soviet intentions. Stalin’s pressure on the Turkish 
government for concessions with grave implications on Turkey’s national integrity, 
or not withdrawing his troops from northern Iran in violation of wartime agreement 
had to do with historical tendencies, or by Soviets’ self-image as a great power rather 
than security concerns. Therefore, Soviet foreign policy toward the Middle East in 
the immediate postwar years was treated on the basis of a reference to foreign policy 
of tsarist Russia, fashioned after George Kennan’s “Long Telegram” of 1947. 
However, it would be a mistake to assume that the general area of the Middle 
East had a special place and priority in Soviet foreign policy. But rather, Russian 
foreign policy was characterized by a shifting mix of objectives with respect to 
different components of the general area. Correspondingly, the Soviets divided the 
general area of the Middle East into three regions,113 according to the relative 
importance of regions in Soviet foreign policy. The so-called “Middle East” 
constituted the entire belt of lands bordering the USSR between the Turkish Straits 
and Afghanistan, which went under the American definition of a “Northern Tier.” 
The rest of the area was divided into two regions as the “Near East” and “North 
Africa.”114 This study will necessarily examine Soviet policy in the region that was 
called the “Middle East” by the Soviets and, for the sake of clarity, employ, at least 
in the period under consideration, the Soviets’ own definition while examining their 
policies.  
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That concentration was indeed the result of Russian policies implemented 
until the mid-1950s. Until that time, only Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan had appeared 
as the main countries that had to deal with the prospect of direct Russian threat, as 
evident in numerous wars and frontier engagements before and after the Soviets. 
Russian policy toward the rest of the region was fairly vague. In this sense, 
Khrushchev saw the year 1956 as a historic turning point since “before that, the 
Soviet Union and Imperial Russia before it- had always treated the Near East as 
belonging to England and France.”115 This is also evident in Khrushchev’s reference 
to Stalin’s response to King Faruk’s appeal for arms in order to force Great Britain to 
evacuate its troops from Egypt. Stalin’s justification of his refusal was that the Near 
East was part of Britain’s sphere of influence, and, therefore the Soviets could not go 
sticking their nose into Egypt’s affairs.116 However, that is not to say that they kept 
their eyes closed to that part of the region if opportunities in their favor arose such as 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. But in this case again, they refrained from overt actions, 
which, in turn, could provoke a possible counteraction from the Great Britain and 
U.S.A. Therefore, it might be said that it was only after the Suez crisis of 1956 crisis 
that Russia advanced far enough in its political and military penetration in the Near 
East.117  
While the history of Russian relations with the Middle East might well be 
traceable to early times in diplomatic history, there is no need to give here a detailed 
historical survey in order to comprehend the persistent features of Russia’s foreign 
and economic policies concerning the region, which adjoined the southern frontiers 
of Imperial Russia. Since what remained persistent throughout imperial Russian 
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history can be summed as the struggle of Russian leaders to control the Straits of the 
Bosporus and Dardanelles, doors to the Black Sea, and to acquire Constantinople due 
to its significance to the (Greek) Orthodox Faith. 
This traditional policy had been pursued for centuries, though with minor 
successes, till the First World War. During the war, tsarist Russia found a unique 
chance in its history to attain its aspirations relative to Constantinople and the 
Turkish Straits. In order to achieve its traditional goals, it demanded from Great 
Britain and France that “the question of Constantinople and of the Straits must be 
definitely solved according to the time-honored aspirations of Russia” in the event of 
an Entente victory.118 In the face of counterclaims from Britain and France to 
recognize Russian claims, St. Petersburg gave its assent to the inclusion of the 
neutral zone of Persia in the British sphere of influence and recognized “the 
desiderata of Great Britain and France” relative to postwar Middle East. Later during 
the secret negotiations for partition of the Ottoman Empire, Russians put forward 
territorial claims in northeastern Anatolia as counterclaims to endorse the Anglo-
French territorial claims in the rest of the Ottoman Empire.119
However, tsarist Russia did not survive long enough to see the 
accomplishment of its “time-honored” imperial aspirations. Following the Bolshevik 
seizure of power in 1917, the new Soviet state hastened to proclaim by a decree that, 
“Constantinople must remain in the hands of the Mohammedans”…“The treaty for 
the division of Persia is null and void” …“The treaty concerning the partition of 
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Turkey and the subduction from it of Armenia, is null and void.”120 As seen from its 
very contents, the new Russian government channeled its diplomatic efforts, the day 
after it took power, to arouse its southern neighbors to revolt against western 
imperialistic nations.121 At the Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East in 1920, the 
Soviets continued their efforts to attract the countries of the East and build a bridge 
between the Soviet Union and the Middle East through exploiting the strong anti-
imperialistic and national sentiments in those countries. Later in 1921 and in 
subsequent years, treaties, based on recognition by each party of the independence of 
the other, were signed with each country bordering the new Soviet state-Turkey, Iran 
and Afghanistan. All these kinds of “peaceful” overtones, in a broader context, took 
their bearings, of course, from the immediate domestic or external constrains, faced 
by the infant Soviet state: 
Not having yet succeeded in creating adequate fighting forces for the defense 
of the country, surrounded by enemies awaiting its ruin, suffering from the incredible 
destruction brought about by war and Tsarism, Soviet Russia in its foreign policy had 
all the time to keep in mind the need of avoiding the dangers threatening its 
destruction at every step.122
With these considerations, peaceful overtones towards Middle Eastern 
countries mentioned above were all calculated steps as to “guard the gates against the 
British.”123 As a result of these diplomatic maneuverings, the Soviet Union was 
regarded, to a considerable extent, as having broken with the Tsarist imperial 
tradition. However, the new Russian government’s aggressive policies in subsequent 
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years to extend and consolidate its control over the peoples and territories of the 
former Tsarist empire in areas bordering the Middle East, if not beyond it, left grave 
doubts about its actual intentions in foreign affairs.124 As most probably reflecting 
these doubts, during an interview in 1922, given to a representative of the British 
press by Leon Trotsky, then People’s Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, the 
critical question was, in the words of the interviewer, “How does the Near-Eastern 
policy of the Soviet Government differ in essence from that of the Tsars and of 
Milyukov?” Trotsky’s answer to this question was very limited in scope but 
indicative for two reasons. Firstly, Turkey and more specially the Straits and 
Constantinople were the only subject for comparison of Near Eastern policies. 
Secondly, the difference between successive states’ and Near Eastern policies was, 
argued by Trotsky, “the same as between robbery and compensating the victims of 
robbery.”125 Then again, Trotsky was not again a determinant voice in Soviet policy. 
During the interwar period, therefore, it might be summed up that there had 
been no concerted attempt to extend Soviet rule beyond the old borders, either 
through the Red Army or through the effective support of local communists. Thus, 
Soviet foreign policy was restricted largely to the promotion of nationalistic and anti-
imperialistic tendencies as a check to the influence of foreign powers.126 This 
atmosphere continued only until the beginning of the Second World War. The first 
structural change in Soviet foreign policy in regard to the Middle East thus prevailed 
in November, 1940. The Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissar for 
Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov, put forward to the German Ambassador in the 
Soviet Union, Friedrich W. Schulenburg, Soviet conditions for the acceptance of the 
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draft of the four power pact.127 Molotov’s official statement read that “The Soviet 
Union is prepared to accept the draft …. which the Reich Foreign Minister outlined 
… “provided that the area south of Batumi and Baku in general direction of the 
Persian Gulf is recognized as the center of aspirations of the Soviet Union” which 
“presumably meant eastern Turkey, Iran and possibly Iraq.”128 Another major 
demand at this time was that “the security of the Soviet Union in the Straits is 
assured by the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between the Soviet Union and 
Bulgaria… and by the establishment of a base for land and naval forces of the USSR 
within range of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles by means of long-term lease.”129 In 
short, in the planned division of the world between the governments of the Three 
Power Pact, Germany, Italy, Japan and the Soviet Union, Stalin insisted on only one 
major area for penetration and expansion—the Middle East. 
However, events unfolded quite differently from far reaching calculations. 
The Soviet Union found itself in deep disappointment by the “Operation 
Barbarossa.” In order to survive the life-and-death struggle with Germany, Stalin was 
compelled to ally with his “capitalist” rivals in the Middle East. However, since the 
tide of war turned in their favor around 1943, Soviet political policy began to unfold 
“as applied to the specific problems of individual countries.”130 Soviets began to lay 
several test cases of their future relations with the countries adjacent to the Soviet 
Union. Some expressions of Soviet dissatisfaction with Iran and Turkey had already 
been increasingly ominous. Turkey’s wartime polices such as neutrality and its trade 
with Germany appeared, among others, as issues to be exploited by the Soviet 
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government in order to justify its bitterness toward Turkey. Turkey’s severance of 
relations with Germany in August 1944 and declaration of war in February 1945 on 
Germany seemed inadequate to modify the Soviet attitude toward Turkey. Then, at 
the Yalta Conference, Stalin raised formally the revision of the Montreux 
Convention and impressed upon his wartime allies that “it was impossible to accept a 
situation in which Turkey had on Russia’s throat.”131  
On the part of Iran, Soviet attitude toward this country deserve a definition 
more serious than just bitterness. Soviet occupation forces in northern Iran had 
already begun in early 1943 to disregard obligations of the Tripartite Treaty of 1942. 
They backed the reemergence of Tudeh (Masses) Party132 in their zone and when 
events, as a result of agitation of the Soviets through this party, reached such a 
condition to threaten the integrity of Iran, they prevented the movement of Iranian 
security forces. Later in 1944, the Iranian Prime Minister Sa’id’s negative answer to 
the demands of the USSR to grant oil concessions in northern Iran, resulted in the 
fall of Sa’id’s cabinet in the same year. After the end of hostilities, Soviet leaders, 
having already recognized their own power backed by the Red Army and prestige 
during the war, began to act as a “world bully,” wherever their interests were 
involved. Their global political and military policy was based mainly on the 
“disbelief” that “the Western world once confronted with life-size wolf of Soviet 
displeasure standing at the door and threatening to blow the house in, would be able 
to stand firm.”133 Operating on this premise, Stalin thought that the time has come to 
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take up tasks which were interrupted by war.134 Therefore, having already succeeded, 
up to a considerable extent, to expand westwards during the war almost without any 
resistance from their wartime allies, the Soviets did not hesitate to put their policies 
into practice where they saw victory in sight. Stalin, for this end, began to seize 
opportunities created by the vague international atmosphere in the immediate 
postwar era in order to increase his influence and to enhance opportunities to 
undermine the Western position in that area. As a result, Stalin lost no time in 
reactivating the traditional tsarist policy to the South. The “traditional” friendship 
established by the treaties with Turkey in the period following World War I 
(repeatedly in 1921 and 1925) was broken off once the war was over in 1945. 
Moreover, there seemed no hesitation in putting forward some conditions embodying 
irredentist and far-reaching demands to Turkey for revision of the neutrality pact 
which was allowed to lapse after 7 November 1945. In regard to Iran, the Soviets, 
instead of preparing to withdraw from their wartime occupation zone-northern part of 
Iran-, they reinforced their occupation forces with 15,000 soldiers.135 When the 
deadline set by the Tripartite Treaty came, the Soviets refused to evacuate the Iranian 
territory. Moreover, in the intervening months, Soviet efforts culminated in two 
communist separatist regimes, the Kurdish People's Republic and the People's 
Republic of Azerbaijan, in the territory under the Red Army’s occupation. The 
postwar speculations, therefore, centered as in early 1920s on such questions as to 
whether there was resumption of tsarist foreign policy. Soviet attempts for intrusion 
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into the Northern Tier of the Middle East in the immediate post-World War II period 
thus deepened these concerns.  
As seen, the pattern of these developments was consistent with the basic 
policies previously advanced in Soviet-Nazi diplomatic haggling in 1940. But these 
postwar developments should not mean that Stalin did not value the relations that he 
had attained during the war with his wartime allies. On the other hand, the Soviets 
were decisive not to “compromise certain basic principles which were believed 
essential to Soviet interests and security.”136 And there was no indication that the 
Kremlin abandoned its faith in the program of territorial and political expansion 
outlined by the German-Russian non-aggression pact of 1939.137 In regard to the 
Middle East, it meant southward expansion of Russian influence and control at the 
Dardanelles through the establishment of Russian bases at that point. By then, 
however, historical rivalry with Britain began to replace wartime cooperation 
between the “Big three.” Early postwar conflict between them extended from Eastern 
Europe to the rimland of the Soviet southern border. 
In all of this, none of the existing evidence indicated that Moscow had any 
real intention and immediate plans of aggression toward this part of the world.138 
Therefore, it was not clear whether Stalin intended to enforce Soviet policies in that 
area by the use of force or by the threat of force. Regarding this question, while some 
Russian military activities were observed in Iran, in the case of Turkey, nothing more 
than some ambiguous intelligence reports were cited to back up those kinds of 
assumptions. Therefore, it has remained open to question as to whether Stalin made 
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any effort worthy of note to back up policies with the employment of Soviet military 
power. In regard to this controversial issue, an American intelligence report reached 
a conclusion that although the USSR had adequate military and economic power 
capable of overrunning both Western Europe and the Middle East including Turkey 
and Iran, these capabilities were not likely to induce Soviet leaders to undertake such 
a course of overt conflict with the “capitalist world” for an indefinite period.139
To sum up, an idiosyncratic reading of the “lessons of history,” showed that 
there had been no structural change in the historical attitude of the Russians towards 
that part of the world, except for the relatively weak times of the Soviets after the 
1917 revolution, when the Soviet Union showed traditional state behavior of seeking 
peace. The Soviets conducted a policy of “waiting” and “maneuvering” until the 
completion of its nation building phase through creating the fictitious “homo 
Sovieticus.” And when they believed that they had enough power to pursue their 
policies, they “proceeded along their cautious but firm and calculating lines, to move 
into the Middle Eastern picture.”140
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
 
TURKEY’S POSITION 
IN THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR 
 
 
 
 Trying to look for the origins of the Cold War in the latter phase of World 
War II or in the aftermath of the victory leads the debate nearly to impasse. Its 
complexity ostensibly arises from inconsistency and complexity of the policies 
conducted by the heads of the great powers from the very beginning of the Grand 
Alliance or after the end of the war. By the time the Grand Alliance was shaped, the 
seamy side of the hostility - the long-standing political differences in points of view 
and particularly political methods if not that of the military- between the members 
were forgotten or ignored for the sake of military collaboration. Thus, the supreme 
necessities of the war against aggressor nations menacing the peace of the world and 
thereby the very interests of great powers, notably the United States and Great 
Britain, dominated the attitudes of these nations toward the Soviet Union.141 
Consequently, the “joint struggle against German Fascism” had led to the close 
political rapprochement of the Allies. Meanwhile, it was expressed in some circles 
that “although Russians under circumstances making common cause with such 
democracies as United States and Great Britain, it could never be expected to shape 
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follows, therefore, that we shall give whatever help we can to Russia and the Russian people” in Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance 
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their political concepts or rid herself of innate political viciousness.”142 However, the 
result was a political picture framed by the leaders of the Great Powers that did not 
reflect former differences embroiled in their political and ideological systems, but 
cohesion for the consumption of world opinion. Convinced of the justice of their 
cause and the rightness of their policy from the onset of the war, they adapted 
themselves to these new structural changes in the international environment during 
the Second World War and pretended consciously not to see the differences from the 
beginning of the “Grand Alliance” about the end-aims of the war.143  
Concomitantly, concealing the previous hostilities and muting them in the 
interests of military collaboration, the US initially did not regard the Soviet Union or 
personally Stalin, notwithstanding unfavorable conducts in foreign relations, as an 
unacceptable partner with whom to collaborate in stabilizing and remarking the 
postwar world.144 Interestingly, it was also needless, according to Roosevelt, “to 
worry about the possibility of any Russian domination” in the postwar era.145 He, 
instead, appeared absolutely sure that London and Washington together would 
dominate the postwar world.146 Later developments, however, proved these early 
assumptions to be premature in regard to postwar world domination. At the Moscow 
(October 18, 1943 to November 11, 1943) and Tehran (November 28 to December 1, 
1943) Conferences, a new concert of power was developed, which necessarily 
signified awareness on the part of Roosevelt and Churchill of Moscow’s role in 
world affairs. Involving the Soviet Union was then recognized and accepted as “a 
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constructive part as a full and equal member of family of nations in the movement of 
international cooperation” for a lasting peace based upon a policy of general security 
and cooperation.147
Nonetheless the inner side of the “Grand Alliance” or “Comradeship-in-
Arms” was much more different from the prevailing political picture publicized by 
the heads of the Grand Alliance and by other important Allied statesmen that marked 
the diplomatic relationship during the war. Both the statesmen in Washington and 
London were keenly aware, since the very beginning, of the persistent and unvarying 
territorial aspirations of the Soviet Union in areas outside its own borders, especially 
toward its neighbors to the west, that were continually articulated with great 
frequency throughout the war.148 In this respect, Soviet intentions such as to have 
their own cordon sanitaire and their own assurances, apart from any possible general 
security guarantee had already been made amply clear by the Molotov- Ribbentrop 
Pact of 1939. Following that Pact, forcible occupation and absorption of the 
previously independent Baltic countries of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia into the 
Soviet Union in July 1940, Soviet territorial demands from Poland, attempts to seize 
territories from Rumania such as the month of Danube, its aggressive intentions and 
claims in respect to the control of Dardanelles through the establishment of Russian 
bases were all plain indications, which reflected the aims and maneuvers of Russian 
foreign policy to any sober observer of the international scene. 
Without ever thinking of doing otherwise in spite of some counterarguments 
in the administrations, both the US and the Great Britain had tried carefully to avoid 
any disputation with the Soviet government. Instead, less particularistic solutions for 
the postwar world order were discussed. Both Washington and London, therefore, 
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tried to abstain from pressing controversial, but crucial political issues. A briefing 
prepared by the Department of State, put this policy later as: 
Because of the over-riding wartime necessity of avoiding friction which 
might jeopardize military cooperation, more emphasis had hitherto been 
placed on cooperating with the Soviet Union per se than on finding an 
agreed basis upon which the cooperation must be established if it is to 
endure and form one of the foundations of a secure and peaceful world 
order.149
 
At the Moscow Foreign Ministers’ Conference in October 1943, when W. 
Averell Harriman, the US ambassador in Moscow, proposed raising the question of 
Poland, which later arose as one of the conflicting issues between the wartime Big 
Three, the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, rejected the idea: “I don’t want to deal 
with these piddling little things.”150 In a policy paper prepared by the Chief of Staff, 
it was recorded that “due to our [the US] untimely pressing the subject of territorial 
settlement – or other avoidable cause” might cause Russia to abstain from entering 
the war against Japan and thereby prolong it. Therefore, bearing in mind the 
“important connection between the timeliness of discussing territorial trusteeships or 
other forms of territorial settlements and the earliest and least costly defeat of Japan,” 
the fall of Japan had to take place to reach a settlement with Moscow about “these 
controversial subjects.” 151 (Italics added) 
On the other side, Stalin did not indulge in a series of illusions compared to 
his wartime allies about the “temporary association.” Stalin was well aware of the 
fact that Americans and Britons were assisting the Soviets only for self-serving ends, 
not because of cordial friendship.152 The Soviet Union, though, found itself obliged 
to fight on the same side with the “capitalist” states for its own survival, and 
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undertook some commitments later at Moscow and Tehran, both of which 
undoubtedly indicated some tendency to modify the previous concept of 
irreconcilability between “socialism” and “capitalism.” Stalin was not fully 
convinced that this new policy of collaboration with capitalist states would 
succeed.153 However, in light of the Russian political tradition “preoccupation with 
the interpretation rather than the letter of an agreement,” there would be little danger, 
for Stalin, in incurring obligations which Russia itself would be able to interpret 
unilaterally when the time came to deliver.154 At least, this cooperation would assure 
western material aid during the prosecution of the war, and for the reconstruction of 
the devastated country after the war. With all these considerations in mind, Stalin 
aimed to exploit, to the utmost, the circumstances that confronted him, and used 
cooperation merely as a means of facilitating attainment of far-reaching Soviet 
objectives at his allies’ expense.155
In this connection there was nothing inconsistent with Soviet history, theory, 
or practice, which could lead the other “democratic nations” in these years to the 
illusion that it was possible to reason with the Kremlin into accepting steadfastly the 
principle of cooperation for the sake of cooperation with them along the broad 
principles of the Atlantic Charter in the conduct of international affairs in the postwar 
era. “…it is [was] not possible to create “international good will” with them,” argued 
Laurence Steinhardt, American Ambassador in Turkey, already in 1941, “that they 
will always sacrifice the future in favor of an immediate gain, and that they are not 
affected by ethical or moral considerations, nor guided by the relationships which are 
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customary between individuals of culture and breeding.”156 Attitudes and actions of 
the Soviet government in relations, including the early Lend-Lease meetings between 
the Harriman-Beaverbrook mission and Stalin supported those contentions, and 
became the early indications of Soviet thought. Even at a crucial time when great 
swathes of Soviet territory was enveloped by Hitler in September 1941 and the need 
for Allied assistance was high, it was not accidental that Stalin brought up the 
“political issue of Allied peace objectives” and “the matter of German reparations” 
after the war as the main items on the agenda for consideration. It evidently showed 
Stalin’s future expectations from this temporary association. 
But when the end of the war approached, and thereby the common need that 
had provided the very reason for the alliance and held it together in subsequent years 
was removed, a revision of the policy became an inescapable reality for the 
administrations in Washington and London. Differences in political policies of the 
wartime Big Three about postwar international order had begun to unfold. When the 
US Ambassador transmitted a dispatch to Washington about a “startling turn” in 
Soviet attitudes, both leaders of the “free world” had already been caught in a 
dilemma that unless they accepted the Soviet position in Eastern Europe, they would 
not be judged as friends.157 Nothing, which they could do, short of a military 
confrontation with Moscow, could alter it. This irreversible situation, of course, did 
not fully conform to the early calculations, which assumed that the Kremlin would 
collaborate with them in their terms for the postwar world order. Instead, they were 
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being enforced “to accept all Soviet policies backed by the strength and prestige of 
the Red Army” because it won the war for them.158  
Indeed it was understood precisely that the “democratic nations” and the 
Soviet Union had a “different concept of understanding.” Moscow was genuinely 
placing different connotations to words, including wartime declarations, than the 
Americans and Britons.159 Each side interpreted the terms, especially the principal 
tenets of the postwar order in their own way. Thus, when Russians spoke of insisting 
on “friendly governments” in their neighboring countries,160 or of “security” as well 
as “democracy,” they had in mind naturally something quite different from their 
capitalist allies. Consequently, the lack of accord in understanding indicated political 
consequences when the Red Army “liberated” Eastern Europe.  
Terminological diversity notwithstanding, even at a time when the fall of 
Germany was in sight, there had been no “agreed and mutually acceptable political 
program” in regard to what would be necessary to enhance and preserve close 
collaboration in the postwar era between the Allied powers.161 Meanwhile the 
wartime declarations in this respect about peaceful postwar world order carried a 
certain perfunctory quality. Still at Yalta when the very real danger to the hope of 
stable peace after the end of war existed, Churchill and Roosevelt furthered the 
“appeasement” policy, because of their wartime practical interests. In order “to save 
American lives” and have the support of the Soviet Union to defeat Germany and 
then to defeat Japan when the war in Europe was over, they supported the Soviet 
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arguments in a direct or indirect way.162 Further, the deal on “spheres of influence,” 
that implicitly operated since October 1944, gave Stalin a moral justification to 
further his objectives in Eastern Europe. In this respect, Molotov’s indications on a 
number of occasions to Harriman summarized the consequences of their policies. 
Russians, quoted Harriman, “considered that after they had put us on notice of a 
Soviet policy or plan and we did not at that time object, we had acquiesced in and 
accepted the Soviet position.”163  
In the end, it is difficult to put one’s finger on the origins of the cold war 
without referring to the history of relationship between the wartime Big Three before 
and during the war. It is the easiest way to explain the causes of the postwar-short-of-
war situation by referring to the aggressive conduct of the Kremlin or personally to 
Stalin in international affairs. Asserting the contrary should not mean that the Soviet 
Union was innocent. But it was hard to contend that there was a change in the 
fundamental policy or attitude of Moscow toward the “democratic nations.” In other 
words, it was impossible to argue that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union 
conducted before the establishment of the alliance, especially between 1939 and 
1941, resembled the foreign policy pursued in postwar years; that was assumed later 
as the trouble spots between the parties. It might well be that postwar developments 
brought to the surface the underlying attitudes of democratic nations. Since sufficient 
solidarity with the Soviet Union was needed to complete the victory over Germany 
and end the war against Japan, the United States or Great Britain did not risk any 
venture with Moscow. But, the evolution of events indicated that where Americans 
and English left a vacuum, or deferred a decision, Russians moved in. The West 
reaped the harvest of its “appeasement” policy pursued during the war. The result 
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prevailed as physical possession of Eastern Europe by the Soviet Army and a chance 
to pursue its political objectives in that territory. Westerners tried to fill this vacuum 
in the years following the end of the war, but it was too late for a negotiated 
settlement. They were not able to enforce the Kremlin to interpret wartime 
declarations in particular and the world in general in their own way—a situation that 
set the stage for the postwar confrontation. 
In sum, there were three major issues. In the first place were limits of power. 
Secondly, the dichotomy in US foreign policy, between realism and liberalism, was 
executed by realism in decision-making. Lastly, the continuation in Russian/Soviet 
foreign policy of reaching for buffer zones prevailed. It is now evident, albeit in 
retrospect, Turkey realized by 1944 that it might become one of those buffer zones. 
Except that this time, however in vehemently the İnönü government perceived it, 
Turkey was in a position to freely choose sides in the upcoming polarized world. 
 
 
3.1. Turkish- Russian Relations prior to Post-War Crisis 
 
A glance at the history of Turkish-Russian relations would show that 
centuries-long rivalry (18th- 19th centuries) for regional influence-both in the 
Caucasus and Balkans marked this relationship. Since either one or the other power 
had in the European state system a shared history, one side expanded over at the 
expense of the other. When the tide started to turn in favor of tsarist Russia, the 
Ottoman Empire sought to relieve Muscovite danger by acting on the balance of 
power, between Russia and the western powers, especially Great Britain. However, 
when the interests of the western powers and Russian Empire coincided, for the first 
time in history during the First World War, the Ottoman Empire could not escape 
from being prey to them.  
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Thus, the First World War happened to be the last stage of the Ottoman- 
tsarist Russia relations. In this stage, Russian demands during the wartime secret 
arrangements among the Entente powers for the partition of the Ottoman Empire 
evidenced and in a sense summarized century-long Russian aspirations over the 
Ottoman Empire. However, the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 provided a setback on 
the part of Russian Empire to realize its “time-honored aspirations” and opened a 
new page in Turco-Russian relationship. This revolution also became the turning 
point in Turkish- Russian relations which initiated a new era. 
Although the main theme of this thesis centers on the period immediately 
following the Second World War, it has also proved necessary to cover the period 
before and during the war. This chapter, therefore, retraces the successive stages in 
the development of Turco-Soviet relations until the end of the Second World War. In 
order to put issues in perspective, this study will start with a brief survey of Turco-
Russian relations, focusing on the reasons, influences and factors, which caused and 
speeded up the rapprochement between the two countries during the interwar period. 
The second part will examine the relationship in the context of the whole 
international configuration during the Second World War and evaluate the 
relationship on the basis of shifts in both Turkish and Soviet policies. The 
investigation of Turco-Soviet relations both during the interwar years and during the 
war is most enlightening, as it enables one to comprehend the post-Second World 
War crisis between the two neighboring countries, which in turn affected and 
reflected the policies of the other great powers.  
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3.1.1. A Period of Peaceful Interregnum  
 
World War I ended officially on November 11, 1918. Nonetheless, the end of 
this global hostility did not bring peace to the geography of the Ottomans and 
Russians, but turbulent times for the two countries. On the part of Turkey, the 
armistice of Mudros (October, 1918), which provided for a total and unconditional 
surrender of the Ottoman Empire, led to a national resistance movement, though 
scattered but intact, all over the Anatolian homeland. When the “peace” treaty of 
Sèvres was signed in August 1920 by the Ottoman representatives, a Turkish national 
assembly apart from the İstanbul government had already been established in 
Ankara, which unified, to a considerable extent, the national resistance movement 
under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal [Atatürk].164 The Turkish nationalists under 
the leadership of Mustafa Kemal were struggling to thwart the imperialist powers’ 
envisaged plan to partition their homeland and to replace the Sultan’s government 
with a national government. Simultaneously, the northern neighbor of the Turks for 
centuries, Russians (the Bolsheviks), were increasingly preoccupied, after 
overthrowing tsarism by the October revolution, with preserving and consolidating 
their hold against internal and external military challenges. Thus, in the same period, 
both the Turks and Russians were beleaguered by the interventionist powers and 
preoccupied with safeguarding their national integrity against them.  
Under these conditions, the coincidence of common opposition against 
interventions in order to assert themselves as new national entities in the same period 
merged the two emerging states in the practical field of common interest.165 Thus, in 
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this development of mutual interests, it was not unnatural that a process of 
rapprochement took place between the two infant revolutionary states. This closeness 
of national interests enabled the two emerging states to put aside historical rivalries 
and ambitions that each of them associated with a discredited past.  
However, at that point, it should be noted that this rapprochement was not 
immune to confusions on both sides. On the part of Turks, a climate of confusion and 
suspicion prevailed since the initial stage of the War of Independence. The very 
reason for these confusions and suspicions was simply the lack of information about 
what Bolshevism was which led to the dilemma in the minds of ruling class about on 
what bases the future relationship with Bolshevik Russia should be established.166 On 
the other part, to turn the Turkish independence movement into a "revolutionary 
movement" that would embrace all eastern peoples appeared as the main idea in the 
Soviet leaders minds.167 Although, cognizant of the fact that “the movement headed 
by Kemal is not a Communist movement,”168 they still kept encouraging and 
supporting the communist Turkish factions in the Caucasus who were waiting for the 
defeat of the ongoing national movement on Turkish soil and preparing the ground 
for communism in Turkey.   
Under these circumstances, in building policy toward the Bolsheviks, 
Mustafa Kemal and his inner circle were inspired and guided mainly by interrelated 
but at the same time paradoxical objectives: to obtain military/ financial aid from the 
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Bolsheviks169 but at the same time to “check,” during the interval until independence 
was achieved, the possible penetration of Bolshevism into the Turkish lands.170 By 
careful observance of these objectives, the Turks achieved to establish the first 
diplomatic bond with Bolshevik Russia. On March 16, 1921 the Treaty of Friendship 
and Fraternity was signed between the Government of the Russian Socialist 
Federative Soviet Republic171 and the Government of the Grand National Assembly 
of Turkey. 
This treaty carried much more importance for Ankara than Bolshevik Russia 
where civil war and the Allied intervention had been successfully overcome. 
Generally speaking, this treaty provided Turkey in the short term with comfort in the 
eastern front, which was assumed to be much more important than the material help 
in arms and money given by Moscow to carry forward the Turkish National War of 
Independence.172 In the long term, the common frontier of the two nations was 
delineated in the Caucasus (Article 1, 2), “final settlement of the international status 
of the Black Sea and the Straits” was agreed to be solved without “harming Turkey’s 
sovereignty in any way” (Article 5), and former treaties “hitherto concluded between 
the two countries [that] fail to conform their mutual interest” were renounced 
(Article 6, 7).173  
By this treaty, a new era of friendly collaboration with the Russians was 
opened. But also by this treaty, the new relationship started to take its real shape. 
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Through the provisions and the sprint on which the Moscow treaty was based, all 
possible cause of friction - mainly the questions of Armenian and the Straits- seemed 
to be solved with mutual understanding. However, a real test in this relationship had 
to do with the Lausanne Peace Conference in 1923. During the sessions of the 
conference, which dealt with the question of the Straits, the Turkish delegation failed 
to support either Soviet opposition to the Allied suggestions or their own principles, 
and felt obliged to accept the compromise solution suggested by the Allied 
powers.174  
While Soviets unwillingly signed the treaty, though never ratified it, a degree 
of estrangement was inescapable. The Turkish stance during the Conference was 
contrary to the sprint of the relevant provision of the Moscow Treaty as well as to the 
interests of the Soviets. However, in their opposition of Western imperialism, this 
situation did not seem to drive a serious wedge between the two states. Both of them 
were cognizant of the fact that they were left isolated and needed peaceful relations 
rather than hostility between themselves as well as the European powers. This was 
the case again in 1925 when the two countries demonstratively signed the Treaty of 
Neutrality and Mutual Non-Aggression.175 The underlying reason for the renewal of 
Turco-Soviet friendship was a reaction to the unfavorable settlements confronted 
separately by both states in the international arena.176 In 1929, a new dimension was 
added to the relationship when the two parties decided to extend the 1925 Treaty for 
two more years. In it, the two states accepted that they would not enter into political 
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negotiations with a neighboring nation without consulting the other and not to 
conclude any agreement without concurrence of the other.177 In this respect, Turkey 
sought Soviet approval before joining the League of Nations in 1932 as well as 
before forming the Saadabad Pact in 1937.  
In the later years down to the World War II, Turkish- Soviet relationship 
continued to be “a reverse function of the differences both parties had with the 
western powers.”178 In this fragile period, the Turkish government, despite its 
obvious western orientation and its stubborn attitude toward communism, succeeded 
in keeping its relations with the Soviet Union at a favorable level. However, since 
differences of the parties with western powers started to diminish in the light of 
emerging threats from Europe in the mid-1930s, tendencies of the parties changed in 
a parallel way.  
This situation became obvious during the Montreux Conference of 1936. 
Although Turkey and the Soviet Union had been in complete accord at the time 
conference convened, the Soviets changed their position without informing the Turks 
beforehand. They displayed a sense of reluctance to concede to Turkey full control of 
the Straits that somewhat clouded the friendship. However, what was more critical 
for the future of the relationship was the unofficial proposal of the Foreign 
Commissar Maxim Maximovich Litvinov about the bilateral Soviet-Turkish pact for 
joint defense of the Straits and in turn attitude of the Turks to this overture. In 
response to it, Turkish government not only displayed strict resistance, but also 
                                                 
177 Full text in Güngör, 290-1. It was interesting that the supplementary protocol which counted the neighboring nations of each other was 
kept secret.  
178 Kennan, Soviet Foreign Policy, 66. 
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informed Britain about the Soviet move, which indeed really annoyed the Soviet 
government.179  
Therefore, the Montreux Conference could be taken as one of the breaking 
points in Turkish-Soviet relationship. It became clear that there were no longer 
common interests as had existed during the 1920s. The Soviet press, which supported 
Turkey for its struggle against imperialism, began from that moment on to charge 
Turkey with playing the game of the “imperialist powers.”180 At this juncture, it is 
worth noting that the underlying reason for Soviet coolness was the new western 
orientation of the Turkish government and specifically the renewed cordiality 
between Britain and Turkey.181 On the Turkish part, “a certain amount of suspicion 
arose” and in consequence, “Turkish policy reoriented away from the Soviets and 
towards Britain.”182 This process of reorientation in Turkish policy continued with an 
increasing trend until 1939 and culminated in Anglo-French-Turkish alliance in that 
year. 
However, the cordial relationship appeared to continue after Montreux. As 
the Soviets did not further insist on their unfriendly attitude toward Turkey, most 
probably due to the deteriorating international situation in Europe, the relationship 
continued as before Montreux until the crucial year, 1939. However, the “cordial” 
relations came to end, according to Saracoğlu, just after the Anglo-French-Turkish 
treaty was signed on October 19, 1939: 
From that time on Soviets no longer kept Turkey informed of their 
negotiations with neighboring powers and after a while Turks ceased 
furnishing similar information to the Soviets. While relations between 
                                                 
179 İsmail Soysal, “1936 Montreux Boğazlar Sözleşmesi ve Sonradan Çıkan Sorunlar,” in Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisi: 200 Yıllık Süreç (Ankara: 
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[the] two countries continued to be “correct,” the former friendship and 
intimacy no longer existed.183  
 
Thus, the process of rapprochement that began early in the 1920s, proved to 
be temporary and opportunistic before the war. As Mustafa Kemal put it upon the 
treaty with Bolshevik Russia, the success of the treaty depended on the future 
attitudes of the two parties and more specifically on not changing their position under 
the effect of their old customs or for any other reason.184 The developments of the 
period seemed to imply Moscow’s return to its old (tsarist) customs. Whatever the 
exact reason was for changing its position, the new conjuncture prohibited a 
reasonable relationship which had been maintained with considerable success for two 
decades. Having stated this factor though, the Nazi threat to Soviet Russia should 
also be born in mind. 
 
 
3.1.2. The Situation during the War 
 
The relationship between the two countries during the Second World War 
followed an uneasy pattern. Contrasted with the pre-war situation, it developed 
within a broader context, in which the relationship could no longer be taken as an 
isolated issue. Their dealings with European powers rather than mutually became 
much more influential in shaping the relationship during the period under review. 
More specifically, Soviet relations with Germany appeared as the determining factor 
for the relationship of the two neighboring powers. Therefore, in contrast to the 
relatively consistent pattern of the relationship in the pre-war period, sharp turning 
points reasoned by Soviets’ as well as Turkey’s changing wartime positions were 
                                                 
183 FRUS, 1942, vol.4, The Ambassador in Turkey to the Secretary of State, 820. 
184 The letter of Mustafa Kemal to Enver Pasha on October 4, 1920. A copy of this letter could be found in Borak, 215-8. 
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observed during the war. Accordingly, the wartime period of the relationship should 
be examined through three interlinked periods.  
The first period began with the efforts of the countries to draw their line of 
action in face of the approaching war. To this end, Turkey, intent on associating itself 
with Great Britain without hurting its relations with the Soviets, whose friendship 
was held in high esteem, was far more eager for a tie between Britain and the Soviet 
Union.185 Therefore, while discussions for a mutual assistance pact with Britain went 
on, Turkey assigned itself a mediatory role when the Anglo-French-Soviet 
negotiations reached an impassé. In the words of Saracoğlu, Turkey hoped that it 
could constitute itself as “a bridge across the gap between Britain and France and the 
Soviet Union.”186 On the other hand, meanwhile Moscow was vacillating between 
different foreign policy options. The Soviet Union, on the one hand, gave the 
impression during Soviet Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Vladimir 
Potemkin’s visit (April 28-May 5), who made favorable remarks concerning the 
Anglo-Turkish Declaration of Mutual Co-operation and Assistance in the 
Mediterranean and the Balkans, that it would take the same course.187 On the other 
hand, the Kremlin considered rapprochement with Germany among its possible 
policies. To that effect, it had already made tentative efforts to improve relations with 
Berlin, which culminated in a Non-Aggression Pact in August 23.188 Therefore, it 
conducted the pact negotiations with Britain and Turkey in a dilatory manner in order 
to gain time to see the result of its negotiations with Germany. Moscow thought in 
                                                 
185 While Turkey’s main policy during the war and immediate prewar era was to maintain its neutrality as long as possible, it struggled to align 
itself with western powers, especially with Great Britain in order to “insure” itself in case it had to enter the war. For President İsmet İnönü’s 
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furtherance of this plan that it could induce Turkey to “act at the same time and in the 
same manner” as the Soviet Union.189
At this juncture, Saracoğlu negotiations of autumn 1939 carried utmost 
importance. The two sides saw the negotiations as the last chance to induce the other 
to act in the same manner as the other. Although this hope of Ankara had been 
demolished and complicated by the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, Turkey 
did not abandon its efforts in that direction. Under these circumstances, negotiations 
between the Turkish Foreign Minister, Saracoğlu and Stalin began officially on 
September 26 in Moscow. After several attempts were made to reach a mutual 
understanding, the negotiations failed on October 16, at the time when it seemed to 
promise a favorable result.190 The reason for this failure was the Soviet suggestion for 
an arrangement in their favor concerning the provisions of the Montreux Convention 
and a reservation regarding Germany.191
Thus, the period of hard bargaining during the last days of peace and in the 
first days of the war ended with unexpected results. Contrary to the initial hope of 
Turkish policy makers for an improvement in the relations between Russia and Great 
Britain through Turkey, Ankara found itself in a new, unexpected, and in many ways 
disturbing situation. To the displeasure of the Soviets, Turkey signed the Tripartite 
Pact of 1939 with Britain and France on October 19, 1939, which proved to be 
anchor of Turkish foreign policy throughout the Second World War. The Soviets 
envisaged this fact to be against Germany, with which the Moscow linked its interim 
                                                 
189 Ibid., 20. 
190 During the last meeting before the close of the negations, Stalin said he would sign Soviet-Turk treaty. However, as early as on 9 October 
(since October 1 no meeting had taken place), Molotov expressed the view that “in all likelihood a mutual assistance pact with Turkey would 
not be concluded.” Ibid., 120. 
191 İsmet İnönü, “Türkiye üzerine bir makale.” Ulus, 15 September 1947. 
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fate.192 But it is quite interesting that despite the Soviet attitude toward Turkey, 
Turkish officialdom described the Turkish-Soviet relationship as “correct” but 
lacking “former friendship and intimacy.”193 In addition, while the Tripartite Act was 
geared singly and totally against a military threat emanating from the Mediterranean 
(i.e. Italy) the extremely cautious Soviet sensitivity over the rapprochement between 
Rome & Berlin is noteworthy. 
Nonetheless, the inner side of the relationship in this period was different 
from what appeared to be. Ever since the failure of the negotiations in 1939, 
considerable uneasiness dominated strategic considerations in Ankara. The most 
important reason for this uneasiness was the vagueness of the attitude and policy of 
the Soviet Union in this period. On the one hand, Turkish leaders hoped that trend of 
events would gradually force restoration of the cordial relations that formerly existed 
between Turkey and Russia possible.194 On the other hand, the same leaders were 
apprehensive about the possible aggressive policies of the Soviets in regard to the 
Straits or to the Eastern provinces of Turkey.195 These apprehensions of the Turks 
emanated partly from Russian military activities in Eastern Europe in the summer of 
1940. But more importantly, political aggression of Germany against Turkey was the 
main source of apprehension for the Turkish government. 
During the occupation of France certain documents purporting to show 
the support of Turkey for French and the British intentions directed 
against Russia were made public. France and Great Britain were 
dissatisfied at the delivery of materials to Germany in accordance with 
                                                 
192 Turkey insisted on a reservation in the pact in respect to the Soviet Union whereby the Tripartite Pact would not obligate the Turkish 
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193 FRUS, 1942, vol.4, The Ambassador in Turkey to the Secretary of State, 820. 
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the Russo-German Pact. The Soviet Union did not conceal its displeasure 
at Turkey’s alliance with France and Great Britain. The Germans, when 
they published the French documents, were working zealously, in a tense 
political atmosphere, to create armed conflict between Turkey and 
Russia, and seeing Turkey isolated, they believed that, as was the case 
with Romania, it would be drawn closer to them against an eventual 
Russian aggression.196  
 
However, German White Papers delivered to the Soviets seemed inadequate 
to be an effective source of friction, let alone creating armed conflict between the 
two neighboring states. But they were enough to increase uneasiness in high circles 
in Ankara as reflected in İnönü’s speech of July 12. In this speech, the Turkish 
President emphasized the readiness of Turkish people to take up arms to defend their 
independence and integrity. His speech was generally meant to convey a warning to 
Moscow not to make any demands which would impair either the independence or 
the territorial integrity of Turkey.197 Around the same time, Molotov read a report at 
the joint session of the Supreme Soviet, in which he stated that although the relation 
had been qualified since July by the German White Papers leaked, there had taken 
place no important changes in the relations of the Soviet Union with Turkey.198
But in the following months, Molotov, as if to give substance to Turkish 
apprehensions, was immersed in some long range diplomatic activities together with 
Hitler and Ribbentrop in Berlin. In the course of conversations, Soviet government 
demanded from Hitler as conditions for accepting the proposed Four Power Pact, a 
base within range of the Straits and recognition “the area south of Batum and Baku in 
the general direction of the Persian Gulf as the centre of the aspirations of the Soviet 
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Union.”199 According to the files of the German High Naval Command, Molotov 
also requested in addition to bases in the Straits the Kars-Ardahan region of 
Turkey.200 Additional evidence, which became available to the Turkish authorities 
after a while, was the offer by Arkady Sobolev, then General Secretary of the Soviet 
Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, to Bulgarians to partition Turkish Thrace.201  
Despite all these aggressive demarchés of the Soviets, there were no 
proposals to the Turkish government in regard either to the modification of the 
regime of the Straits or to territorial rectification. Nonetheless, this situation did not 
reflect a change in Soviet policy toward Turkey. This was related more with the 
relationship between Germany and the Soviet Union. New problems emanating from 
the implementation of the Secret Protocol of German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact 
created grave concerns about German intentions in the minds of high circles in the 
Kremlin. Moreover, the Soviet government was still awaiting an answer from Berlin 
in regard to its statement of position of November 25 concerning the issues raised 
during the Berlin discussions.202  
At this juncture, German forces, after occupation of Greece, appeared at the 
western borders of Turkey. In Ankara, it was mainly assumed that Hitler had two 
options at that moment- descending to the Middle East through Turkey or attacking 
the Soviet Union from the west, - while the later option found more supporters.203 
The general view in Ankara was, therefore, that Germany could not afford the Soviet 
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army in its backyard and, therefore, Hitler would firstly attack the Soviet Union. 
However, the Turkish leaders were also aware of the fact that Hitler needed to 
ensure, at least, Turkish neutrality before embarking on an offensive upon the 
Soviets;204 otherwise Turkey could face the same eventuality. Therefore, fear of a 
possible German offensive over Turkey seemed as natural and primary reason, which 
had been instrumental on the part of Turkey in bringing about the Turkish- German 
Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression Pact.  
Nonetheless, other considerations that could plausibly be assumed to have 
played a non-negligible role in signing the treaty were taken into consideration in the 
decision-making process of the Turkish ruling elite. It had been neither fear of 
German attack nor fear of Soviet attack alone that occupied the minds of the Turkish 
leaders during and before 1942. Rather it was the likelihood of an alignment between 
Germany and Soviet Union.205 Therefore, it might well be argued that Turkish 
leaders under fear and antagonism toward the Soviets, which had come to exist in 
Turkish high circles,206 regarded the Treaty with Germany as a way to impede 
alignment of Germany with the Soviets. Inseparably linked with this consideration of 
the Turks were the advantages Germany would gain from this treaty- protection of 
their right flank in the German-Russian struggle, and thereby, facilitate the German-
Russian war. 
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Then not unexpectedly, only three days after signing of the treaty between 
Turkey and Germany came the Operation Barbarossa. Turkey declared its neutrality 
in the face of the German-Soviet war. Meanwhile upon the news of German attack 
on the USSR, a release of tension was observed in Turkish high circles, who had 
been under enormous stress during the passing months and managed to avert, at least 
for a while, the two possible menaces from their country. Also an “atmosphere of 
festival” was apparent around the country.207  
It was also specifically during this period that some Turks including several 
senior officials ventured into some dangerous activities, which inevitably were 
perceived by the Soviets as a threat to them. One of these issues, indeed the most 
dangerous one to Turkish international relations, especially with the Soviets, was the 
German sponsored208 Pan-Turanist movements within Turkey. It began effectively 
after the outbreak of German-Soviet war, mostly as a part of the German attempt to 
convince Ankara to enter the war on the side of Germany. For the Pan-Turkists, the 
Second World War was a unique opportunity, which they had been waiting, for 
realization of their goals. Therefore, the hopes and activities of Pan-Turkists to unite 
of all Turkish people increased in direct proportion to German victories on the Soviet 
Union.209 This increase in Pan-Turkist sentiments and indeed aggressiveness toward 
the Soviet Union were best observed from the Turkish media and publications during 
that period. 
As to the policy of the Government itself this state of affairs in the following 
years until 1943, it was ostensibly different from its pre-war policies, which had 
especially been established and pursued by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. While there is 
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no concrete evidence to suggest that the Government of Turkey itself officially 
favored and supported Pan-Turkist leanings in that period,210 its policy of aloofness 
from this state of affairs alone formed such a flagrant contrast to what the regime and 
the government had been standing for. Moreover, it was observed that the Turkish 
government’s attitude toward Pan-Turanian leanings developed from strong official 
opposition to a mild tolerance during that period. Also this development in the 
Government’s attitude naturally brought about “the lessening of Turkish sensitivity 
to possible Russian criticism of such activity.”211  
But it should also be noted that the change in the attitude of the Government 
was not true in essence and therefore, need not be interpreted as a possible change in 
the official position of the Turkish ruling elite toward this movement. It should rather 
be taken up as an attempt of the Turkish government to bend with the course of 
events after the German offensive on the Soviet Union.212 In its “ticklish” 
international position, keeping a closed eye to the flaring Pan-Turanist sentiments in 
Turkish media and winking at some “unofficial” contacts of Turkish statesmen with 
German officials, the government pursued two mixed policies. On the one side, the 
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Government sought to mollify German pressure on Turkey by giving the impression 
that they had mutual feelings toward a possible unity of Turkic elements in the 
Caucasus under Germany’s authority after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In other 
words, the Pan-Turanianism was used as an issue in Governments diplomatic efforts 
to keep its neutrality in the face of German pressure to drag Turkey into war against 
the Soviets.213 On the other side, Ankara sought to keep the Pan-Turanian movement 
under close observation and control, which was assumed to be inevitably on the 
agenda in the event of a German victory over the Soviets. In other words, it was part 
of the Government’s effort to cover all options by providing a contingency plan in 
the event of clear German victory.”214 Under these considerations, Pan-Turanian 
movements continued to play a role in Turkey’s relations with Germany on a course 
following German advances in the Soviet Union. 
On the Soviet side, a process of reorientation in their attitude toward Turkey 
was initiated as the military and political situation in Europe progressed to their 
disadvantage. But it was, however, shortly after the German attack that the Soviet 
Union as the new ally of Britain issued a declaration: 
The Soviet Government confirm their fidelity to the Montreux 
Convention and assure the Turkish Government that they have no 
aggressive intentions or claims with regard to the Straits. The Soviet 
Government, as also His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, 
are prepared to render every help and assistance in the event of her being 
attacked by any European power.215
 
The second period started by this declaration, during which the Soviets 
needed Turkish friendliness more than the Turks needed them. Especially after the 
German attack on the Soviet Union, which made the friendship or at least neutrality 
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of Turkey extremely important, the Soviet government reiterated, on every occasion, 
its assurances about Turkey’s territorial integrity, including “Straits and all Turk 
interests” in order to attract Ankara to join the Allied block. Nevertheless, Turkish 
leaders no longer entertained the thought that “after about 20 instances in which 
since war began Turks had suggested to Soviets various bases for new 
rapprochement” friendship between the two countries could be restored.216 On the 
contrary, they were convinced that Moscow was definitely hostile to Turkey. 
However, despite all these anti-Russian sentiments in Turkish high circles, there 
seemed no official change in the attitude of Turkey toward the Soviets.  
In this period, the eventuality of war between Germany and Russia played a 
considerable role in forming Turkish foreign policy in regard to western powers and 
the Soviet Union. While neither side’s defeat was more favorable to the Turks, it 
became evident in the later stages of the war that, Turkish ruling classes “greatly 
feared a German defeat, Soviet predominance and the bolshevization of Europe.”217 
Parallel with this observation, the President of Turkey, İsmet İnönü, in a conversation 
with the American Ambassador, Laurence Steinhardt, expressed his grave concern 
about the result of a possible victory of the Soviet Union over Germany: “Soviet 
imperialism to over-run Europe and the Middle East.”218 On the other hand, despite 
the Non-Aggression Pact, German threat was still a factor that the Turkish 
government could not disregard in any sense. It was not difficult for Turkish leaders 
to realize that German victory would mean the end of Turkish independence. 
Therefore, Turkey hoped that Germany would exhaust its resources in Russia, 
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otherwise, as Marshal Fevzi Çakmak expressed, “We realize that if Germany has a 
quick success over Russia we will be next sheep for slaughter…”219  
With these considerations, the best policy in order to meet all diplomatic and 
military eventualities was to preserve neutrality and wait for the results. This 
expected time came in the last months of 1942, when the military tide turned in favor 
of the Soviet Union after the victories in the Battle of Stalingrad. This time also 
marked the beginning of Soviet pressure on Turkey, which followed an increasing 
trend parallel with the military situation in the war. For the Soviets, “the neutrality of 
Turkey became increasingly more favorable and necessary to Germany as Turkey 
secures the safety of the Balkan flank for the German armies, and allows the 
Germans to continue to hold very limited forces there and to concentrate the 
overwhelming proportion of the German troops on the Soviet-German front…”220 
Therefore, the Soviets, for whom the preservation of Turkish neutrality had been an 
important strategic consideration, started to employ pressure directly or through 
Britain and US to persuade Turkey to abandon its neutrality and take an active part in 
the war against Germany. Soviet pressure included an assassination attempt on the 
German Ambassador in Ankara, Franz von Papen through the machinations of the 
NKVD.221
For its own part, apprehensive of its position during and after the war in view 
of the increasing political and military strength of the Soviets, Turkey began its 
struggle to improve its position in the face of the Soviets. To this end, Ankara lost 
little time to approach the Soviet ambassador in Ankara on February 13, 1943 to start 
negotiations for the improvement of Soviet-Turkish relations. Turkish parleys with 
the Soviets were intended to establish closer political cooperation through an 
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agreement with them. The military situation, however, made it more tempting for the 
Soviets to act with greater boldness in their dealings with the Turks. The reply of the 
Soviets, therefore, reflected this boldness as well as their sense of “betrayal”:  
…under the conditions, when the Balkans are at present in the hands of 
Germany, which is waging war against the USSR and with which Turkey 
is not in a state of war, but is bound with a friendship treaty and is 
rendering her economic aid, the proposal by the Turkish Government of 
political cooperation and consultation in respect to the Balkans is losing 
its significance without Turkey basically changing its relations with 
Germany.222
 
Britain, albeit for its own reasons, started to harbor the same view in regard to 
the Turkish position after the situation in the battlefield had changed around 1943.223 
Apart from the shared Allied cause to shorten the war against Germany, the 
Whitehall had another motive to urge Turkey to take an active part in the conflict- to 
prevent possible Soviet expansion into the Balkans with the collaboration of 
Turkey.224 Therefore, the year 1943 represented for Turkey increasing pressures from 
its ally, the Great Britain. Against these increasing pressure from London, Turkey 
generally put forward two concerns. The first was related with the military situation 
that could plausibly affect Turkey. More specifically, it was the German threat, 
which, for the Turks, was still strong enough, notwithstanding serious defeats in the 
face of Soviet forces, to inflict great damage to Turkey.225 The second and also the 
main concern of the Turks was political dangers surrounding their entry into the war 
which was somewhat identical with that of British: Russian predominance in the 
Balkans after German forces withdrew and thereby left a power vacuum in the 
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area.226 For the Turks, the Soviets would fill the power vacuum either by occupying 
the area including the Turkish straits as liberators or by act of aggression.227 At this 
juncture, although the ultimate concern was identical, it was the question of tactics 
that drove a wedge between Turkey and Britain. To the Turkish mind, Russia would 
not attack Turkey, if Ankara stayed out and “remained strong and intact.” However, 
Britain thought the opposite. 
During that period, Britain did not refrain from engaging in different tactics to 
convince Turkey to enter the war on the Allied camp. It should be noted that British 
tactics proved to be detrimental to Turkish national interests, if not during the war, in 
the immediate postwar era for these tactics gave most probably the impression to 
Stalin, he had in post war era, that the Soviet Union would be in a position to get 
every advantage from an isolated Turkey without facing British opposition. Churchill 
especially personally took a conciliatory attitude towards Russian aspirations, 
specifically in regard to the Turkish Straits. At the Tehran Conference in November 
1943, in order to give an Allied ultimatum to Turkey, Churchill assumed the mission 
of informing the Turks the price of a refusal. Ankara’s refusal to accept the Allied 
ultimatum “would have very serious political and territorial consequences for 
Turkey, particularly in regard to the future status of the Straits.”228 For Churchill, it 
was a simple calculation for Ankara: Turkey, provided that it entered the war on the 
Allied side, would make good use of British alliance in postwar era when it had to 
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confront its fear of the Soviet menace; if not, Ankara would find itself alone vis-à-vis 
the Soviets.  
On the other side, not different from what Germans did, British policy makers 
tried, for their own ends, to make use of Turkish fear of the Russians. Even on the 
way of his first meeting at Adana with İnönü, Churchill harbored the idea in his mind 
that “he would not undertake to control the Russians regarding the Dardanelles,” if 
Turkey did not abandon its policy of neutrality in favor of the Allied powers.229 
While this did not become the case during the meeting at Adana, it was during the 
meeting between the Turkish and British Foreign Ministers at Cairo that Ankara was 
threatened to be left in “the unenviable position in which Turkey would find itself 
vis-à-vis the Russians in the event it declined to meet British wishes.”230 However, 
what was much more striking was the fact that during this discussion, the two 
ministers, who should be assumed to be on the same side, found themselves on the 
opposite sides. While Anthony Eden was annoyed by Turkish discourses on Soviet’s 
post-war position, which seemed to them “little more than echoes of Axis 
propaganda,” Menemencioğlu did not behave shyly and accused him of acting as 
spokesman not only for Britain but for Russia as well.231  
Along with these emerging realities in the international arena, Ankara set in 
motion a series of moves designed to smooth its relations both with the Soviets and 
other members of the Allied powers- Britain and the US. To this end, Turkey ceased 
transporting chromite to Germany upon serious protests from London and 
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Washington,232 when they also wanted the resignation of Foreign Minister Numan 
Menemencioğlu, who had been the target of bitter focus of Britain for his claimed 
pro-Axis stance.233 Apart from these moves, Ankara was preoccupied in getting rid 
of a dangerous issue concerning its relations with the Soviets. This preoccupation 
reflected in the repressive raids with wide publicity against a secret “society” that 
was accused of propagating Pan-Turanian ideas. The persons, who were assumed to 
be members of this society, were accused of forming the society to engage in racist 
and Pan-Turkist propaganda in Turkey.234 However, it was understood from 
President İnönü’s address on the occasion of “Youth and Sport Day, May 19” that 
the Turkish government’s action against this group and thereby this movement was 
intended not only to prevent the formation of any potential revolutionary group 
within the country. But this action also represented a desire to obliterate a possible 
source of friction between Turkey and Soviet Russia and sweeten, if possible, the 
relationship by presenting this action as a concession to the Soviets.235  
However, the Soviets were far from being impressed by suppression of Pan-
Turanists. The whole affair was regarded by the Russians, as revealed in their press 
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and radio, nothing more than “eyewash.”236 From that time on, it became clear that 
the Soviets, cognizant of the fact that if the war went on expectedly, they would 
surely have a powerful say in postwar world affairs, expanded their pressure over 
Turkey. Suffice it to say, the more Turkey adopted a mild manner toward breaking 
off its diplomatic and economic relations with Germany, the more of the USSR’s 
displeasure increased.  
Toward the closing stages of the war, when the decision of Turkish 
government to rupture its relations with Germany on August 2, 1944 became evident, 
the attitude of the Soviet Union toward Turkey had already changed: “[The] Turkish 
question” was to be left to the postwar era. This idea was clearly open in the Soviet 
reply to a British memorandum in which the decision of Turkey to rupture its 
relations with Germany was quoted. The Soviet reply stated that Turkish 
government’s new position in respect to Germany was unsatisfactory as well as too 
late. The Soviet government expressed, as a last remark before its denunciation of the 
Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression between the two countries, its 
consideration to discontinue pressure on the Turkish government and “leave it 
entirely to its own will.”237
 
 
3.1.3. Conclusion 
 
After a peaceful interregnum between the 1920s and mid-1930s, Turkish-
Soviet relations were tested in the Second World War. The relationship proved, by 
the events in the late 1930s and during the Second World War, to be grounded on 
national interests rather than on good will and sentimentality. While common 
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struggle against imperialistic powers in the early 1920s and thereafter common 
stance against the same powers had provided the binding clause until the mid-1930s 
for the isolated states of the post- First World War era vis-à-vis the international 
system, this clause became invalid in the changing international positions of both 
countries. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, both states succeeded in consolidating, 
to a considerable extent, their internal and external conditions and, as a consequence, 
dependence on each other’s friendship lessened. On the part of Ankara, this process 
was accelerated by deep seated suspicion and indeed fears in the minds of Turkish 
leaders that the Soviets would begin to pursue tsarist policies in regard to Turkey 
once they ceased to perceive Western Powers as a menace to their national interests. 
However, the Turks, cognizant of the fact that the influence of every great power was 
indirect and transitory but the Soviet Union owing to its geographical proximity, 
continued their friendly but cautious policy toward Moscow. Nonetheless, without 
the glue that had linked the two states throughout the 1920s and 30s, the friendship 
would inevitably be subject to strain. 
That being the case, the Montreux Convention was the most appropriate time 
for a turning point in the relationship, not only between Turkey and the Soviet Union 
but also between Turkey and the western world, particularly Britain. During the 
negotiations at Montreux in 1936, Anglo-Turkish relations, which revived since 
1926, were further advanced at Russian expense. From then on, Turkey’s relations 
with Britain were based on much friendlier terms than with the USSR. However, a 
real blow to the relationship between Turkey and Soviet Union might well be said 
that it came after the Turkish effort on the eve of the Second World War to link its 
two separate relationships with the Great Britain and France on the one side and the 
Soviet Union on the other side failed. Moreover the Soviet’s Non-Aggression Pact 
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with Germany caused the two states to bind themselves, after a brief period of being 
on the same side, on the opposite camps. 
Repercussions of this situation, however, could be much more different had 
not Germany attacked the Soviet Union in 1941. Firstly, it might well be the 
beginning of the traditional rivalry between Russians, who linked somewhat their 
faith with Hitler, and British that allied with Turkey. Because Soviets evidenced 
having revived their tsarist policies in regard to Turkey in particular as revealed 
during Saracoğlu’s Moscow visit in October 1939 and in general to the Middle East 
as revealed by the Berlin negotiations in 1940. Therefore, it was the German advance 
over Soviets that provided a pause to Soviet’s revisionist policies in regard to the 
Middle East in general and Turkey in particular. 
Under these circumstances, the relationship started to take a new shape by the 
Second World War. Throughout the war, the relationship developed within a broader 
context, in which it could no longer be taken as an isolated issue. Their dealings with 
European powers rather than bilateral dealings became much more influential in 
shaping the relationship. Indeed, these dealings of Ankara and Moscow shaped the 
relationship by providing a test case for each country to display their intimacy toward 
each other. Russians in their dealings with Germans felt that they could accomplish 
their time-honored aspirations over Turkey. Despite this situation, however, they 
showed no hesitation in bringing strong pressure to bear on Turkey, after German 
advance in 1941, to pursue a policy, which was in keeping with their national 
interests but detrimental to Turkish interests.  
On the other side, from the beginning of the war, Turkey pursued a consistent 
policy toward the Soviet Union in accordance with the treaties signed between them 
before the war. In every step, Ankara took great care to remain loyal to the 
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provisions of these treaties. In any case except some minor controversial issues such 
as passage of Axis shipping through the Straits, Turkey “literally” did not deviate 
from these treaties. Nonetheless, Ankara could not escape from being criticized, 
condemned and towards the end of the war accused for its foreign policy, which 
reached a level in postwar era to slander. Accordingly, Turkey “would have attacked 
USSR had not USSR turned Germans back at Stalingrad.”238  
It is evident that Ankara’s policies throughout the war were attuned in each 
case according to immediate circumstances of the war and to the needs of national 
interests. This situation naturally rendered it impossible that Turkish policy could be 
ruled by long-term considerations and, in turn, gave way to criticism such as breach 
of faith. However, it should be noted that these condemnations and in later stages 
accusations could go in no way beyond the moral tone. Turkey pursued a cold-
blooded, pragmatic, and totally realistic approach to world power politics during the 
war. But in each case, an emphasis on “legality” and “legitimacy” could be observed 
in Turkey’s dealings both with western powers and with the Soviet Union.239  
However, beneath its legalistic attitude, the Turks’ traditional fear of Russia 
was quickened by the grave prospect of Soviet expansionism in the Balkans in the 
face of growing Soviet political and military power. This concern of Turkish ruling 
classes was transformed into the necessity for a firm and well defined attitude toward 
the Soviets. To this end, Turkish ruling circle, in every opportunity, struggled to 
draw the attention of London and Washington to this approaching danger. But it can 
not be said that the remarks of the Turkish statesmen had any convincing influence 
over American and British policy makers, who indulged in appeasing the Soviets for 
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the sake of short-term military necessity. On the contrary, it seemed that the Turkish 
endeavor was received, at least in some circles, with great reticence.  
To the Turkish mind, British and American arguments that postwar peace 
could be attained through a viable world organization seemed inadequate to contain 
highly prospective Soviet expansionism, which was perceived as a serious threat to 
Turkish national interests. In this respect, contrary to American and British thinking 
that formal accords reached at the wartime Big Three Conferences would be enough 
for the foundations of a secure and peaceful world order, the informal and unspoken 
agreements were much more important for the Turks. For Ankara, only a viable 
balance of power could keep rein Soviet expansionism in the postwar era.240  
Therefore, toward the end of the war, Turkish leaders were highly anxious 
about the possible repercussions of American and British appeasement policy on the 
national interests of Turkey. Because, appeasement policy of the US and Great 
Britain meant “isolation” in the international arena for Ankara. Turkish leaders were 
cognizant of the fact that as a small power in the neighborhood of an aggressive 
world power, Turkey could not face serious military and political challenges 
emanating from the Soviet Union without effective support of the Great Britain and 
US. But since strategic planners in London and especially in Washington placed 
more emphasis on cooperation with the Soviet Union “because of the over-riding 
wartime necessity of avoiding friction which might jeopardize military 
cooperation,”241 they were not ready to allow long term concerns of Turkish leaders 
about Turkey’s national interests to drive a wedge between the US along with Britain 
and Soviet Union. 
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Under these circumstances, it could be argued that  the ground for a postwar 
crisis in Turkish-Soviet relations had already been there during the later phases of the 
war. It was in part because of the policies pursued by Ankara, which came into 
conflict with the interests of the Soviet Union and in part because of the immediate 
concerns of the US and Great Britain concerning the mounting and evidently 
expansionist Soviet power. At the end of the war, the Soviet Union was a world 
power in closer cooperation than Turkey with other world powers, which resembled 
in a sense the situation in 1915. Whereas, Turkey was somewhat an isolated small 
power that would surely have to confront political challenges from the Soviet Union 
in the postwar era. 
Simply to say, the picture in the northernmost part of the Middle East, at least 
in Turkey had all the signs to point to the revival of the historical rivalries in that part 
of the world. The only thing that was waiting was the placement of every actor in this 
picture.  
  
 3.2. The Postwar Crisis 
 
 
3.2.1. The Soviet Denunciation of the Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Neutrality 
and Nonaggression  
 
War in Europe ended officially in 1945. The Turkish government succeeded 
in maintaining its neutrality right up to 23 February 1945, when it declared war on 
Germany and Japan. While it was emphasized in the Assembly debate that the 
declaration was “the natural consequence of [Turkey’s] alliance with Britain within 
the framework of our friendship with the Soviets,”242 this, however, appeared 
nothing more than a tactical move on the part of Turkey to become a charter member 
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of the United Nations in accordance with the Yalta decision that “only those nations 
which had declared war on Germany before March 1, 1945, would be invited to San 
Francisco.”243 It thus appeared also the first tactical move on the part of the Turkish 
government to enhance its post-war situation.  
However, the end of hostility in Europe caused no rejoicing in Turkey. On the 
contrary, the Turks had to continue to be preoccupied with Soviet Russia. Thus, it 
just became, for the Turks, the continuation of the “war of nerves” with the Soviets, 
which remained comparatively latent in the early stages of the war, but started to 
manifest itself, with mounting intensity, since the Battle of Stalingrad. But in the 
immediate postwar era, Ankara had to face the Soviets in a sense of isolation. 
Therefore, Turkish leaders had to pursue and defend their foreign policy under a less 
favorable condition than before. 
At this juncture, the decision of Moscow to denounce the neutrality pact with 
Turkey should be regarded as a key turning point not only in this relationship but 
also in the great power rivalries, which seemed to have stilled during the interwar 
years, in the Middle East. By this decision two neighboring nations came to an 
historic crossroad. Therefore, two years following the end of hostilities in Europe 
constituted the most troubled period in the history of the Soviet Union-Turkey 
relationship, which dated back to the end of First World War.   
 
 
3.2.1.1. The Soviet Note of March 19, 1945 
 
Subsequent to the Yalta Conference (February 4- February 11, 1945), 
Molotov, in his meeting with Selim Sarper, the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow, 
who was prepared to depart from Moscow, informed him of the Soviet decision to 
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denounce Soviet- Turkish neutrality pact with all its supplementary clauses, which 
was to expire on November 7, 1945. For this effect, on March 19, Molotov handed 
Sarper, on behalf of Soviet government, a statement for transmission to Government 
of Turkish Republic. In this statement, which was made public on March 20-21, it 
was declared that: 
Soviet Government, acknowledging value of Soviet-Turkish Treaty of 
December 17, 1925 in cause of maintaining friendly relations between 
Soviet Union and Turkey, nevertheless considered it necessary to assert 
that owing to deep changes which had taken place particularly in course 
of Second World War, this treaty no longer corresponded to the new 
situation and required serious improvement.244
The Soviet notice was surely in accordance with points of November 17, 
1935 protocol providing for procedure of its denunciation, and therefore the 
denunciation itself was not a surprise.245 The Soviet Ambassador to Turkey, Sergei 
Vinogradov, emphasized that his country’s move was not unfriendly, but merely 
reflected a desire to update relations with Turkey.246 Nonetheless, the perceived 
motive of Moscow for giving notice of termination at that time gave way to doubtful 
interpretations. For Americans, the Soviet government regarded this time as 
propitious to induce the Turks to enter into bilateral discussions looking to a 
modification of the Montreux Convention, and, at the same time, to confront the 
British with a fait accompli.247 On the side of the Turks, who had indeed been 
anticipating this Soviet move long before,248 Soviet move was the forerunner of the 
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inevitable request for a modification of Montreux Treaty.249 The Turks were also 
inclined to interpret the timing mostly in line with the evolving international context 
by the end of the war. It was, thus, the impression in Turkish official circles that the 
timing of the notice reflected a desire on the part of Soviet government “to avoid the 
exaggerated importance that might otherwise be attached to such a notice, were it to 
be given immediately prior to or at the time of the San Francisco Conference.”250  
Most probably to prevent this from happening and transform the event into 
remedy its political isolation in the emerging international system, Ankara sought, 
from the beginning, to draw Britain into the decision-making process. The Turks, 
upon Soviet denunciation, did not lose any time to approach Britain to this effect and 
sought their advice. Only three days after the Soviet note, Turkish Foreign Minister, 
Hasan Saka summoned the British Ambassador in Turkey, Sir Maurice Drummond 
Peterson. After informing the Ambassador about the Soviet denunciation, Saka 
expressed the wish of his government to consult, before deciding on the form of 
reply to the Soviets, the British government whose advice they would greatly value. 
Saka further explained that their greatest worry was that the Russians “in reality 
wished to have bilateral conversations with the Turks in order that the Montreux 
Convention be modified” before a new treaty was negotiated or before it was brought 
to any meeting of the three Grand Alliance powers.251 This was indeed the case as 
British Deputy under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Orme Sargent 
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Cevat Açıkalın met, upon instructions of Turkish government, with Eden. Eden gave the same advises with Henderson. See İkinci Dünya 
Savaşı Yılları, 251-2. 
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informed American Ambassador to the United Kingdom, John J. Winant that the 
Foreign Office regarded the Soviet notice as the first move in a Soviet plan to 
“soften” Turkey preparatory to bilateral discussion on the Straits.252 The Turkish 
government was, therefore, advised by the British government to reply that it would 
examine any proposals which Moscow might make for improved treaty, and to 
remind the Russians, if necessary, that the question of Straits regime could only be 
discussed multilaterally.253  
This move of Turkish government indeed pointed out the beginning of a new 
attitude on the part of the Turks. At the time when the two countries were isolated 
from international systems, the previous agreements had been a reversed function of 
their relations with western powers. Accordingly, the two states negotiated and 
signed all the previous treaties tete á tete. But now, the Turks were not only aware of 
the emotional aversion with which they had been regarded in the Soviet Union, as 
well as the causes thereof. But also, they were aware that certain course of change in 
the attitude of Soviets, who were surely conscious of their growing political and 
military strength especially since 1943. Therefore, Turkey felt the need to turn to 
classical power politics-playing the historical rivals against each other. Thus, this 
move could easily be construed the Turks’ traditional appeal for British support 
against the Russians.254  
As the wording of the Turkish reply of April 4 indicated, the Turkish 
government took British advice into consideration. Thus, in its conciliatory and 
cautious reply to the Soviet statement, the Turkish government officially announced 
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its approval of the Soviet suggestion with regard to “replacing the expiring pact with 
another pact more suitable to the present interests of both parties and including 
thorough-going modifications has informed the Government in question that it is 
ready to study with care and good intentions the proposals to be made to it with this 
aim.”255 From then on, policy makers in Ankara refrained from making any 
suggestions for the conclusion of a pact. It was mostly because of the opinion in the 
minds of Turkish policymakers that any “accidental” suggestions, no matter how 
generous they were, would inevitably be regarded as insufficient by the Soviet side. 
Moreover, in the next step, according the Turks, the Soviets would inevitably exploit 
these suggestions as a springboard for better conditions.256 
Under these considerations, refraining from making any suggestion the 
Turkish government appeared uneasy about possible Soviet proposals. Nonetheless, 
Soviet officials were inclined not to let Ankara get away with trumped-up excuses 
until after Molotov returned from San Francisco.257 Therefore, on a number of 
occasions, when Turkish officials endeavored to explore what the Soviet government 
contemplated as the terms of a new pact, there consistently came the anticipated 
response from the Soviets. “Due to lack of time to examine the issue, they were 
unable to put forward anything. Nonetheless, they would very pleased, should 
suggestions came from Turkish side. Besides, this situation might well be 
advisable.”258 It was thus evident that Moscow was trying to maneuver Turkish 
leaders into making some proposals first.259  
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In light of these monotonous Soviet responds, which were surely in line with 
Russian negotiation tactics, Turkish Foreign Ministry was insistently reminded not to 
suggest anything to the Soviets, but to throw the ball to the Soviets. In the following 
weeks of 1945, some developments in this respect, however, worried not only some 
senior policymakers in the Turkish Foreign Ministry but also American and British 
diplomats in Turkey. These developments, which were sought to proceed in secret 
manner from London and Washington, were surely related with the news about the 
“sweet talks” in Ankara between Sarper and the Soviet Ambassador to Turkey, 
Sergei Alexandrovich Vinogradov.260  
During these talks, Sarper, representing the Turkish government and surely 
with the absolute consent of President İnönü, went over various aspects of Turkish-
Russian relations and took some extremely dangerous initiatives, which appeared to 
detract the official stand of the Government. To this effect, apart from some 
concessions, made “in the hope of putting an end to Turkish-Russian complex,”261 
Ankara appeared as the party having made the initiative for a treaty of alliance with 
the Soviets, which would logically far transcend the Treaty of Friendship and 
Neutrality of 1925.262 The contemplated alliance was to be about the security of the 
Black Sea in the form of either as a tripartite alliance between Turkey, Soviet Union 
and Britain or as an alliance between Turkey and Soviet Union with a reservation in 
respect to Britain. In it, there would be, as proposed by Sarper, a provision denying 
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passage through Straits to warships of Soviet’s enemies in the event of a war. When 
Vinogradov inquired, in turn, how Turkey would implement this provision, if the 
enemy of the Soviet Union (referring to England) became a state that had an alliance 
with Turkey, the reply of Sarper was that the provision would be implemented even 
to this state. 
While the other details of the contemplated alliance was agreed to be 
furthered between Sarper and Molotov once Sarper returned to Moscow, several 
points about these talks were already interesting in principle. One of these points was 
that, during the course of these talks, Vinogradov, of course representing Soviet 
thinking, proceeded with much more caution than Sarper in regard to their existing 
relations with Britain. When Sarper inquired whether the provision about the closing 
the Straits to the warships of other powers would add one more wedge to the set of 
frictions with Great Britain, Vinogradov gave a fast reaction and said that: “there 
have been none and there would not occur any disagreements with Britain. What are 
called as disagreements with Britain is nothing more than different point of 
opinions.” On the other side, Sarper implied that Turkey could fight even with 
Britain in order to implement the mentioned provision concerning the Straits.  
The second point was the implications inherent in the answer of Vinogradov 
to Sarper’s question about contemplated alliance. An alliance against “no one” could 
only be interpreted that the Soviets wished “union of policies instead of friendship.263 
In the same line, Ambassador Feridun Cemal Erkin, soon to become secretary 
general of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, expressed his bewilderment to see how any 
useful purpose could be served by Turkey forming an alliance with the Soviet Union:  
Friendship? Ok. But what about an alliance with the Soviets? Against 
whom? Which countries, especially at that moment, could endanger us 
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[Turkey]? Would it be too surprising, if the countries, of which we 
[Turkey] sought sincere support, regard this alliance as formed against 
them?264
 
The final point is that the Turkish government preferred to keep the gist of the 
talks between Sarper and Vinogradov secret from the Americans and Britons. 
According to the instructions given to Sarper before his departure to Moscow,265 
Turkish Foreign Ministry planned to inform and receive consent of Britain only after 
the successful conclusion of the negotiations between Sarper and Molotov in regard 
to the contemplated alliance was seen in sight. In this connection, Sarper, after his 
last meeting with Vinogradov, in which an oral agreement was reached, visited the 
American Chargé in Turkey and the British Ambassador in Turkey in order to 
acquaint them with Turkish government’s relations with the Soviets. In those 
meetings, Sarper stated that, while there had been some “conversations” with 
Russians since his arrival, no definite conclusion was reached with regard to any new 
Turk-Soviet agreement.266  
The minutes of these talks, in sum, reveal that Sarper, of course with the 
consent of President İnönü, indulged Turkey’s weakness vis-à-vis the Soviet Union: 
Turks’ sense of isolation.267 Although Turkish leaders would realize the grave 
consequences of taking initiatives with Soviet government shortly afterward, the 
situation seemed to have extremely complicated and, thereby, in a sense got out of 
hand. Therefore, Ankara would have to spend a great effort to get shut of from this 
strain in the following months. 
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3.2.1.2. The Soviet Demands of June 7  
 
Against this background, it could plausibly be said that an optimistic view 
had dominated the Turkish ruling class during the period prior to the Sarper- 
Molotov meeting of June 7. During that period a far more transcending matter in 
importance than Turkish-Russian relations, according to Sarper, was that of 
“relations between three big powers, which seemed at moment not to be running too 
smoothly.”268 Even extreme rumors concerning aggressive Russian plans against 
Turkey, which would be put forward as the concrete evidence of Soviet aggressive 
designs over Turkey after this meeting, seemed ineffective to cast this optimistic 
view in regard to Turk-Soviet relations into shadow. Reflecting this optimistic 
atmosphere in the Turkish government, he further stated that “Turkey stood firm in 
the face of Russian and German demands in 1939 and could not be coerced now.”269 
In this connection, any attempt on the part of Russia at that moment was unlikely. 
With this optimism, Sarper, upon his return to Moscow, took the opportunity 
afforded by the authority of the Turkish government to discuss the orally-reached 
agreement (between Sarper and Vinogradov) with Molotov. Nonetheless after the jolt 
which Sarper received from Molotov on June 7, Ankara was seriously discouraged to 
pursue this line further.  
While the main theme of this meeting had already been evident for both sides, 
it proceeded to a much more different direction. At the outset of conversation270 
Molotov launched into statements that before it would be possible to win and deserve 
the friendship of the Soviet Union, it would be necessary to settle all outstanding 
questions between the two countries. The first question for the Soviets was the 
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situation created by the treaty of 1921, which was negotiated at a time, when Soviet 
Russia was weak, and therefore formed some “unjust” territorial adjustments. When 
Sarper asked, if Molotov hinted a rectification of the Turco-Soviet frontier, Molotov 
replied that he only meant to remove the present “unjust situation.” When Sarper 
protested that no government in Turkey could justify such a matter to the Turks and 
refused to discuss questions regarding Turkish territorial integrity, Molotov said that 
they would lay the question aside for the time being, but the Ambassador should 
understand that it remained unsettled. 
The second issue was the preparation of the favorable ground for the Soviets 
to establish a military base on the Dardanelles. For Molotov, although the Soviets 
were sure about Turkish good intentions in defending the Straits, “goodwill” was not 
enough to guarantee Soviet security at the Straits. A people of 200,000,000 
inhabitants could not depend solely on the goodwill of Turkey in this matter but must 
also consider what Turkey’s possibilities of defending the Straits are. When Sarper 
refused the idea of Soviet bases at the Straits, Molotov, reformulating his 
proposition, inquired again that if Turkey was unwilling to provide a base to the 
Soviets at the time of peace, what about Turkish attitude in time of war. In reply, 
Sarper said that he had not touched upon this issue before but if Turkey would enter 
such a war in accordance with the contemplated treaty of alliance, this issue could be 
discussed between each country’s Chiefs of Staff.  
The third issue was the modification of the Montreux Convention governing 
the passage in the Straits through a bilateral understanding. Molotov argued that the 
two countries could make an agreement on the revision of the Montreux Convention 
prior to any future international conference for the revision of the Montreux and this 
issue could be negotiated in parallel with the negotiations of the contemplated 
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alliance. Sarper said that if, in the future, the Montreux regime was discussed 
multilaterally, there would surely be a difference between standing together as allied 
countries and as the countries with indefinite relations as of then. However, Sarper 
argued that there was no need now to discuss this matter since it could give way to 
some doubts and wavering on the part of the allied countries. 
The forth issue was the fruits of the impressions that Sarper had during the 
course of conversation about “certain considerations,” which the Soviet government 
would in the case “contemplated to present.” On the course of conversation, Sarper 
formed the impression that these considerations, albeit seemed to have remained in 
the mind of Molotov, were most probably related with Soviet interference in Turkish 
domestic affairs. With regard to the same issue, Sarper remarked that in the face of 
unequivocal Turkish replies, Molotov would not present these certain considerations 
at any time in the future.  
Despite Sarper’s speculation about this issue in his report, it gave way, in the 
following time, to further speculations about the real intentions of the Soviets over 
Turkey. The common point of these speculations was that this “vague” approach of 
Molotov was intended to bring Turkey, like Poland under direct Soviet influence. 
Indeed, this issue had already been made known indirectly to the Turkish 
Ambassador in Moscow around the time of denunciation that “Turkey was making a 
grave mistake in trusting the Anglo-Americans and that their best course was to link 
up with the Russians and abandon the Anglo-Americans who were too far away.”271  
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3.2.1.3. The Sarper-Molotov Conversations of June 18 
 
Upon receipt of the Sarper report about June 7, the Turkish government 
cabled Ambassador Sarper on June 12, its opinion about the Soviet proposals for an 
alliance as well as its directions about future negotiations of Sarper with Molotov.272 
In it, Ankara informed its Ambassador that the Government could not accept as a 
basis for discussion the proposed territorial adjustments or bases at the Straits. In the 
same line, Sarper was also instructed that as an international Treaty, Montreux could 
only be modified on a multilateral basis. 
The Turkish Ambassador in Moscow again met Molotov on 18 June.273 But 
in this meeting discussions regarding a treaty of alliance were no more conclusive 
than those on June 7. Molotov reiterated during this meeting that if a treaty of 
alliance was in question, the Turkish government should settle the questions referred 
to earlier. In reply, Sarper reminded Molotov that Soviet territorial and base demands 
could never take place on the negotiation table since the meeting of June 7. At this 
juncture, Molotov seemed to reveal the Soviet’s principle concern in these 
negotiations. He said that they could put aside the idea of alliance and go on 
discussing the Straits question. Thus, it could be argued that if the territorial demands 
were put forward in the frame of an alliance, these demands would logically be 
denounced after putting aside the idea of alliance.274  
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Nonetheless, Sarper did not touch upon this point and asked Molotov what 
kind of benefits Soviets could expect to discuss a multilateral agreement through 
bilateral way. In reply, Molotov reminded Sarper of his former attitude on the same 
issue. Then Sarper explained to Molotov that Ankara had hoped to discuss the Straits 
question under the idea of an alliance but not in the framework of the Montreux 
convention and, after Soviet demands of base and territory, the basis for this alliance 
was destroyed. While Molotov continued to insist on discussing the Straits question 
through the idea of another agreement, Sarper reiterated in each case that the Turkish 
government had thought it possible to reach a solution about the security of the 
Soviets and Black Sea apart from the Montreux Convention and through another 
alliance.  
Under these circumstances, the negotiations for an alliance that began by 
Sarper- Vinogradov meetings of March 20-21 came to an impasse on 18 June. The 
reason for this impasse was ostensibly the differences between the issues that had 
been reached at the closing of Sarper- Vinogradov meetings in Ankara and the issues 
that were put forward by Molotov in Moscow.275 Nonetheless, the real reason was 
realization of the Turkish government the grave consequences of its initiatives that 
had been made on March 20-21. A conversation between Feridun Cemal Erkin and 
President İnönü after the Sarper-Molotov meeting on June 7, 1945 was enough to 
explain the penitence of the Turkish leaders about these initiatives. When Erkin 
explained his bewilderment about the alliance negotiations between Sarper and 
Vinogradov, İnönü expressed his feeling that it had been an illusion to have 
considered forming an alliance with the Soviets. Nonetheless, he added that “what’s 
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done is done. Now we look forward to working out a solution to escape from this 
grave situation.”276
In the meantime, the Turkish government sought British advice on the 
unacceptable Soviet demands. On June 20, Sir Maurice Peterson informed Ankara 
that there was no need to add to the remarks of Sarper. British Ambassador also 
enquired whether Ankara would wish for British intervention with Moscow before 
the projected meeting of the Big Three at Potsdam in July. The Turkish government 
was pleased at this suggestion and particularly welcomed the British promise of 
intervention with Moscow with or without US support.277
Nonetheless, at this time, motivation of the Turkish government seemed not 
only the need to consult with the British government on the Soviet demands. But it 
was much more related with the emerging psychology in Turkish ruling class 
concerning the likelihood of grave consequences in the event the USSR should insist 
on its demands.278 In reality, these concerns were very result of the Soviet’s “war of 
nerves” that had been carried on since the denunciation.  
 
 
3.2.1.4. The Soviet “War of Nerves” 
 
Throughout these protracted maneuvers and negotiations in the last months of 
the war, the apprehensions of the Turkish government with respect to the possibility 
of aggressive action on the part of Russia were gradually heightened. In reality, these 
concerns were the result of Soviet’s intense “war of nerves” that had been carried out 
increasingly since the denunciation in March. In this war of nerves, the Soviet press 
and radio campaign against Turkey, which could evidently be regarded as 
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government-inspired, along with providing sources for the rumors of military action 
near Turkish frontiers seemed as the main issues.  
In the early stages of Soviet campaign until June, the Soviet government 
gradually intensified its bitter press and propaganda campaign against Turkey in the 
attempt to support its official overture to Ankara. The leitmotif of Soviet propaganda 
in this period was, therefore, structured along similar lines with the contents of 
Molotov’s note to the Turkish Ambassador. In this respect, while there are a great 
deal of examples indicating Soviet thinking in this period toward Turkey, an article 
in Izvestia on March 21, entitled “Regarding Soviet-Turkish relations” gave enough 
clue about the main tenets of Soviet propaganda. This article asserted, after quoting 
Molotov’s statement of March 19 and reviewing the history of the treaty of 1925, in 
effect that: 
…it cannot go unmentioned that during present war Soviet-Turkish 
relations have left much to be desired at various times. Automatically to 
leave in force a treaty concluded under completely different 
circumstances would not of course, be in internal interests of either side. 
It would also not be in interests of countries united for defeat of German 
aggressor have already concerned themselves with having foundation for 
lasting peace.279  
 
In this period, a study made at the Turkish Embassy in Moscow revealed that 
Russian press criticism of the Anglo-Saxon powers, both “quantitatively and 
qualitatively,” exceeded that of Turkey.280 However, hostile Soviet propaganda 
against Turkey, parallel with the Kremlin’s attitude toward Turkey, picked up after 
the Sarper-Molotov meeting of June.281 From then on, hostile Soviet propaganda 
targeted not only Turkey’s foreign policy (first of all Ankara’s relations with 
“imperialist” countries, notably the US and Great Britain) but also the domestic 
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affairs of Turkey.282 In this respect, Soviets suggested that relations between the two 
countries would be improved by a new government in Turkey more friendly to the 
Soviet Union and might even be raised “to the level of Soviet-Polish friendship.”283
Nonetheless, what formed much reaction from the Turkish press as well as 
Turkish government was the Soviet’s steady building up, in the following months, 
through press and radio, a case for annexation of Turkish eastern vilayets to the 
Soviet Armenian Republic.284 Although practically no Armenians remained in 
Eastern Turkey, in the absence of any significant leftist opposition in Turkey, the 
Armenians appeared as a viable, though artificially created, discontented element for 
the Russians.285 With regard to this issue, the publication in Izvestia, Pravda and Red 
Star, on 20 December, of the letter written by two Georgian professors(S.R. 
Dzanashia and N. Berdzenishvili), who demanded that 10.000 square miles of 
Turkey, “the seized cradle of our people,” be forthwith handed over to the Georgian 
SSR outraged the Turks.286 The preceding day, the Soviets had announced in Izvestia 
and Pravda that they would give assistance to Armenians abroad, who wished to 
emigrate to the Armenian SSR, hoping that “a full-fledge crusade for Armenian SSR 
recovery of historical Armenian territory would draw popular Armenian support 
abroad.”287  
To aggravate the war of nerves, the Soviet government was not confined to 
radio and press campaign. Soviets benefited from their military and political 
presence in the countries bordering Turkey which provided the Kremlin with 
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additional opportunities for its war of nerves against Ankara. Still on April 7, British 
representatives in Bulgaria had reported some “stories” current in Sofia that “the 
Russians contemplated some sort of aggressive action in Thrace against Turkey.” 
However, according to the same report, these stories were “planted, probably by the 
Russians in their current war of nerves.” Moreover, it was speculated that at the 
present juncture, it would be “fanciful” even to consider that “Russia would launch 
an act of aggression against Turkey.” 288  
In the meantime, Bulgarian Minister to Turkey, Nikola Antonov, was 
instructed by the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry to assure the Turkish government that 
“Bulgaria had no intention of altering its policy of good neighborly relations with 
Turkey and that the presence of Russian forces in Bulgaria could in no way modify 
the desire of Bulgaria to preserve such relations with Turkey.” The Bulgarian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Petko Stainov, also added that there was no increase in 
strength of Bulgarian military forces in southeastern Bulgaria and that he knew of no 
recent increase in Russian forces in that area. 289
Rumors of the dramatic activation of Soviet military in bordering countries 
such as Bulgaria and Iran continued through the Fall. Turkey was made even more 
apprehensive by the news flowing from Moscow. The reports from Moscow in 
October were full of news that Russian people were being told by internal party 
agitators “USSR might go to war with Turkey.” However, according to George F. 
Kennan, then the American Chargé in the Soviet Union, this domestic agitation 
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might, among other reasons, might well be planted on foreign observes as part of an 
unusually refined war of nerves designed to soften up Turkish government.290  
Widespread alarmist rumors about ominous troop concentrations and 
movements heightened as the expiration day of 1925 the Treaty closed. And these 
rumors reached their zenith on October 25, when Turkish General Staff summoned 
British military, Naval and Air Attachés and informed them of the latest intelligence 
about Soviet concentration of troops in the Balkans (in Rumania and Bulgaria), 
Caucasus and Iranian Azerbaijan. In light of this intelligence, the Turkish General 
Staff argued that an “attack of Russian Army might take place about November 8 
after expiration of 1925 Treaty which would give Russians 2 weeks to complete 
preparations.” Explaining these serious concerns to British Service Attachés with the 
statement that if a Russian attack took place Turkey would resist, the Turkish 
General Staff inquired as to what assistance they could count on from the British.291
In the face of Turkish concerns about a Russian attack, neither the British 
Ambassador, Peterson, nor American Ambassador Wilson seemed alarmed. Peterson 
was inclined to feel that this situation was “another phase of war of nerves” and 
therefore “Turkish General Staff was unduly nervous.”292 For him, the reason for 
mentioned troop concentration in the Balkans was that “Soviets might feel their 
troops were so unpopular in Balkans that they must be kept on move from one 
country to another.” The Whitehall was of the same opinion with Peterson: “Russians 
would create any incident resulting in an overt act against Turkey.” Moreover, 
British Foreign Office argued that if the Turks keep calm in the face of renewed 
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Russian war of nerves, they should be able to weather the storm and resist 
intimidation.293
On the same issue American Ambassador commented that:  
 
If Soviets are engaged in intensified war of nerves they would probably 
do exactly what they are now doing as regards troop concentrations, 
coinciding with expiration of 1925 Treaty. They have in fact succeeded 
to limited extent in creating atmosphere of concerns here with hers with 
widespread alarmist rumors.294
 
On October, 30, Turkish General Staff, Mehmet Kazım Orbay reviewed the 
situation with the American Ambassador. In this meeting, he said that information 
regarding Russian troop concentration, of which he emphasized to be very reliable, at 
least as regards Bulgaria and Rumania, was mostly the same. Furthermore, he 
expressed that, under these circumstances, he was faced with grave responsibility of 
whether he should recommend mobilization and also Turkey, as member of United 
Nations Organization, “felt entitled to look to that organization for security.” 295 
However, despite trustworthy information of the Turkish Chief of Staff about Soviet 
military activities, only two days later, the Turkish Foreign Minister told Wilson that 
“serious concern which existed few days ago regarding Soviet troop movements near 
Turkish frontier has diminished.”296  
In all of that, the Soviets played their game very skillfully. But there was 
nothing unexpected about this war of nerves. In the same month with the 
denunciation, the American Ambassador to Turkey, Laurence Steinhardt predicted 
the possible Soviet foreign propaganda in the following days against Ankara. He 
believed that Soviet policy would follow the familiar pattern, from which there had 
been little deviation since 1939, - “criticism of the Turkish government and outburst 
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in the Soviet press and on the radio against the Turks.” Shortly afterwards, rumors 
would circulate of a nature tending to alarm the Turks. In consequence of these 
tactics, Turkey would presumably “soften” and enter into bilateral discussions with 
the Soviets in respect to future Turkish- Soviet relations including the Straits.297  
Parallel with Steinhardt’s assessments about short-term Soviet tactics against 
Ankara, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Hasan Saka conveyed the same views. He 
expressed that “the Soviet government will resort to its customary methods to 
achieve its ends and will not hesitate to exert extreme pressure including violent 
criticism and denunciation of Turkish government through the radio and by other 
means.” Whereas, according to Saka, Soviet government would not resort to armed 
force.298  
In the view of the considerations and evidence outlined above, it can be 
plausibly said that Turkey as well as Britain and USA were fully aware of what was 
going on: the Soviet’s “war of nerves” against Turkey or Soviets “customary 
methods” to achieve its ends. They were also well aware of the state of mind of 
Soviet leaders, who were assumed not to attempt any venture that could bring the 
Soviet Union against the US and Great Britain. In connection with this, an overall 
examination of Soviet tactics in foreign affairs indicates “lingering Soviet hopes of 
achieving their foreign policy goals without undermining relations with the west, 
hopes which seemed to be alive as late as early 1946.”299 Indeed the whole situation 
during this period under review was summed up by Churchill during the Potsdam 
Conference. As revealed in “Thompson Minutes,” British Prime Minister commented 
that: 
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Undoubtedly, Turkey was very much alarmed by a strong concentration 
of Bulgarian and Soviets troops in Bulgaria; by continues attacks in the 
Soviet press and radio; and of course, by the turn which the conversations 
between the Turkish Ambassador and Mr. Molotov had taken in which 
modifications of Turkey’s eastern frontier were mentioned, as well as a 
Soviet base in the Straits. This led Turkey to fear for integrity of her 
empire and her power to defend Constantinople. He understood, 
however, that these were not demands on Turkey by the Soviet 
government. But that the Turks had asked for an alliance and then 
Molotov had stated the conditions for an alliance. He quite saw that if 
Turkey asked for an offensive and defensive alliance, this would be the 
occasion when the Soviets would say what improvements they wanted in 
the Turkish situation. However, the Turks were alarmed by the mention 
of these conditions.300  
 
Under these circumstances, it should be made clear that while to perceive 
troop concentration, especially in the atmosphere of tension and mistrust in ongoing 
relations between the two countries as threatening was unnatural, it would be more 
helpful not to “lose sight of the tactics usually resorted to by Soviets.”301 But in the 
light of evidence, it might well be argued that the Turkish ruling class seemed to be 
inclined to dramatize and react disproportionately, if not to hostile Soviet propaganda 
through press and radio, to the rumors of military action against Turkey. In other 
words, Russian military activities during the period were not observed in their 
objective nature, but in their perceived meaning whereby Turkish decision-makers 
formed a picture of “threat” emanating from the Soviet Union. 
The reasons for Turkish state of mind were, however, might well be Turkey’s 
postwar isolation in foreign affairs due to its wartime neutrality and diminished 
popularity of the contemporary Turkish regime during the war. With regard to the 
first point, it could be argued that Ankara dramatized and capitalized on Soviet’s war 
of nerves owing to Turkey’s vested interest in accentuating its own geographical 
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importance especially regarding the Middle East in the eyes of Britain and the US 
and thereby getting support of these powers in the emerging international system 
against the USSR.302  
With regard to the second issue, it was evident to the most casual observers 
that the popularity and strength of İnönü’s regime had been suffering, particularly 
since the outbreak of war in 1939, a consistent diminution in popularity and public 
confidence.303 The most important reasons for this trend were: 304 (1) “the growth of 
a top-heavy bureaucracy;” (2) the failure to check the inflationary spiral and thereby 
high cost of living (3) bribery and corruption (4) the lack of freedom of the press and 
of speech (5) wastage of Government funds and lack of an effective policy to 
promote the economic advancement of the country (6) “the merest lip-service to 
democratic forms.” Nevertheless, the public had been exposed during the wartime 
years to more or less constant threat of immediate warfare and as a consequence the 
general focus of attention had been upon the war situation. Therefore, criticism of the 
home-regime had been tempered by the conviction that the Government was steering 
the safest course through the dangers.  
Nonetheless, the relaxation of external danger now brought the Turkish 
people to a full realization of their unfortunate economic plight as well as political 
uneasiness. Turkey’s ruling class knew too well of this frame of mind that could 
hardly result in a prudent and peaceful situation in domestic affairs. Thus, it was 
probable that the various manifestations of discontent, which was already felt in the 
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press, would eventually lead to a political crisis in the country.305 The implications of 
this situation were clear. Turkish ruling class sought in order to seek solace for its 
internal political problems, to capitalize on Soviet threat.306
 
 
3.2.1.5. Turkish and British Efforts to Involve the United States in the 
Crisis 
Having obtained Ankara’s agreement to intervene with Moscow, the British 
Chargé d’Affairs, John Balfour, representing the British government called on 
Acting Secretary of State, Joseph Grew on June 18. Reviewing Turkey’s rejection of 
Molotov’s demands of June 7, Balfour suggested that the US government join British 
government in its “firm” representations to the USSR regarding Molotov-Sarper 
conversation of June 7 on the grounds that Russian desiderata concerned powers 
responsible for World security Organization and that Molotov’s action is contrary to 
explicit assurances given by Marshal Stalin at Yalta. Without committing his 
government, Grew promised to give immediate attention to the British government’s 
proposal. He suggested, however, that it would be preferable, in any case, to 
withhold action until after the San Francisco Conference. Balfour expressed his 
agreement with the wisdom of delay but he also needed to express his hope that even 
if the US could not “feel in a position to make a joint approach with the British 
government,” it would at least support the British action with some step of its own.307
A few days later, on 23 June, American reply to British aide-mémoire was 
handed to the British Embassy in Washington. The Department of State argued in its 
memorandum that the Whitehall was inclined toward an early approach to the Soviet 
government in “firm language” since the Sarper-Molotov conversation of June 7 had 
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taken place in a “friendly atmosphere and was of an exploratory character.” 
Therefore, the Department considered it “premature to protest what amounts to a 
preliminary exchange of views.” Moreover, a protest in firm language made by either 
Washington or London might “overemphasize” the importance of the conversation of 
June 7, in which no “formal demands” had been presented by the Russians to the 
Turks. Finally, the Department suggested that the best tactics under the 
circumstances would be to treat the conversation between Molotov and Sarper “as a 
matter not calling for special action because the forthcoming meeting of the Heads of 
Government is so close at hand.” Refraining from giving advice to the Turkish 
government, which had requested the views of the US, the Department was to 
express the “hope” that future “exploratory” conversations would be conducted in a 
“friendly atmosphere unclouded by threats” and “in accordance with the principles of 
the International Security Organization.” 308
Washington in fact was aware of the implications of the situation in Turkey. 
Still in April, Wilson suggested to President Truman that “in view of fact Eastern 
Europe had been lost to USSR, our interests in the Middle East as well as our general 
interest in world cooperation and security should lead us to support Turkey in 
resisting demands affecting independence, in the event such demands should be 
made.”309 While Truman replied affirmatively and expressed his thought that the US 
should support Turkey at that time, it was obvious that some other relevant aspects of 
the situation impeded immediate American support to Turkey.310
It was surely disappointing to Turkey along with Great Britain, both of which 
believed that American support was of crucial importance in face of Russian threat to 
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Turkey in particular and Middle East in general. On July 2, the Turkish Prime 
Minister expressed his disappointment at American views regarding Molotov-Sarper 
conversations. Speaking frankly, Saracoğlu said that he could not comprehend that 
the US wanted Turkey to conduct “further conversations” with USSR on matters 
relating to cession of Turkish bases and territory. Speculating on the disguised 
objectives of Russians, Prime Minister said that: 
The Soviets gone mad; they dream of world domination. They are 
crossing you at many points; Bornholm, Trieate, Albania, Greece, 
Turkey, Iran. When they find a weak spot they exploit it. ...If you resist at 
one point they drop it for moment. But questions have been raised and 
they will come back to it.311  
 
Under these circumstances, according to Saracoğlu, the situation could only 
be saved if the US and the Great Britain stood firm at Potsdam and refuse any 
compromise on principles. However, most American policy makers including 
President Truman were still hopeful that the Soviet Union was a power that could 
cooperate for world peace. Therefore, perceiving no conflict between American and 
Russian interests especially in the Middle East,312 Truman decided “to stick carefully 
to our agreements and try our best to make Russians to carry out their 
agreements.”313
Despite American refusal for a joint demarche in Moscow with regard to the 
Soviet demands on Turkey, the British government informed the White House that it 
had decided to take action in Moscow after having considered most carefully all 
factors in the case. In particular, it was thought better that Moscow should be 
informed of British views in advance of Potsdam Conference rather than to give the 
impression that London was indifferent, and “spring it on them for the first time at 
the Conference.” Accordingly, the British Ambassador in Moscow, Sir A. Clark, was 
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instructed to point out to the Soviets that His Majesty’s government had been very 
much “surprised” by the Soviet “territorial claims and demands for bases in the 
Straits, since these activities cannot be regarded as exclusively Turco-Soviet 
matters.” Territorial matters should be examined in the light of the UN. And the 
latter affected the Montreux Convention. Moreover, it had been agreed at Yalta that 
the Soviet government should consult with American and British governments before 
approaching the Turks on matters affecting the Montreux Convention. The British 
government had been much more surprised at the recent Soviet press and radio 
campaign against Turkey recalling Stalin’s consent to take no action affecting 
Turkey’s independence and integrity. The British government wished the Soviet 
government to be aware of its views on these matters as it considered the whole 
question would have be discussed at the Big three meeting.314
 
 
3. 3 Great Power Debate over the Question of the Straits 
 
The Black Sea Straits, which have been Turkish territorial straits since 1453, 
constituted one of the constant issues of general European politics ever since Russia 
obtained an access to the Black Sea by the conquest of the Crimea and Rumania.315 
Before that time, the Black Sea was “a beautiful virgin in the harem of the Sultan” 
and the control of the Straits resided exclusively in the Ottoman Empire. In this 
peaceful period that no “question of the Straits” existed, even commercial vessels, let 
alone warships, were permitted to traverse the Dardanelles as far as Istanbul but no 
further. Nonetheless parallel with the decline in Ottoman power, this situation 
gradually changed. With this respect, the breaking point had to do with the Treaty of 
Küçük Kaynarca of 1774, under which Sublime Porte remained obliged, after a six 
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year war with Russia, to grant Russian commercial vessels the right to free 
navigation through the Dardanelles. While the “ancient rule” of the Ottoman Empire 
as to exclusion of foreign vessels through the Straits remained intact, similar 
privileges were granted subsequently to other powers and made universal by the 
Treaty of Paris in 1856. 316  
However, what made the Straits a major issue of power politics were the 
crucial issues of the passage of warships into or out of the Black Sea and control of 
the Straits. This was exactly the case that formed the question of the Straits not only 
in the 18th and 19th centuries but also in the post- Second World War period. The 
reason was indeed simple. The Straits not only constituted “the major factor of 
national interests, existence, sovereignty, and security” for the Turks, they also 
constituted a major factor for some principal powers, notably Russia and Great 
Britain.317 For Russia, the Straits afforded them the sole outlet by water to the 
Mediterranean, and conversely an inlet passage for attack by warships upon its 
backdoor through the Black Sea. On the other hand, it afforded Great Britain to keep 
Russian power away from its imperial line of communication and to keep the balance 
of power in Europe. Therefore, both states had been continuously concerned with the 
Dardanelles and the Straits and moreover anything advantageous in the regime of the 
Straits was for these reasons bound to be dangerous for the other. Accordingly for 
protection of their interests in the Straits, both states advocated on different phases of 
the Straits question some opposite regimes in the Straits when the principle of the 
closure of the Straits came up for discussion. For its own part, while the constant 
objective of absolute control over the Straits remained unchanged, Russia advocated, 
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in times of weakness, that the Straits be closed to warships including its own and at 
times that the Straits be opened to all warships including its own. Britain’s policy 
similarly changed according to its contemporary necessities and needs but principally 
regarded the alteration of the principle of the closure of the Straits in the interests of 
Russia as a casus belli with Russia.318
In this manner, the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi (1833) opened a new phase in 
the question of the Straits.319 Although it was ostensibly a treaty of mutual assistance 
between Sultan and Tsar, its secret article, which changed the “ancient rule” in favor 
of Russia, was enough to attract reactions of Big Powers, namely Great Britain and 
France. Hünkâr İskelesi, therefore, was not destined to last more than a decade. In 
1841, Britain along with France managed to destroy the advantages of this treaty by 
the Convention of London of 1841, by which the “ancient rule” was accepted by the 
powers with some minor exceptions allowing light vessels serving diplomatic 
missions. From this treaty on, “ancient rule of the Sultan” was translated into an 
international concern.320 Subsequently, the traditional right asserted by Ottomans was 
recognized by the European Powers and it continued in principle to be the law 
governing the passage of warships through the Straits until the end of the First World 
War. 
 
3.3.1 Diplomatic Prelude 
In all of it, the Ottoman Empire sought to prevent foreign powers from 
achieving their aims on the Straits by maneuvering between these major powers. In 
most part of the period of the” Sick Man of Europe,” Britain emerged as the 
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champion of the Ottoman Empire, and took the lead in resisting Russian policy over 
the Straits. However, it did not refrain from exploiting Russian aspiration on the 
Straits in order to protect its wider interests in the Middle East. This was the case in 
1915 when Britain reversed its traditional policy and concluded the “Constantinople 
Agreement,” by which it was decided to put an end to the question of the Straits, at 
the general peace settlements, in line with Russian desires.321   
While Russian desire to open up the Straits to war ships was legislated by the 
Straits settlement at the Lausanne Conference, it was now opposed by the 
Bolsheviks. At the sessions concerning the Straits, the new Soviet government 
proposed a straits regime constructed on the following lines: (1) complete and 
permanent freedom of waters from the Aegean to the Black Sea for commercial 
navigation of all nations in peace and war;(2) closure both in peace and war to ships 
of war and aircraft of all nations except Turkey;(3) recognition of the full sovereignty 
of Turkey on land and sea and the right for it to arm, fortify shores, own a war fleet, 
and employ every engine of modern warfare.322 However, Britain along with other 
Allied powers insisted on the maintenance of Art. 37 of Sèvres that “…agree to 
recognize and declare the principle of freedom of transit and navigation by sea as 
well as by air…in the Straits” and consequently a compromise solution was agreed 
upon.323 In it, the Straits were demilitarized and “complete freedom of passage for 
warships” in time of peace was legislated with the limitation that “the maximum 
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force which any one Power may send through the Straits into Black Sea is not to be 
greater than that of the most powerful fleet of the littoral Powers of the Black Sea...” 
The Straits Convention, which was clearly more in the British interests rather 
than the Turks and Soviets, was signed by the Soviet Union on 14 August 1923 
under protest and Moscow did not ratify it. Although in 1923 the Straits question 
surely was not solved, in broader context, by the Lausanne and its accompanying 
Straits Convention the perennial Eastern Question was to some extent stabilized. This 
stabilization, of course, was due to the emergence of a victorious Turkey at the end 
of the war of Independence and more importantly because of the weakness of Russia 
after the Bolshevik revolution in October 1917.  
The Turks regarded the Straits Convention as a settlement infringing on their 
independence, exposing their biggest city and diminishing their value in the world of 
international diplomacy.324 However, as long as the collective security system 
established by the League of Nations promised some hope of being successful, 
Ankara did not raise the question of remilitarization of the Straits.325 Nonetheless, 
Turkey, due to the decline in international life in the early 1930s, vehemently felt the 
deficiency of demilitarization clause of the Convention. As a consequence, Ankara 
gave several warnings to the world that the country regarded the clauses relating to 
demilitarization as being of discriminatory nature and suggested revision of the 
Lausanne regime several times from May, 1933 onwards.326 Finally, on April 11, 
1936, Turkey formally requested the same to the Secretary General of the League.327  
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At Turkey’s request, the Conference powers met at Monteux on June 22, 
1936. During the sessions of the Conference the discussion came around between the 
Turkish thesis, which was mostly favored by the Soviet Union, and the British 
thesis.328 The Turkish thesis substituted the formula registered in the Lausanne 
Convention of “freedom of navigation” for absolute Turkish control of shipping, 
which naturally abolished the International Commission that imposed severe 
restrictions on the entry of non-Black Sea warships into the Black Sea and finally 
allowed full remilitarization of the Straits. Against the Turkish thesis, Britain insisted 
on the continuance of the International commission and free access into the Black 
Sea. Discussions around these theses hastened in view of dangerous international 
outlook and reached its final form on July 20, 1936.329 The outcome of the 
Conference permitted Turkey to refortify the Straits and international control ended. 
Also by the new Convention, Turkey was granted the right to close the Straits to 
warships in time of war or of an immediate threat of war.  
At this time the Soviet Union signed and ratified the Convention. But it was 
not that the Convention satisfied Moscow. Therefore, from 1936 on, Moscow sought 
favorable occasions to raise the revision of this Convention. The first move came at 
the beginning of the Second World War, when Turkish Foreign Minister, Şükrü 
Saracoğlu visited Moscow in the hope for a pact with the Soviet Union. During the 
meetings in Moscow, Russians revealed their concern emanating from spreading the 
conflict in Europe and wanted Turkey to close the Straits to warships of non-Black 
Sea powers, which surely was not in conformity with the Montreux Convention and 
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therefore rebuffed by Ankara.330 It became clear that the Soviets continued to harbor 
the same views in regard to the Straits regime, when the British Ambassador in 
Moscow, Sir Stafford met with Stalin on July 1, 1940. Stalin said that “Relations 
with Turkey could be straightened out ...But such relations depended on a mutually 
satisfactory resolution of the problem of the Straits.”331 In the meantime, Stalin did 
not hesitate to offer Ankara to “give the Dodecanese islands and some territory in 
Bulgaria and possibly in northern Syria” in the hope of softening Turkey’s position 
regarding the Straits.332
Turkey refrained from discussing the revision of the Montreux Convention. 
But Moscow was not intent on giving up this matter and continued its approaches 
throughout the same year. The awaited opportunity came from Berlin in November, 
when the world island was delimited into “spheres of influence” between Germany, 
Italy, Japan and the Soviet Union. At this time, Moscow was not content with a new 
treaty satisfying Soviet security concerns in the Straits. What the Soviet government 
demanded from Hitler as conditions for accepting the proposed Four Power Pact was 
a base for land and naval forces within range of the Dardanelles.333    
On 22 June 1941, Germany attacked the USSR, by which the Russian dream 
concerning the Straits had to be one more time put off. Thereafter, Moscow felt the 
need to encourage Turkey to implement the Montreux Convention and, to this effect, 
announced its satisfaction with the Convention on 10 August 1941. However, once 
the military situation was reversed in favor of the Soviets after Stalingrad, Moscow 
again started to pronounce its desire to its new allies. It was obvious that post-
Stalingrad years presented Russia with a unique opportunity to prepare the ground 
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for a solution of the Straits Question after the end of the war according to its own 
interests. Russians were again the ally of Great Britain. And Turkey seemed as a 
state which betrayed both the Soviet Union and Britain. This situation was indeed 
unfamiliar with both the Russians and British. This situation was, to some extent, 
like the situation in 1915. Therefore, it was “hard to suppose Russians forgot that 
Britain offered them Constantinople in the earlier part of the late war.”334
The first major effort of Stalin with regard to the Straits was to outline the 
Russian position to the allies took place at the Tehran Conference of 1943. It can be 
plausibly argued that during this conference Churchill paved the road for a postwar 
crisis regarding the Straits in particular and Turkey’s isolation in general. He 
suggested that if Turkey refused to enter the war, it would lose British sympathy and 
thereby “its post-war rights in the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles would be 
affected.”335 Furthering his policy, the British Prime Minister revealed, without 
taking care of Turkish national interests, his idea that such a “large mass” as the 
Soviet Union “deserved the access to warm water ports” and this question should be 
settled “agreeably as between friends” as part of the peace settlement.336 Indeed, 
Churchill’s attitude towards the Russian aspiration was also in contrast to the reports 
prepared by both the British Foreign Office and Chief of Staff the same year. One 
Foreign Office report in July indicated that “though Turkey behaved badly in the war 
because of neutral position, Britain needed to defend Turkey for its own interests 
against Russia in the future.”337 In the complementary report, the British Chief of 
Staff argued that “since it provides reasonable safeguards to the British interests in 
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the Middle East and Mediterranean, at no greater cost than that of providing 
diplomatic support to Turkey…”338  
At the end of the Teheran Conference, however, it was generally agreed that 
the regime of the Straits should be revised. However, since Stalin did not insist on 
this matter at that time, it remained untouched until the Moscow Conversations of 
Stalin with Churchill. In October 1944, Stalin raised the matter again wishing the 
Convention modified “to allow free passage at all times of Russian warships.” One 
of the reasons advanced by Stalin for the need of modification was that Japan was at 
present a party to the Convention.339  
At that time, Churchill agreed with the need for revision, partly because of 
the situation of Japan as a signatory state but mostly because Turkey’s policy from 
1943 on. “Inonu missed the market,” argued Churchill during the meeting, indeed 
which revealed his bitterness over Turkey’s non-belligerence and the abortive 
discussions with Inonu at Cairo in December 1943.340 In other words, having 
received some weapons from Britain and when they were not in danger from 
Germany, the Turks were expected to come in on the British side and give Britain 
support from their territory. Otherwise, the Turks would have “a pretty raw deal at 
the peace and thereafter.” To this end, only the right moment to put this across 
awaited.341  
It was agreed by Stalin and Churchill at the close of the meeting that the 
Soviet government would present notes through diplomatic channels to both the US 
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and Great Britain setting forth detailed proposals for the revision. In his telegram, 
Churchill, after informing of Stalin’s views, advised Roosevelt that “revision is 
clearly necessary as Japan is signatory and Inonu missed his market last 
December.”342 Thus one of the implications of this October meeting was that the US, 
though not a signatory power to the Montreux, was drawn into the Straits question. 
However, the Soviet government did not send any notes presenting its proposals and 
the Montreux Convention, therefore, the issue did not come up again until 10 
February 1945 at Yalta. 
 
 
3.3.2 The Straits at Yalta Conference  
 
Contrary to the United States “hopes” regarding the Straits that this matter 
would not be raised and that “the Montreux Convention had functioned well and the 
Soviet government so declared to the Turks jointly with Great Britain,”343 Marshal 
Stalin raised the question of the revision of the Montreux Convention at the plenary 
session of February 10th. Without stating his desiderata, he claimed that the treaty 
was now outmoded instigating that the Japanese played a more important part under 
the Montreux regime than the USSR; and that the Montreux Convention linked up 
with the League of Nations which was no longer a reality. Nonetheless, the real 
reason for Stalin seemed the unacceptable situation, in which the Turks could close 
the Straits “not only in time of war but if they feel that there is a threat of war.” In 
other words, it was impossible for the Soviets to accept “a situation in which Turkey 
had a hand on Russia’s throat.” The Convention had been signed when Russian 
relations with Great Britain were not perfect. He was sure, however, that Great 
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Britain no longer had any idea of “strangling” the USSR with the help of Japan. He 
was sure that there would, therefore, be no objection to some revision of the treaty. 
Both Churchill and Roosevelt agreed with Stalin that the treaty needed 
revision. Recalling the British sympathy with the proposal to revise the treaty when 
Stalin had first raised the subject last October, the British Prime Minister said that the 
present position under which the one exit to the Black sea could be closed was not 
satisfactory. Therefore, Churchill thought that consideration should be given to the 
desirability of accompanying any proposal for changes in the Straits regime to meet 
Russian needs and wished for reassurances given to Turkey regarding the 
maintenance of its independence and territorial integrity. In reply, Stalin said that he 
had nothing to hide and readily agreed that such assurances should be given.  
While Roosevelt made no specific remarks on the Straits during the 
Conference, it was evident that he would “not object to minor changes in the 
Convention, if they were “suggested by the USSR or Great Britain.” However, it was 
also evident that any major changes in the regime of the Straits, which would 
“probably violate Turkish sovereignty and affect adversely the strategic and political 
balance in the Balkans and the Near East,” would not be accepted by Roosevelt. 344
At the end of the Conference, it was agreed by the Big Three that the USSR 
would make known its wishes at a later date to the American and British 
Governments for discussion at the prospective “Meeting of Foreign Affairs” and that 
the Turkish government should be informed in general terms. On February 27, in 
accordance with this understanding, the British government informed Ankara in very 
general terms of what had passed in Moscow.345 Some time later than Eden, Molotov 
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informed Sarper that the Soviet government would have to discuss the Straits at some 
future date.346
 
 
3.3.3 The Straits at Potsdam 
 
After Yalta, there were neither Soviet proposals made for revision of the 
Straits regime nor a meeting as planned of the three Foreign Secretaries in London to 
discuss this matter. On the eve of the Conference, the US was in a mood reflecting its 
traditional approach toward the Straits question.347 Therefore, while Turkish and 
British attitudes, let alone the Russians, were well known, American attitude on this 
issue was still defined on vague and confused terms.348 Although Americans were 
dragged into the question after Yalta, since then they did not expose their own 
attitude on this question because the US had not been a signatory to the Montreux 
Convention and also because the Turks had not approached them.349  
It is also interesting to note that although the American government had been 
well informed on the subject and its grave implications to world peace, the Straits 
question was yet being discussed on the first day of the Conference by American 
Joint Chief of Staff. At the meeting of the Joint Chief of Staff on July 17, Admiral 
Leahy, President’s Chief of Staff opened the discussion concerning the Straits by 
mentioning that “the President had not given any consideration to this matter yet.” It 
was also evident that there were still differences in points of view of the Army and 
the Navy. Under these circumstances, the discussions culminated in the agreement 
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with the attitude of the State Department to the effect that “the Dardanelles should be 
a free waterway without defenses by either Turkey or Russia.350  
In summing up, on the eve of Potsdam, while all parties agreed for the need 
of revision, there was lack of accord on the question of the passage of warships. 
Turkish attitude on this point was, as always had been, that “in time of war, Turkey 
must have the right to exclude all warships from the Dardanelles and any foreign 
bases in the Straits was out of question;” Russian attitude, again as always had been, 
as free passage of its warships through the Dardanelles at all times and bases on the 
Dardanelles for the joint defense of the Straits; and British attitude, was to support, 
though this would be detrimental to British strategic interests, the Soviet proposals 
for the right to send Russian warships through the Dardanelles in time of war as well 
as in peace, but to resist any Russian demand for bases in the Straits. 351
With these considerations, the Potsdam Conference began with the meeting of 
Stalin, Truman and Churchill between 12 July and 2 August 1945 to discuss the post-
war world order including the Turkish Straits. The question of the Straits was 
brought up on the agenda at the Sixth Plenary Meeting on 22 July.352 Admitting the 
need to modify the Montreux Convention and his readiness “to welcome an 
arrangement for the free movement of Russian ships, naval or merchant, through the 
Black Sea and back,” Churchill, however, impressed on Stalin the importance of not 
alarming the Turks. Then Churchill revealed his understanding of the recent events 
until the time of the Conference and wanted to learn the recent position of the 
Russians. In response to his request, Molotov circulated a document, which declared 
that (1) the Montreux Convention should “be abrogated in the proper regular 
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procedure;” and (2) “the determination of the regime of the Straits….shall fall within 
the province of Turkey and the Soviet Union;” and (3) the new regime should also 
provide “in addition to Turkish military bases the establishment of Soviet military 
bases in the Straits.”353  
As discussion continued, it became clear that the Soviets harbored aspirations 
not different from Tsarist Russia and they were in this regard, actually trying to 
dictate tsarist policies to Britain and the US. Upon Churchill’s statement that he 
could not consent to the establishment of a Russian base in the Straits and that he did 
not think that the Turks would agree either, Molotov replied by invoking the 
previous treaties (referring to the treaties of 1805 and 1833) had existed in the past 
between Russia and Turkey.354 For the Soviets, these treaties meant what the Turks 
had feared the Soviets would do: “the settlement of the Straits question only by 
Turkey and Russia.”  
In the course of discussions which went on in the same atmosphere in the 
Seventh Plenary Meeting on 23 July,355 the Soviets insisted on their demands of base 
in the Straits referring to the situations in other canals such as Suez, Gibraltar or 
Panama. At this point, despite the fact that “the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal 
logically should receive the same treatment” in the event of “Internationalization” of 
the Straits, Truman proposed that “there be free and unrestricted navigation of such 
inland waterways …and that the regulation of such navigation be provided by 
international authorities…”356 Against Truman’s proposals to place the Straits of 
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Black Sea in a broader context, Stalin seemed unwilling to regard the Black Sea 
Straits as the Danube and the Rhine as a substitute for Soviet bases in the Straits. 
Upon Truman’s insistence to regard them in the same way, Stalin indicated that they 
should put off the question “since their views differed so widely.”357  
In the end, it was agreed by the three Powers that the Montreux Convention 
should be revised (to accord to the vessels of Black Sea powers entire freedom of 
movement through the Straits). And “as the next step the matter should be subject of 
direct conversations between each of the three Governments and the Turkish 
Government.”358 Upon this conclusion, the Soviet government made known its view 
that “this freedom of transit should be guaranteed by Turkey and Russia jointly.” On 
the other hand, British government was of the view that “the freedom of transit 
should be guaranteed by an international organization.” Finally, the American 
government concurred, with the addition that “the Straits should be neutralized, 
thereby removing the necessity for any military establishment to guarantee the 
freedom of transit.”359  
On July 26, the British Ambassador informed the Turkish Prime Minister 
about the Potsdam discussions on the Straits and advised him that the Turks should 
“keep their heads and in reply to Russian approaches maintain firmly that question 
must be settled on international basis.” He also stressed the significance for the Turks 
of having American guarantee of freedom of Straits. Nonetheless, upon being 
informed by the British Ambassador, Turkish Prime Minister became “perturbed.” 
He remarked that Truman’s proposal struck something between Lausanne and 
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Montreux. Nonetheless, what definitely troubled him was “possibility Turkey might 
be asked demilitarized Straits.” However, on July 28, the Turkish government now 
accepted internationalization of the Straits on “condition that neither Turkey’s 
sovereignty nor security were diminished” and as a consequence of such settlement 
Turkish-Russian relations should improve.360  
 
 
3.3.4 Post-Potsdam Period 
 
In the immediate post-Potsdam period, it was easy to observe the 
disappointment of Turkish leaders about the American attitude toward Turkey. For 
them, recent events indicated a lessening American interest in Turkish affairs and 
even some let down in American support for Turkey.361 However, there was also a 
good side of the situation: involvement of the US in the dispute. At that point, the 
determining factor seemed both for Britain and Turkey as the power of the US since 
American inaction would be interpreted as a “green light” by the Soviets in 
furthering their demands on Turkey.362
Despite these concerns of the British and Turkish governments, the American 
government did not initiate the procedure as agreed at Potsdam. This “inaction” on 
the part of Washington heightened the fears of Britain and Turkey that America was 
again on the way of its traditional noninvolvement.363 Under these considerations, 
both states expressed their concerns to the State Department. In this regard, on 20 
August, Ankara expressed its worries that it would await with interest for 
Washington’s response to “the Turkish initiative,” which had been decided upon 
with a view “to ascertaining as soon as possible the British and American point of 
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view in this matter.”364 A day later, First Secretary of the British Embassy, A. H. 
Tandy called on Lewis Jones, the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern 
Affairs and reminded him that the Turks, who were most anxious to have some 
communication from the American government, still had not received any.365  
In reality, a great number of American policy makers was also dissatisfied 
with Truman’s proposals at Potsdam. On September 25, the Ambassador in Turkey 
warned the Department that in light of the development of air power since World 
War I, freedom of passage in the Straits for Russia could not be effectively 
guaranteed by international agreement or even by actual control of the Straits. 
Therefore, “question of Straits as raised by USSR instead of being crux of matter” it 
appeared merely a “façade” behind which lies Soviet objective: “to bring about 
change in Turkey’s internal regime.” However, this Russian objective embodied 
some broader implications: 
In chain of countries bordering USSR on west and south from Baltic to 
Black Sea, Turkey is sole country which is not governed by ‘friendly’ 
regime. A ‘friendly’ regime in Turkey under Soviet domination would 
mean actual control by USSR of Straits. But more important than this it 
would mean termination of Turco-British alliance and end of western 
liberal influence in Turkey and probably ultimately in Middle East.366
  
On September 27, George F. Kennan sent a message to the State Department, 
stating his concurrence to the views expressed in Wilson’s message: 
I know nothing in Soviet ideology or diplomatic practice which would 
justify us in hoping that Soviet aspirations with respect to Turkey would 
be satisfied by concessions regarding the Straits. We must expect that any 
concessions on this nature will be exploited to utmost in Moscow with 
view to eliminate of western influence in Turkey and establishment of 
regime ‘friendly’ to Soviet Union.367
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Despite these warnings, the US submitted on November 2 its response to 
Ankara’s note of August 20 concerning the question of the Straits, in which the 
American government expressed its hope that problem of the control and use of the 
Straits could be solved in a manner that would enhance international security and 
give due consideration for the Black Sea states and interests of Turkey. In this note it 
was also declared that the Montreux Convention was subject to revision by an 
international conference in 1946 and the US would be pleased to participate, if 
invited. At the end of its note, the American government expressed its position, 
proposing the principle of complete freedom of passage for all merchant vessels, 
freedom of passage for warships of the Black Sea powers at all times, and closure to 
warships of non-Black Sea powers.368  
Against Truman’s optimism for a solution in conformity with international 
security, news coming from Ankara was, in a sense, confirming previous views of 
the Turks as well as Wilson and Kennan about ultimate Soviet aim in this issue. In 
his meeting with the Soviet Ambassador in Ankara, Sergei Alexandrovich 
Vinogradov, Wilson formed the impression that Moscow raised the Straits question 
merely as a façade behind which stood the Russian objective to control Turkey. 
Vinogradov said that the American proposal failed to offer the necessary security to 
the USSR and moreover, Turkey was not capable of enforcing the closure of the 
Straits to non-Black Sea warships which necessitated having bases in the Straits.369  
On November 12, Feridun Cemal Erkin, Secretary General of Turkish 
Foreign Office met with Wilson in order to convey the Government’s satisfaction 
with the American note and its interim official reply to the American note. Erkin 
informed Wilson officially that the Turkish government was “glad to have received 
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this proposal and appreciate warmly evident concern of the US government in 
drafting proposal to safeguard sovereignty and independence of Turkey.” Erkin also 
emphasized the Government’s attitude that it would await receipt of views of the 
British and Soviet governments before giving a more detailed reply to 
Washington.370
In the meantime, upon request of Ankara, the Whitehall informed the Turkish 
government on November 21 of its concurrence with American principles with minor 
changes. Following this, on December 5, the Turkish Prime Minister, in a press 
conference, stated that his government accepted American proposals as a basis for 
discussion.371 On the other side, the Soviet government made it known that it did not 
have any intention of making a new proposal of its own but contemplated its position 
stated in June 7 and later at Potsdam.372
 
 
3.3.5 The Soviet Notes of August and September, 1946 
Due to the Soviet insistence of not making any new proposals other than 
referring to its demands of June 7 and Potsdam, there occurred no development in the 
question of the Straits until August 7, 1946. At that time the Soviet government 
notified Turkey and other signatories that the present regime of the Straits no longer 
provided sufficient guarantee of the security of Black Sea states, and proposed a new 
regime. In this note, without reference to Kars and Ardahan, Ankara was also held 
responsible for malfeasance in the regime of the Straits during the Second World 
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War.373 Five proposals were put forward for the new regime, three of which were not 
different from the American proposals of November 2, 1945 and accepted by Turkish 
government as a basis of discussion. However, the last two proposals- the first being 
about a new regime of the Straits elaborated by Black Sea powers only, and the 
second being the joint defense of the Straits by Turkey and the Soviet Union,- 
brought about disagreements between the principal powers.   
The first response to this note came from the US on 19 August, 1946. It 
reiterated its position of November 2, 1945 and rejected the last two proposals of the 
Soviets. The Americans rejected the fourth proposal expressing that a new regime 
could not be the concern of the Black Sea powers only. They also held that Turkey 
should continue to be primarily responsible for the defense of the Straits and put the 
prospect of an attack on the Straits in the basket of the UN Security Council. The 
British and Turkish governments did not act differently and followed the American 
view in rejecting the last two Soviet proposals.374
The Kremlin replied to the Turkish note on 24 September, in which, it 
reiterated the charges concerning the violations of the Straits regime during the war 
and its previous five proposals. Moreover, Moscow warned the Turkish government 
that if Ankara rejected the joint defense of the Straits with the Soviets or took some 
military measures in the Straits with some non-Black Sea powers, such an action 
would be regarded as contrary to the security of the Black Sea. 375 In reply to the 
second note the three governments followed the same suit and repeated their 
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previous stand that they, while they accept the first three proposals as a basis of 
discussion, rejected the last two proposals.  
The last Turkish note received no answer from the Soviet government. The 
Soviet Union could follow suit in accordance with the Montreux Convention and ask 
for a revision of the Montreux by an international Conference. However, in October 
the Soviet government preferred not to further the question any more and informed 
London that it deemed it “premature” to call a conference on the Straits.376 Indeed, 
by this last Soviet move it became obvious that what the Soviets dreamed of was the 
more than a revision in the Montreux Convention that would, as they argued, 
guarantee the security of the Black Sea coast. 377 But it was the strengthening of their 
position in the Middle East. 
 
 
3.3.6 Development of American Position 
 
On March 12, 1947, President Truman recommended assistance to Greece 
and Turkey. He explained the grave situation in these countries and argued that the 
American government should help Turkey (and Greece) in order to help it to 
maintain its integrity in the face of Soviet threats. Because “that integrity is essential 
to the preservation of order in the Middle East” and hence “to the security of the 
US.” He specified, as the major factor occasioning his proposal, the attempted 
“subjugation of peoples by armed minorities and outside powers using coercion and 
infiltration.”  
But it was plain that Truman did not make the whole story utterly clear. 
Truman in his message did not give adequate information on the total situation in the 
Middle East and America’s entire relationship with Russia that called forth the 
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Truman Doctrine. Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg as the Chairman of the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, emphasized that at no point did Truman “bring hazard home to 
the US as an American hazard in any aspect” but rather “left it in the ideological 
field, of interests in freedom.” Then he asked whether the contemplated aid to Greece 
and Turkey “come back to the United States and its own intelligent self-interests in 
very realist fashion.”378 While at that moment the discussion was “off the record,” a 
sincere answer came later from the American Ambassador in Turkey, Edwin C. 
Wilson: “what are we doing here is not because we like the color of the eyes of the 
Turks or the Greeks or anything of that sort. We are doing it because it is in our own 
interests, and we would do it regardless of what regime was in Turkey…” But details 
were again “off the record.”379  
However it was quite open that American aid was extended to Turkey for 
American “own self-interests” in order to “build a maginot line out there in the 
Dardanelles area, stop Russia line.” Therefore, it was the place of Turkey at the map 
of Europe, positioned at the “underbelly of Russian Empire,” that necessitated an 
American support to the Turks rather than expecting an imminent Soviet attack on 
Turkey.380
Nonetheless, it took time for American strategic planners to reach those 
conclusions about the place of Turkey in American national interests. It can be 
recalled that on 23 July, 1945, the US government made it known that Soviet 
Union’s desire to revise the Montreux Convention, to establish bases in the Straits 
area and acquire eastern part of Turkey on June 7 was only subject of “a preliminary 
                                                 
378 U.S. Senate, Legislative Origins of Truman Doctrine: Hearings held in Executive Session before the Committee on Foreign Relations 
United States Senate, 89th Congress, First Session on a Bill to Provide for Assistance to Greece and Turkey (Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1973),Executive Session, March 13, 1947, “US interests,” 21. 
379 Ibid, 57, 61. 
380 Ibid, Executive Session, March 28, 65-68; Executive Session, April 1, “Exclusion of Turkey from the Bill” 105. See also Leffler, “Strategy, 
Diplomacy, and the Cold War,” 807-25. 
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exchange of views.” Indeed this attitude of the Truman government was reminiscent 
of Roosevelt policy toward the Soviets, based on cooperation with them in 
establishing peace in the world. Thus still in November 1945 that part of the world 
was assumed to be the most suitable region in which Washington and the Kremlin’s 
polices could “be made to dovetail with minimum friction.”381 In other words, the 
area was seen primarily as the political and military responsibilities of Great Britain, 
and logically Turkey could only be “an area of diplomatic, economic and military 
conflict between the USSR and Great Britain.”382  
However, starting with early 1946, American attitude towards Turkey 
changed. It was mostly because of the evolving place of Turkey in emerging 
American strategic concept for the postwar era. In this strategic concept, Turkey 
attracted attention of the American war planners with its proximity to Soviet’s vital 
areas in the Caucasus and in southerly territorial border. 383 As a sign of this evolving 
Turkish importance, on April 5, 1946, U.S.S. Missouri was sent to Turkey. In later 
months, other strategic plans confirmed this importance and moreover heightened the 
importance of Turkey as an indispensable part of Middle East security.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
381 FRUS, 1945, vol. 8, Conference of Chiefs of Missions in the Near East with President Truman on November 10, 1945, 10-14. 
382 FRUS, The Conference of Berlin, 1945, vol. 1, Briefing Book Paper: United States Policy toward Turkey, 1016. 
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 140
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
Orthodox cold war historiography tends to view the origins of the cold war in 
the Middle East in general and Turkey in particular on a continuum extending from 
the denunciation of Turkish-Soviet treaty of neutrality and friendship to the Truman 
Doctrine. This view suggests that Soviet policy of expansionism reemerged 
following the end of the Second World War and in consequence, other great powers 
sought to contain it. Indeed, apart from Moscow’s bullying of its western neighbors 
and Iran in the immediate post war years, Soviet vocal claims on eastern part of 
Turkey as well as formal demands of bases in the Straits lend strong credence to this 
view. However, in view of the long history of interests and influence in the Middle 
East, on the part of principal powers, notably British, the Russians, as well 
Americans, in some cases going back several centuries involving the Black Sea 
Straits, it will be imprecise to interpret great powers contest in this region in terms of 
the Cold War alone. Yet it must be recognized that the traditional policies were 
reoriented in light of a global struggle between the two emerging camps and it is in 
terms of this contest that the salient features of great powers policies over Turkey can 
best be understood.  
In that light, as far as the Turkish question in British-Soviet relations is 
concerned, it can be said that many problems in regard to Turkey since the end of the 
Second World War or indeed since during the war had already involved 
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considerations of a more permanent strategic nature and required more far-reaching 
policy decisions on the part of Britain and the USSR. In some respects, these 
considerations and policies recalled the classical Eastern Question, which was 
assumed to have been solved after the First World War. For its own, the Soviet 
Union endeavored to obtain a foothold at the Straits whereby it would secure the 
unique warm water approach to the Black Sea and acquire a strategic place to project 
its power in the Mediterranean; and, in broader context, to undermine Britain’s 
position in the northernmost part of the Middle East. As history demonstrates, Great 
Britain, mindful of its imperial interests, had opposed Russian ambitious over the 
Straits and Dardanelles to protect the Mediterranean route to India and to expand its 
influence southward in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when London 
preferred the status quo. Therefore, it was hard to suggest that Great Britain could 
remain indifferent in post-Second World War era to Soviet’s thrust toward Turkey, 
the country which still continued to be of vital importance, by virtue of its 
geographical position for the British Commonwealth of Nations. Nevertheless, when 
the classical story of Russia’s southward expansion resumed specifically on June 7, 
1945, the Eastern Question presented itself in a new light, owing to aroused 
American interests in this part of the world. Russia henceforth had to confront not 
only the opposition of the Turks along with their traditional ally Britain but also the 
power of the US, who emerged during the Second World War as principal world 
power and leader of the “free world.”  
As a newcomer to this strategic picture, Washington’s attitude was to be 
shaped by postwar circumstances. The Soviet aggressive activities toward Iran and 
Turkey, if not in Greece, helped Washington to shape its role in that part of the 
world. However, realization of the US of the repercussions of the decline in British 
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power, to the extent that American strategic interests in the Middle East could no 
longer be protected by Britain as had been done heretofore, became the most 
effective factor in this process. In other words, Britain’s inability to control the 
eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East brought about the possibility of 
elimination of the last bulwark between American interests in the Middle East and 
the traditional Russian expansion. 
Amidst all these great power rivalries, Turkey had three commonly accepted 
foreign policy alternatives. These were to try to maintain neutrality, to submit to the 
strong influence stemming from its northern neighbor, or to turn its face to the west, 
where it spiritually regarded itself as an integral part. In this dichotomous world, 
Ankara’s sense of isolation dominated Turkey’s foreign policies. Nonetheless, until 
the second half of 1945, Turkish policymakers seemed confused about how they 
would overcome their isolation. Initially, they pursued a dual foreign policy. On the 
one hand, Ankara approached Britain under the guise of consultation. On the other 
hand, Ankara sought, behind closed doors, to relive its postwar isolation by forming 
an alliance with the USSR.  
Nonetheless, when Ankara was confronted with the fact during Moscow 
meetings of June that the price of this alliance would be too much, the Turks retorted 
by referring to Russian menace. Nevertheless, with an idiosyncratic reading of the 
“lessons of history,” we realize that there has not been any structural change in the 
attitude of the Russians towards Turkey except for the relatively weak times of the 
Soviets after the 1917 revolution, when the Soviet Union showed traditional state 
behavior of seeking peace until completing its nation building phase, through “homo 
Sovieticus.” Therefore, to assume that alignment with the West in the post war era 
was, as widely accepted, the natural consequence of Soviet pressure since 1939 and 
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the hope in policy makers’ minds that this alignment’s support does not seem 
plausible as the sole factor in motivating Turkey’s attachment to the Western world. 
After June 1945, Turkish government, having lost its prewar internal and 
external popularity during the wartime period, sought to veil its fear of isolation by 
the determination to resist the immediate, but indeed exaggerated threats regarding 
Soviet motives and dangers to Turkish independence and integrity. Although the 
characteristic Soviet threat to Turkey was not new in the postwar period, now the 
Turks changed their previous attitude and were inclined to capitalize on the Soviet 
threat in order to accomplish both some domestic political purposes and more 
especially find itself a place in the postwar emerging international equilibrium.  
The main objective of Turkish foreign policy was thus to obtain western 
political support for Turkey’s internal and external problems. In order to attain this 
objective, Ankara launched a campaign. The İnönü government, after securing its 
rule in consequence of the first free democratic elections of the Turkish Republic in 
1946, stepped up its consultations with the US, attempting to dramatize the Soviet 
threat, arguing that the Kremlin would be deterred not by concessions but by 
firmness. 
Nevertheless, Ankara remained alone, at least for a while, in its uneasiness 
regarding Soviet menacing policy. In addition to Britain’s inability to stand alone 
against the Soviet Union, the US was still an ally of the Soviet Union and American 
policymakers still had the ideal that world peace and security could be accomplished 
through three power cooperation. Therefore, the US was reluctant to believe that 
Soviet behavior of aggressive expansionism formed a pattern that was dangerous to 
American national security. The US did not want to take the risk of waging another 
war by provoking the Soviets, and hesitated to make any commitments to Turkey’s 
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defense such as ensuring the security of Turkish Straits because it did not feel 
primarily responsible for the Middle East and considered the Middle East to lie 
within Britain’s sphere of influence. In this respect one can argue that because of 
American hesitation to take diplomatic action against the Soviets and lack of 
understanding their post war intentions, was Stalin able to go forward in his demands 
over Turkey. 
The arrival of the battleship U.S.S. Missouri on April 5, 1946 into the harbor 
of Istanbul, coincided with a period of international tension in the Near East, was 
received as an evidence of U.S. willingness to take a firm diplomatic stand against 
the threat of Soviet encroachment. On the Turkish side, the arrival of Missouri was 
commonly accepted as the beginning of metaphoric “love affair” between Turkey 
and the US. However, it was not just the beginning of a new attitude solely towards 
Turkey but from a larger viewpoint it was, moreover, the beginning of important 
adjustments in the premises and objectives of American foreign policy towards the 
Middle East since the geostrategic position of this region happened to be seen very 
critical to the strategic security interests of the US. 
On the other hand, this new stance of the US against the Soviets was unclear 
both for the Soviets and for the US itself since demands of the Soviets over the 
Straits and perception of the US in this issue happened to remain with little change. 
So the fundamental change in American mood came after the British Government 
encouraged the US to step in and assume the responsibilities for sustaining Turkey 
and Greece against internal and external threats with a note on 21 February 1947. It 
was just the beginning of a significant deviation from the historical trend of the US 
which had been preoccupation with their own affairs to the exclusion of foreign 
affairs. Britain’s abandoning its role as Turkey’s principal backer since the 1940s, 
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could also be interpreted as handing over the responsibility of world leadership, with 
all its burdens and glory, to the United States ‘the sole remaining superpower’ in the 
post war era. But from a liberal internationalist outlook, this unprecedented 
involvement abroad has been taken as the beginning of the US to move unilaterally 
in dealing with the world affairs by bypassing the United Nations. Washington also 
put aside the possibility of negotiating with the Soviets about the questions 
outstanding from World War II at the time that the four powers were still trying to 
solve those questions. 
Just nineteen days later after the British note, President Truman went to both 
houses of Congress on 12 March, 1947 and asked for approval of funds to enable 
Greece and Turkey to defend their national integrity. Ankara was included in this 
American assistance program which has been known as Truman Doctrine due to 
Turkey’s importance for the US that lied in the preservation of its independence and 
the maintenance of its present status as a buffer against expansion of the Soviet 
Union into the Middle East. Indeed, it carried the meaning of more than a mere 
gesture of American power, showing Turkey that the US would not leave it alone 
against Soviet pressure. More importantly, there was relief in Ankara because its 
historical fear of isolation might be ending. Bearing in mind that US support to 
Turkey was the result not of American charitable impulses, but of Washington’s 
strategic interest in encouraging Turkey that was stable and Western aligned, one can 
easily grasp the core characteristics of the emerging alliance between a regional and 
a global power which had different interests in scope and geography. The US, 
ultimately, began to move into the power vacuum left by the decline of the British 
Empire in the Middle East and “support the free peoples who are resisting 
subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” 
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It was obvious to any observer of the postwar Turkish-Russian relations that 
the only remedy for Turkish position vis-à-vis the Soviets was to obtain great power 
support, notably of the US and Great Britain. Although the Turkish leaders most 
likely realized that alliance with London was the only one which could assure 
wholehearted support for their isolated country, they apparently were not fully 
convinced that London alone was able to provide it. They, therefore, fostered a rather 
extensive supplementary support from Washington.  
At this juncture Turkey’s contribution happened to be a catalyst in the 
deterioration of the pragmatist wartime partnership between the Soviet Union and the 
Western Allies. Turkish policy makers stressed the power and inevitability of 
Russian attack in the event of lack of British and American opposition. 
In all of it, it can be said that during the subject period, in the Middle East the 
danger to the security of the free world did arise not so much from the threat of direct 
Soviet military aggression. It mainly aroused from continuation of the unfavorable 
historical trends. Therefore, imperial rivalries and dynastic ambitions suffice to 
explain most part of the postwar situation in the Middle East and thereby gave 
enough clue for the origins of the Cold War in that part of the world.  
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